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factional	warfare,	widespread	 accusations	 of	 corruption	 and	multiple	 Labor	 Party	
splits.	 Intertwined	within	 these	 issues	were	questions	of	democracy	and	oligarchy	
within	 the	 labour	 movement.	 To	 what	 extent	 should	 members	 control	 labour	
institutions?	Democracy	within	 unions	 and	parties	means	 control	 by	 the	ordinary	
members	and,	where	necessary,	their	accountable	representatives.	Oligarchy	sits	at	
the	 opposite	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum	 from	 democracy	 and	 entails	 organisational	






NSW	 Labor	 Party	 were	 oligarchies	 and	 became	 more	 oligarchical	 over	 time.	
Conversely,	 the	Miners	Federation	was	highly	democratic,	although	 it	 too	became	
less	democratic	over	time.	The	NSW	Labor	Party	was	an	 interconnected	oligarchy,	
both	influencing	and	influenced	by	its	affiliated	trade	unions.	These	influences	were	





Oligarchy	 predominated	 in	 the	 AWU	 and	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 but	 it	 was	 always	
contested.	Countervailing	tendencies	against	oligarchy	were	continuously	operating	
in	 some	 form,	 even	 when	 the	 organisations	 were	 at	 their	 least	 democratic.	 My	
analytical	 framework	 comes	 from	 the	 sociological	 literature	 on	 trade	 union	 and	
political	party	democracy	and	I	compare	each	organisation’s	community,	rules,	local	
autonomy,	rank-and-file	decision-making,	 internal	opposition,	 free	communication	









































































and	Coles	have	 left	workers	worse	off	 than	 the	Award,	which	 is	meant	 to	be	 the	










not	 surprised	 by	 the	 current	 state	 of	 Australia’s	major	 political	 parties	 and	 trade	
unions.	I	now	believe	that	party	and	union	democracy	is	unusual	and	unlikely,	but	
still	 possible	 in	 some	 circumstances.	 Understanding	 these	 circumstances	 will	
sometimes	enable	us	to	create	democratic	organisations,	but	more	often	it	will	allow	
us	to	understand	that	democracy	in	a	particular	organisation	(like	the	HSU	or	SDA)	is	













































































The	 NSW	 labour	 movement	 was	 highly	 interconnected.	 Events	 inside	 one	 major	
organisation	 affected	 what	 happened	 inside	 the	 others.	 My	 study	 is	 therefore	




union	 oligarchy,	 while	 the	Miners	 Federation	was	 a	 democratic	 exception	 to	 the	
oligarchic	norm.	Both	unions	were	at	various	times	affiliated	and	not	affiliated	to	the	






or	 attempting	 to	 transpose,	 their	 own	methods	 into	 another	 organisation.	 But	 in	



















Democracy	means	 “rule	by	 the	people”	but	opinion	 varies	widely	 as	 to	what	 this	
popular	 rule	should	entail	and	the	extent	 to	which	the	people	should	 in	 fact	 rule.	
There	 are	 three	 main	 types	 of	 democracy:	 “participatory”,	 “direct”	 and	
“representative”.	In	a	participatory	democracy,	all	members	can	discuss	every	aspect	



















power	or	 rights,	 to	 systems	which	provide	 varying	degrees	of	minority	 rights	 and	
power	sharing.	The	AWU,	Miners	Federation	and	Labor	Party	all	promoted	strongly	



















ideal”,	 so	 assessing	 whether	 a	 country	 or	 organisation	 is	 democratic	 involves	

















In	 a	 “model”	 democratic	 labour	 organisation,	 local	 branches	 would	 form	 the	
foundations	 of	 the	 organisation	 and	 would	 be	 run	 as	 participatory	 democracies.	
Where	 appropriate,	 local	 braches	would	 consist	 of	 smaller	 “shopfloor”	workplace	
units.	At	 the	district	and	national	 level	as	many	decisions	as	practicable	would	be	
made	 by	 direct	 membership	 vote,	 and	 remaining	 decisions	 made	 by	 elected	
representatives	 who	 were	 as	 accountable	 as	 possible	 to	 the	 ordinary	 members	






organisations	 require	 efficient	 and	 effective	 leadership	 that	 can	 make	 difficult	














But	 leaders	can	also	make	bad	decisions.	And	 leaders	develop	their	own	 interests	
that	can	be	at	odds	with	the	interests	of	members.	Most	obviously,	the	leaders	want	
to	 maintain	 their	 positions	 and	 power.	 The	 increased	 efficiency	 provided	 by	
undemocratic	organisation	is	of	no	use	to	the	members	if	it	is	not	directed	towards	

















holding	 politicians	 accountable	 to	 their	 election	 promises.	 Furthermore,	 party	
memberships	 do	 not	 by	 definition	 need	 to	 be	 small,	 unrepresentative	minorities.	
Enhanced	party	democracy	could	cause	a	large	increase	in	membership.	Even	if	the	
















so	often	complained	of	within	socialist,	 social	democratic	and	 labour	parties,	 that	
initially	 reformist	 politicians	 will	 be	 corrupted	 into	 conservatism	 by	 their	 elite	
parliamentary	 lifestyle.	 Fully	 realised,	democratic	political	 parties	 could	 transform	
political	 life	 by	 empowering	 ordinary	 members	 and	 citizens	 to	 participate	 in	





as	 a	 general	 rule,	 high	 levels	 of	 democracy	 are	 good	 for	 an	 organisation	 and	 its	











This	 thesis	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 the	 period	 from	 1910	 to	 1939.	 Analysing	 the	
movement	over	three	decades	has	allowed	me	to	study	events	in	detail	while	also	
observing	larger	patterns	and	trends.	This	period	includes	some	big	world	events:	the	









of	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 an	 alliance	 of	 trade	 unions	 and	 local	 party	 branches	






most	 populous	 state	 in	Australia;	 in	 1925	 it	 had	 2.3	million	 out	 of	 Australia’s	 5.9	
million	people.	It	provided	an	even	larger	share	of	Labor	Party	members	as	it	had	the	


















around	 80	 per	 cent	 of	 mineworkers	 were	 Miners	 Federation	 members,	 giving	 it	
20,000	members	in	total.15	
	
The	 memberships	 of	 both	 the	 AWU	 and	 Miners	 Federation	 were	 based	 outside	
Sydney	in	rural	and	regional	areas	of	NSW.	It	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	these	
two	unions	do	not	represent	the	large	proportion	of	NSW	trade	unionists	who	lived	




successful	political	party	within	 the	NSW	 labour	movement.	For	 the	entire	period	



































and	 personal	 papers	 and	 memoirs.	 In	 the	 institutional	 archives	 rule	 books,	
conference	reports,	election	results	and	internal	inquiries	have	provided	the	basis	for	
exploring	 issues	 of	 democracy	 and	 oligarchy	 within	 the	 movement.	 I	 have	 then	





Miners	 Federation	 housed	 at	 the	 Noel	 Butlin	 Archives	 Centre	 at	 the	 Australian	
National	 University	 in	 Canberra.	 Unfortunately,	 there	 are	 few	 surviving	 official	
records	for	the	NSW	Labor	Party	in	my	period.	When	Lang	and	his	Inner	Group	lost	
control	 of	 the	 party	 in	 1939	 they	 stole	 the	 party	 records	 and	 they	 were	 never	
recovered.17	Fortunately,	however,	there	are	newspapers,	especially	the	Labor	Daily,	
Australian	Worker	and	Sydney	Morning	Herald,	which	provide	extensive	coverage	of	







searches	 and	 enabled	me	 to	 find	 useful	 information	 that	 I	would	 otherwise	 have	







following	 sections.	 Finally,	 biography	 and	 details	 of	 what	 it	 was	 like	 to	 work	 in	








all	 supposedly	 democratic	 voluntary	 organisations	 would	 inevitably	 become	
oligarchies	controlled	by	and	for	a	small	group	of	leaders.	He	reasoned	that	leaders	
will	govern	an	organisation	not	to	benefit	their	members	but	to	advance	their	own	










communication	with	members,	 they	 can	dominate	 the	organisation	and	entrench	
their	positions.19	He	mischievously	labelled	this	cycle	the	“iron	law	of	oligarchy”.	
	




members.	More	optimistically,	 however,	 the	Webbs	believed	 that	 it	was	 possible	
under	 some	 circumstances	 for	 ordinary	members	 to	 control	 officials,	 leaders	 and	
policy.20	More	recent	scholars	have	expanded	on	this	argument.	Richard	Hyman,	for	
example,	 argued	 from	a	Marxist	 perspective	 that	 “countervailing	 tendencies”	 can	
offset	 the	 propensity	 towards	 oligarchy.	 These	 countervailing	 tendencies	 include	
membership	 pressure	 on	 the	 leaders	 “from	 below”	 and	 ideological	 support	 for	
democracy	 amongst	 the	 leaders	 themselves.21 	Hyman’s	 analysis	 was	 couched	 in	
terms	of	the	different	class	interests	of	workers	compared	with	those	of	trade	union	
officials,	and	by	extension	 labour	party	 leaders,	who	occupy	distinct	places	 in	 the	
relations	of	production.	Alvin	Gouldner	argued	 that	 the	 iron	 law	of	oligarchy	only	
describes	 one	 half	 of	 a	 perpetual	 struggle	 between	 democracy	 and	 oligarchy,	
observing	that	if	“oligarchical	waves	repeatedly	wash	away	the	bridges	of	democracy,	
this	eternal	recurrence	can	happen	only	because	men	doggedly	rebuild	them	after	


































electoral	 competition,	 keeps	 members	 informed	 and	 interested,	 fosters	
























of	 sitting	 officials	 and	 enables	 opposition	 groups	 to	 communicate	 with	
members.28		





centralised	within	political	parties.	 In	addition	 to	Michels’	 “iron	 law	of	oligarchy”,	
Moisey	 Ostrogorski	 and	 Max	 Weber	 described	 a	 “caesaristic-plebiscitarian	
dictatorship”,	Maurice	Duverger	an	oligarchic	“inner	circle”,	and	Angelo	Panebianco	
a	“dominant	coalition”.29	From	the	mid-twentieth	century,	political	party	scholarship	
shifted	 away	 from	 the	 study	of	 political	 parties	 as	 organisations	 and	 towards	 the	
study	 of	 party	 systems	 and	 electoral	 politics.	 As	 Panebianco	 observed	 in	Political	
Parties:	Organisation	and	Power,	itself	now	more	than	a	quarter	of	a	century	old,	this	




















“relation	of	 influence”,	with	at	 least	some	degree	of	 reciprocity.	Both	Panebianco	







Where	 a	 party	 sits	 on	 this	 continuum	 depends	 on	 what	 Panebianco	 called	 the	
“substitutability”	 of	 “organisational	 incentives”,	 which	 are	 the	 inducements	 that	
motivate	people	to	become	party	members.	In	other	words,	the	extent	to	which	the	
leaders	can	“unbalance	 in	 their	own	favour	 the	exchanges	with	 the	rank	and	 file”	







distribute	 organisational	 incentives. 32 	I	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 substitutability	 of	
organisational	 incentives	 is	 one	 useful	 consideration	 in	 explaining	 internal	
governance	of	parties	and	unions	but	 that	 it	 is	often	overwhelmed,	either	by	 the	















the	 ideal	 that	 [they	 were]	 sent	 in	 to	 give	 effect	 to”. 33 	Furthermore,	 Labor	
governments	can	usually	argue	that	any	action	is	consistent	with	party	policy	as	that	
policy	 is	 “occasionally	 contradictory,	 frequently	 vague,	 rarely	 put	 in	 any	 order	 of	
priority	 and	 almost	 never	 tied	 to	 any	 specific	 timetable”.34	Childe	 concluded	 that	




Parties	 can	 certainly	 face	 difficulties	 in	 controlling	 their	 politicians	 and	 these	
difficulties	were	fully	expressed	within	the	ALP	in	Childe’s	period,	as	I	discuss	below.	




ability	 to	 embarrass	 and	 even	 expel	 uncooperative	 parliamentarians	 which,	
depending	on	the	circumstances,	will	often	be	a	powerful	sanction.	Through	party	
factions,	 extra-parliamentary	 groupings	 can	 exercise	 significant	 control	 over	 pre-
selections	 and	 the	 choice	 of	 parliamentary	 leader	 and	 cabinet	 ministers.	














the	 ordinary	 members.	 Robert	 McKenzie	 studied	 the	 British	 Labour	 Party	 in	 the	
period	from	1900	until	1964	and	maintained,	 in	 line	with	Michels,	 that	despite	 its	
democratic	constitution	the	party	was	in	fact	an	oligarchy.	For	McKenzie,	ordinary	
members	were	 of	 “little	 importance”	 in	 “an	 analysis	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 power	
within	the	party”	which	was	controlled	by	the	parliamentary	leaders	in	coalition	with	
some	 of	 the	 trade	 union	 leaders.38 	Samuel	 Beer	 countered	 that	 what	 McKenzie	
interpreted	 as	 oligarchy	 in	 the	 period	 1918-48	was	 in	 fact	 the	 result	 of	 “a	 broad	
consensus	 in	 the	 party	 on	 ideology,	 program	 and	 strategy”	 in	 which	 “all	 major	
elements	…	were	so	much	in	agreement”	that	“serious	questions	of	power	were	not	
raised”.39	Minkin	also	opposed	McKenzie,	arguing	that	while	“there	is	much	which	









affiliation	of	 trade	unions.41	Unions	pay	dues	 in	exchange	 for	authority	within	 the	
party	 in	 the	 form	of	 representatives	and	delegates	on	party	bodies.	This	power	 is	













example,	 unions	 formed	 the	 basis	 for	 factions	 which	 provided	 opposition	 to	 the	
sitting	 officials.	 Some	 unions	 such	 as	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 also	 imported	 their	
democratic	practices	into	the	party.	
	
Issues	 of	 identity	 and	 community:	 men	 and	 women,	 competing	 masculinities,	
localism	and	imagined	communities	
Issues	 of	 identity	 and	 community	 amongst	 union	 and	 party	members	 influenced	
oligarchy	 and	democracy	within	 all	 three	organisations.	While	 the	AWU	excluded	
women	from	almost	all	areas	of	union	life,	the	Miners	Federation	gradually	increased	
the	 role	of	women,	particularly	 through	 the	Women’s	Auxiliaries	 in	 the	1930s.	 In	




party	 early	 on.	 In	 chapter	 seven	we	will	 see	 that,	 unlike	 in	 the	AWU	and	Miners	
Federation,	 women	 successfully	 won	 a	 public	 role	 within	 the	 party	 in	 the	 early	
twentieth	century	and	helped	to	shape	it	from	the	local	branch	communities	up	to	
the	state	level.	Women	represented	the	party	at	Annual	Conference,	on	the	Central	
Executive	 and	 in	 the	 NSW	 Legislative	 Council	 and	 the	 party	 rules	 contained	
affirmative	action	provisions	for	women.	
	
Another	 relevant	 gender	 consideration	 is	 that	 the	 cultures	 of	 both	 the	AWU	and	
Miners	 Federation	 were	 influenced	 by	 competition	 between	 rival	 masculinities.	
Marilyn	 Lake	 argued	 that	 there	 was	 tension	 in	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 Australia	






















independent	 masculinity	 pervaded	 the	 pastoral	 station	 and	 shearing	 shed	 and	
created	a	culture	of	hierarchy	amongst	pastoral	workers	which	was	well-suited	to	
oligarchical	 AWU	 union	 leadership.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 AWU	 leaders	
presented	 themselves	 in	 the	 model	 of	 wealthy,	 responsible	 breadwinners,	
deliberately	distinguishing	themselves	from	the	ordinary	members	and	demanding	
obedience	 from	 them.	 Competing	 masculinities	 also	 influenced	 the	 miners.	 In	
chapter	 four	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 encouraged	 the	 responsible	


















key	 to	 the	 formation	 of	 national	 imagined	 communities,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	miners’	
national	newspaper,	Common	Cause,	was	one	of	the	key	facilitators	of	the	national	
mining	 community.	 Additional	 factors	 were	 shared	 entertainment	 and	 sport	
between	 regions,	 the	 national	 organisation	 of	 the	Women’s	 Auxiliaries	 and	 rising	
class	 consciousness	 in	 the	 1930s.	 State-wide	 “imagined	 communities”	 were	 also	
important	within	 the	AWU	and	NSW	Labor	Party	and	were	 similarly	 facilitated	by	







formed	government	 in	NSW	 in	1910.	 Excitement	quickly	 turned	 to	 frustration	 for	



















no	 significant	 spoils,	 but	 members	 did	 expect	 to	 gain	 materially	 in	 the	 form	 of	
improved	wages	and	employment	conditions	implemented	by	Labor	governments.	
The	 labour	movement	 was	 split	 ideologically	 between	 what	 subsequent	 scholars	
have	 called	 “labourism”	 on	 one	 side,	 and	 various	 forms	 of	 socialism	 and	 anti-
capitalism	on	the	other.	Labourism	was	a	reformist	ideology	which	held	that	strong	




Tariffs	 would	 protect	 Australia’s	 manufacturing	 industry,	 thereby	 protecting	 its	
employees’	 jobs,	wages	 and	 conditions.	 A	 “White	Australia”	would	 prevent	Asian	
workers,	who	often	accepted	poor	pay	and	conditions,	from	driving	down	wages	and	
conditions	 for	 white	 Australians.	 More	 conservative	 labourists	 advocated	 reform	
through	 political	 action	 and	 arbitration,	 while	 more	 militant	 labourists	 also	






















States-based	 Industrial	 Workers	 of	 the	 World	 (IWW)	 began	 to	 organise	 within	
Australian	unions.	The	anti-capitalist	IWW	argued	that	the	interests	of	workers	and	
employers	were	irreconcilable.	It	advocated	the	formation	of	One	Big	Union	(OBU)	
for	 all	 workers,	 controlled	 by	 the	 rank	 and	 file.	 Once	 organised,	 the	 OBU	would	
overthrow	 capitalism	 through	 a	 general	 strike.53	In	 December	 1916,	 twelve	 IWW	
members	were	 jailed	 for	 seditious	conspiracy.	Many	within	 the	 labour	movement	


















1921.	 Its	 judicial	 inquiry	 into	 the	 case	 had	 found	 multiple	 problems	 with	 the	







unionists,	 the	 failed	 strike	 demonstrated	 the	 need	 for	 greater	 trade	 union	
organisation	and	direction	from	above.	For	example,	Albert	Willis,	Secretary	of	the	
Miners	Federation,	had	known	that	 the	miners’	position	was	weak,	and	had	 tried	
unsuccessfully	 to	 prevent	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	 General	 Strike.	 These	 more	
militant	unionists	began	organising	for	the	creation	of	OBU.	Their	OBU	would	break	
down	 traditional	 craft	 unionism	by	organising	workers	by	 industry	 rather	 than	by	
trade.	This	would	prevent	employers	from	pitting	one	trade	against	another	within	
an	 industry.	Willis	and	 Jock	Garden,	NSW	Labor	Council	Secretary	and	 leader	of	a	
group	 of	 radical	 union	 leaders	 known	 as	 the	 “Trades	 Hall	 Reds”,	 led	 this	 OBU	
movement.	Unlike	the	radical	 IWW	which	had	conceptualised	the	OBU,	Willis	and	
Garden	did	not	reject	political	action	or	compulsory	arbitration.	They	also	favoured	

































trade	 union	 organisation	 and	 in	 1928	 refused	 to	 affiliate	 with	 the	 newly-formed	
Australasian	 Council	 of	 Trade	 Unions	 (ACTU).60	AWU	 leaders	 were	 jealous	 of	 the	
ACTU’s	position	as	 the	nation’s	 largest	union	organisation	and	did	not	want	to	be	
supplanted	by	a	 rival	national	union	body.	Furthermore,	 the	OBU	and	ACTU	were	
organised	 by	 the	 AWU	 leaders’	 factional	 enemies	 and	 the	 bodies	 had	 ties	 to	













for	 revolutionary	 ideas	 amongst	 its	members	 and	officials,	 the	Miners	 Federation	
took	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 this	 increasingly	militant	 section	 of	 the	 labour	movement.	
When	 the	 new	party	 proved	 ineffective,	 in	November	 1920	 the	 Trades	Hall	 Reds	

















He	worked	 as	 an	 accountant’s	 clerk	 and	 then	 as	 a	 real	 estate	 agent	 and	became	
independently	wealthy.	Lang	was	active	in	the	Labor	Party	from	the	early	twentieth	
century	and	entered	politics	when	he	won	the	state	seat	of	Granville	 for	Labor	 in	
1913.	 He	 had	 no	 real	 experience	 or	 connection	 with	 trade	 unions	 or	 the	 labour	
movement.	 Serious,	 ruthless	 and	 ambitious,	 Lang	 rarely	 smiled	 and	 had	 no	 close	



































Annual	 Conference	 rather	 than	 Caucus	 to	 maintain	 his	 leadership.66	In	 1926	 the	
militant	 faction	 controlled	 a	 Special	 Conference	 and	 confirmed	 Lang	 as	 the	
parliamentary	 leader	 for	 the	 life	 of	 the	 current	 parliament.	 This	 radical	 change	
removed	the	politicians’	right	to	choose	their	leader,	and	began	what	his	opponents	
called	 the	 “Lang	dictatorship”.	 The	party	 split	 in	1927,	 this	 time	over	 the	militant	
faction’s	 proposed	 1927	 Rules	 which	 introduced	 a	 group	 system	 of	 party	
organisation.	Opponents	within	and	outside	the	party	labelled	them	the	“Red	Rules”,	





it	 was	 an	 egalitarian	 and	 internally	 democratic	 movement.	 Control	 by	 ordinary	
members,	usually	termed	“rank-and-file	control”,	was	central	to	its	stated	ideology.69	
All	 leading	 figures	within	 the	movement	 claimed	 to	 support	 the	position	 that	 the	
ordinary	 members	 should	 have	 as	 much	 control	 of	 labour	 institutions	 as	 was	
practically	possible.	The	extent	to	which	the	leaders	actually	believed	in	membership	
control	 varied,	 and	 was	 generally	 less	 than	 they	 claimed.	 As	 we	 will	 see,	 the	
authoritarian	and	oligarchic	behaviour	of	the	AWU	leaders	within	their	own	union	
and	within	the	Labor	Party	reveals	a	weak	commitment	to	internal	democracy.	The	



















the	 Trade	 Union	 Secretaries	 Association	 (TUSA)	 was	 a	 key	 site	 of	 pro-Lang	
organising.72	Lang’s	prestige	was	so	great	that	he	was	able	to	defy	expulsion	by	the	
Federal	ALP	 in	1931	and	continue	as	 leader	of	 “Lang	 Labor”,	which	 remained	 the	
dominant	labour	party	in	NSW.	There	had	been	long-running	hostility	between	the	
federal	 and	 NSW	 ALP	 but	 the	 immediate	 cause	 of	 the	 split	 was	 disagreement	
between	the	Federal	ALP	government’s	conservative,	deflationary	response	to	the	











involvement	 unparalleled	 in	 the	 party’s	 history”.74	The	 units	 were	 a	 reflection	 of	









organised,	 radical	 faction	within	 the	 party	which	 controlled	 the	 election	 of	many	
branch	officers	and	Annual	Conference	delegates.75	Many	in	the	ruling	Inner	Group	















the	 unions	 blocked	 Lang’s	 takeover.79 	The	 Inner	 Group	 now	 consisted	 of	 Lang’s	






















much	 noted	 but	 little	 analysed	 by	 historians.	 This	 thesis	 is	 the	 first	 book-length	
analysis	of	democracy	and	oligarchy	within	the	NSW	labour	movement	in	this	period	
and	 the	 first	 chapter-length	 analysis	 for	 each	 organisation.	 There	 has	 been	 little	







Historians	 agree	 that	 trade	 union	 leaders	 were	 the	 most	 powerful	 extra-
parliamentary	 actors	 within	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party. 82 	Furthermore,	 historians	
recognise	 that	 union	 leaders’	 power	 within	 the	 party	 came	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	
positions	of	dominance	within	their	unions.83	In	the	1960s	Irwin	Young	and	Miriam	





my	 approach.	 He	 focused	 on	 union	 participation	within	 the	 Labor	 Party	 and	 also	



















NSW	 Labor	 Party	 based	 its	 party	 and	 local	 branch	 structure	 on	 “the	 urban	 craft	
unions,	 or	 maritime,	 coal	 mining	 and	 other	 unskilled	 unions”	 which	 all	 shared	 a	


















Markey	 noted	 that	 the	 history	 of	 the	 AWU	 between	 1880	 and	 1900	 “confirms	
Michels’	thesis”90	and,	in	her	review	of	Mark	Hearn	and	Harry	Knowles’	history	of	the	









are	 the	 historiography’s	 only	 engagement	 with	 the	 extensive	 international	







50	 years	 of	 its	 history	 the	 AWU	 changed	 from	 a	 federal	 oligarchy	 to	 a	 collegial	
oligarchy	 to	 a	 simple	 official	 hierarchy.	 The	 union	 possessed	 none	 of	 the	 seven	
requirements	 for	 trade	 union	 democracy.	 In	 chapter	 one	 I	 argue	 that	most	 AWU	
members	 did	 not	 form	 strong	 occupational	 communities,	 the	 union’s	 rules	 were	
undemocratic	and	 there	was	a	 large	gap	 in	status	and	skills	between	officials	and	
ordinary	members.	 In	 chapter	 two	 I	 show	 that	 the	 union	 had	 low	 levels	 of	 local	








1. The	 pastoral	 industry’s	 scattered	 and	 itinerant	 rural	workers	 did	 not	 form	
lasting	communities	and	were	overly	reliant	on	official	union	communication.	
2. The	 aspirational,	 competitive	 and	 hierarchical	 elements	 of	 the	 AWU’s	
workplace	culture	made	it	well-suited	to	authoritarian	leadership.	









AWU	 affiliation	 with	 the	 Labor	 Party	 had	 mixed	 effects	 on	 the	 union’s	 internal	
governance.	 On	 the	 democratic	 side,	 factional	 opponents	 within	 the	 Labor	 Party	
publicised	the	AWU	leaders’	undemocratic	behaviour.	On	the	anti-democratic	side,	
however,	affiliation	gave	AWU	officials	power	and	prestige	within	the	Labor	Party	
which	 further	 exacerbated	 the	 status	 gap	 between	 members	 and	 officials.	




conscription	 plebiscite.	 The	 AWU	 and	 its	 Worker	 newspapers	 strongly	 opposed	









Chapters	 four,	 five	 and	 six	 focus	 on	 the	 Miners	 Federation.	 In	 chapter	 four	 I	
investigate	why	 the	Miners	 Federation	was	 democratic	 by	 comparing	 it	 with	 the	
AWU.	 The	 Miners	 Federation	 possessed	 six	 out	 of	 the	 seven	 requirements	 for	
democracy;	it	had	a	strong	occupational	community,	democratic	rules,	high	levels	of	
local	autonomy	and	membership	decision-making,	internal	organised	opposition	and	





possess	 was	 equality	 between	members	 and	 officials.	 Miners	 Federation	 leaders	
enjoyed	high	pay	and	celebrity	status	within	mining	communities.	
	
I	 argue	 that	 in	 the	 cultures	 of	 both	 the	 AWU	 and	Miners	 Federation	 there	were	
tensions	between	solidarity	and	egalitarianism	on	the	one	hand	and	aspirationalism,	
competitiveness	 and	 hierarchy	 on	 the	 other.	 In	 the	 AWU	 aspirationalism,	
competitiveness	 and	 hierarchy	 prevailed	 and	 led	 the	 union	 down	 the	 path	 to	













mid-1920s,	 and	 privileged	 political	 action	 over	 industrial	 action,	 this	 encouraged	
membership	 passivity.	 The	 absorption	of	 the	Miners	 Federation’s	Common	Cause	
newspaper	 into	 the	 Labor	Party’s	Labor	Daily	 also	 reduced	 the	utility	of	Common	










1915.	 To	 build	 a	 national	 miners’	 community,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 needed	 to	
overcome	 localism	 and	 it	 did	 so	 by	 creating	 an	 imagined	 community	 of	 miners	
through	 the	 national	 newspaper	 Common	 Cause,	 class	 consciousness,	 shared	






strike.	 We	 will	 see	 the	 complexities	 of	 Miners	 Federation	 democracy	 in	 action.	
Central	leadership,	a	national	mining	community	and	working-class	solidarity	chafe	
against	 local	 community,	 local	 autonomy,	 membership	 decision-making	 and	





























Within	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party,	 local	 branch	 autonomy	 and	 membership	 decision-
making	declined	and	only	a	minority	of	branches	had	strong	enough	communities	to	
resist.	 In	 chapter	 nine	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 so-called	 “Lang	 dictatorship”	 enhanced	
democracy	by	establishing	effective	extra-parliamentary	control	over	the	politicians	
for	the	first	time	in	the	party’s	history.	By	the	mid-1930s,	however,	the	increasing	









methods	and	cultures	 into	 the	party.	But	sometimes	 the	oligarchical	AWU	and	 its	
Australian	Worker	newspaper	actually	enhanced	Labor	Party	democracy	by	providing	



























became	 more	 oligarchical	 as	 the	 interwar	 period	 progressed.	 Even	 the	 Miners	
Federation’s	 democracy	 declined	 somewhat,	 especially	 under	 the	 Communist	





















contextual	 factors	 that	 allowed	 the	 AWU	 to	 become	 and	 remain	 an	 oligarchical	
union.	
	
The	 sociological	 literature	 identifies	 seven	 key	 requirements	 for	 trade	 union	
democracy:	 democratic	 rules,	 a	 close-knit	 occupational	 community,	 internal	
organised	 opposition,	 local	 autonomy,	 membership	 decision-making,	 equality	
between	 officials	 and	 members	 and	 free	 communication.	 These	 requirements	
provide	a	useful	framework	for	analysing	democracy	and	oligarchy	within	the	AWU,	
which	 did	 not	 possess	 any	 of	 the	 seven.	 This	 chapter	 focuses	 on	 the	 AWU’s	
occupational	community,	 rules	and	equality	between	officials	and	members	while	




contextual	 elements	 continued	 to	 allow	 for	 its	 persistence	 and	 development	
throughout	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century.	Time	and	again	we	will	see	how	
the	aspirational	and	hierarchical	elements	of	the	AWU’s	founding	ethos,	the	pastoral	














Shearers	 in	 the	 south-eastern	 state	of	Victoria	 founded	 the	Australasian	 Shearers	




annual	 convention	 and	 executive	 council.	 By	 the	 twentieth	 century	 the	 AWU	
published	the	Australian	Worker	newspaper	 in	Sydney,	the	NSW	state	capital,	 the	
Worker	 in	 Queensland	 and	 the	 Westralian	 Worker	 in	 Western	 Australia.	 These	
newspapers	were	widely	read	by	AWU	members	and	the	general	public.4	
	
By	1910	 there	were	 two	AWU	branches	 in	NSW.	Both	primarily	 enrolled	pastoral	
workers	 with	 the	 Bourke	 Branch	 covering	 western	 NSW	 and	 the	 Central	 Branch	
covering	 the	rest	of	 the	state.5	In	1913	the	annual	convention	retitled	 the	Bourke	














































































1918	 to	 1926	 in	 which	 this	 “old	 guard”	 and	 “their	 henchmen”	 did	 not	 “score	 a	








reformists	 who	 advocated	 modifications	 of	 the	 existing	 political	 and	 economic	










There	 was	 always	 a	 radical	 minority	 of	 officials	 and	 members	 who	 opposed	
arbitration.	Within	 the	 AWU	 and	 the	wider	 labour	movement	militant	 reformists	
promoted	strikes	and	radicals	worked	to	overthrow	capitalism.21	Militant	members	
























































rest	 of	 the	 branches	 combined.	 Its	 Secretary	 Clarrie	 Fallon	 used	 this	 massive	
membership	to	govern	the	union	 in	an	unofficial	dictatorship.	By	1932	NSW	AWU	
membership	 had	 collapsed	 from	 35,000	 to	 5,000,	 primarily	 due	 to	 the	 Great	
Depression.25	Fallon	blamed	Bailey	and	the	other	NSW	leaders	for	the	severity	of	the	
membership	decline,	the	union’s	political	isolation	from	Lang	Labor	and	the	growing	




At	 the	1938	NSW	Branch	election	Bailey	made	a	 surprise	 comeback	and	won	 the	
presidency.	 This	 reflected	 the	 members’	 growing	 anti-Lang	 sentiment	 and	
resentment	of	federal	AWU	domination,	and	perhaps	some	nostalgia	for	the	1910s	
and	 1920s	 when	 Bailey	 reigned	 supreme	 in	 the	 NSW	 AWU.	Many	 of	 his	 former	
enemies	 and	 critics	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 labour	movement	 praised	 Bailey	 as	 a	
returning	anti-Lang	hero.	The	SMH	editorialised	that	“Mr	Bailey's	battle	against	the	
Langist	challenge	and	the	Communist	 influence	…	was	Homeric”.26	But	the	federal	





















branches”,	 power	 was	 by	 necessity	 centralised	 and	 the	 branch	 officers	 had	 “an	
incalculable	advantage	over	the	ordinary	working	members	who	can	only	be	known	
as	 a	 rule	 to	 their	 actual	workmates	 in	 a	 limited	 area”.	 Thus	 “the	majority	 of	 the	
delegates	to	the	annual	convention	are	organisers	or	other	employees	even	more	






First,	 the	 increasing	 tendency	 towards	 “larger	 unions	 spread	 over	 a	 number	 of	
localities”	 which	 meant	 that	 “the	 opportunity	 for	 old	 craft-style	 participatory	
democracy	based	on	small	localised	union	membership	was	receding”.	Second,	the	




I	 follow	 Childe	 and	 Markey	 and	 highlight	 the	 AWU’s	 scattered	 membership,	
centralised	constitution	and	devotion	to	arbitration	as	explanations	of	the	union’s	
oligarchy.	 I	 expand	 on	 their	 analysis,	 in	 particular	 demonstrating	 additional	 anti-






























majority	 were	 either	 rural	 “bushworkers”	 such	 as	 shearers,	 farm-hands,	 rabbit-
trappers,	sugarcane	cutters	and	fruit	pickers	or	“navvies”,	short	for	navigators,	who	





















The	shearers	worked	together	all	day	 in	 the	burning	hot	sheds,	shouting	over	 the	
screaming	 of	 the	 shearing	machines	 and	 the	 bleating	 of	 scared	 sheep.	 Originally	
shearers	used	blade	shears	similar	to	 large	scissors	but	 from	the	1880s	they	were	










your	 back	 is	 so	 stiff	 it	 takes	 a	 good	 while	 and	 a	 lot	 of	 determination	 to	
straighten	up	to	a	normal	position.	Most	shearers	end	up	with	crook	backs.34	
Adding	 to	 the	 heat	 was	 the	 steam	 engine	 which	 powered	 the	 machine	 shears.	



































strong,	 stable	 occupational	 communities. 39 	The	 roving	 nature	 of	 shearing	 was,	
however,	conducive	to	the	spread	of	unionism	and	helps	to	explain	how	the	shearers’	
unions	 grew	 so	 quickly	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century.	 Unlike	 shearers,	 other	
bushworkers	 rarely	 worked	 together	 in	 significant	 numbers.	 Scattered	 across	















work	 too	was	 short-term	 and	 itinerant	which	 prevented	 the	 formation	 of	 lasting	
occupational	communities.41	William	Morrow	was	an	AWU	navvy	on	the	Queensland	
railways	 in	the	early	 twentieth	century.	He	recalled	that	 the	navvy	was	“the	most	
loyal	of	men”.42	They	worked	hard	 clearing	 land,	digging	 roads	and	 laying	 railway	
tracks	for	48	hours	per	week.	The	work	was	all	manual	with	pick,	shovel,	hammer	
and	drill;	the	best	assistance	a	navvy	could	hope	for	was	explosives	and	a	horse	and	























































unionists	 and	 solidarity	 in	 defeat	 during	 the	 1890s	 strikes	 long	 remained	 the	
mythological	glue	that	united	the	union.	49		
	
















The	 AWU’s	 masculinity	 was	 based	 on	 the	 “gun”	 shearer	 who,	 with	 his	 physical	
strength	 and	 skill,	 demanded	 high	 wages	 for	 hard	 work	 and	 maintained	 his	
independence	and	autonomy.	This	was	in	keeping	with	some	aspects	of	what	Russell	
Ward	famously	described	as	the	“Australian	Legend”;	the	qualities	of	the	mythical	
“typical	 Australian”	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century.	 He	 was	 “quick	 to	 decry	 any	
appearance	of	affectation	in	others”,	“a	great	'knocker'	of	eminent	people”	unless	



















Bravery	 and	 physical	 and	 mental	 strength	 were	 also	 key	 components	 of	 AWU	






what	 danger	 he	 was	 in.	 The	 shearers	 and	 shedhands	 fled	 because	 they	 knew	
better”.53	This	respect	for	bravery	(or	stupidity)	in	the	face	of	danger	exemplifies	the	








their	 moneybelts	 strapped	 under	 their	 shirts”.54	The	 AWU	 ethos	 sat	 somewhere	
between	 these	 two	extremes.	Where	 it	diverged	 from	Ward’s	“typical	Australian”	
was	 in	 the	 prevailing	 attitude	 to	 work.	 While	 capable	 of	 great	 exertion	 in	 an	







Within	 the	 AWU	 ethos	 there	 were	 contradictory	 impulses	 towards	 egalitarian	









unionists,	 men	 over	 women,	 whites	 over	 non-whites. 56 	As	 the	 bushworkers	 felt	
increasingly	 marginalised	 following	 the	 strike	 defeats	 of	 the	 1890s,	 they	 were	
desperate	to	distinguish	themselves	from	other	marginalised	non-white	workers	and	
women	and	maintain	their	position	in	the	hierarchy	above	these	“inferior”	groups.57	













Sheep	 occupied	 a	 paradoxical	 position	 on	 the	 station.	 They	 were	 completely	
powerless	 and	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 but	 they	 also	 symbolised	 the	
pastoralist’s	authority.	If	shearers	were	unhappy	with	the	owner	they	could	take	it	
out	on	his	sheep.	Smith	recalled	an	owner	warning	him:	“take	your	eye	off	a	shearer	
and	he’ll	have	his	knee	 in	the	groin	of	a	wether	 just	 for	the	pleasure	of	hearing	 it	
grunt.	He’ll	half	break	its	bloody	neck	just	because	its	mine	and	I	am	what	I	am	see?”61	
Sheep	were	treated	as	property	but	there	was	also	the	acknowledgement,	at	least	


















In	 addition	 to	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 the	 pastoral	 station,	 there	 was	 also	 an	 accepted	
hierarchy	 amongst	 the	 unionists	 themselves.	 The	 well-paid	 shearers	 considered	
themselves	“bushworker	aristocrats”	and	lived	and	ate	in	their	own	accommodation	
with	their	own	cook.	Below	them	were	the	station	hands	and	shedhands	who	were	
fed	 and	 housed	 separately	 and	 at	 the	 bottom	 were	 Aboriginal	 workers,	 a	 small	
number	of	whom	were	AWU	members.62	Shearers	looked	down	on	shedhands	and	
often	 treated	 them	 badly.	 Shedhand	 Phil	 Mowbray	 complained	 that	 shearers	
employed	double	 standards,	 condemning	 shedhands	who	worked	with	non-union	
shearers	 as	 “scabs”	 but	 then	 working	 with	 non-union	 shedhands	 themselves. 63	












A	 clear	 pecking	 order	 existed	 amongst	 the	 shearers	 themselves,	 from	 the	 “gun”	










shorn,	 14s	 per	 100	 in	 1889,	which	 facilitated	 sports-like	 competition.67	Each	man	
strived	 to	be	 the	 first	 to	100	 sheep	 in	 a	day	or,	 for	 the	best	 shearers	 in	 the	best	





“men	 continually	 need	 to	 seek	 approval	 of	 their	 masculinity	 from	 other	 men”,	






























perfectly	 suited	 to	 top-down	 oligarchical	 union	 leadership.	 Leaders	 took	 their	
position	at	the	top	of	the	pile	with	political	and	legal	power	to	rival	the	pastoralist.	
The	 fact	 that	 many	 AWU	 leaders	 became	 Labor	 parliamentarians	 and	 Cabinet	
Ministers	was	inspirational	to	bushworkers.	AWU	leaders	had	begun	as	shearers	and	
had	bettered	themselves	to	become	part	of	the	ruling	elite.	The	process	by	which	
shearers	 became	 AWU	 officials	 also	 made	 them	 well-suited	 to	 become	 union	
oligarchs.	Officials	began	as	union	organisers	and	for	a	man	to	do	this	work	effectively	
he	needed	to	be	tough	with	both	words	and	fists.	Most	early	organisers	travelled	the	
vast	 distances	 between	 pastoral	 stations	 alone	 on	 foot	 or	 bicycle.	 The	 organiser	
would	turn	up	at	a	pastoral	station	and,	assuming	he	could	talk	or	force	his	way	past	
the	 pastoralist	 and	 his	 jackaroos,	 would	 begin	 the	 process	 of	 signing	 up	 new	
members	and	chasing	up	existing	members	for	their	union	dues.	This	work	required	
a	combination	of	charisma	and	 intimidation.	When	these	organisers	 later	became	



















The	 AWU	 newspapers,	 always	 more	 radical	 than	 most	 members	 and	 officials,	
encouraged	the	elements	of	egalitarianism	and	solidarity	 in	the	union’s	ethos	and	









shedhands.	 The	AWU	newspapers	 also	 acknowledged	 that	many	members	 either	













union	 information	 and	 therefore	 in	 a	 weak	 position	 to	 resist	 the	 oligarchy.	
Furthermore,	voting	numbers	suggest	the	majority	of	members	were	uninterested,	
as	Michels	would	predict.	Even	with	postal	voting	and	ballot	papers	printed	in	the	
Worker	 newspapers,	 overall	 participation	 in	 both	 the	 Central	 Branch	 and	 RWIB	
elections	 only	 peaked	 at	 around	 25	 per	 cent. 79 	In	 1925	 an	 AWU	 workplace	
representative	wrote	 to	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 blaming	 the	 “apathy	 and	 indifference	 of	







members	who	worked	and	 lived	 in	 strong	occupational	 communities.	 These	were	
most	likely	to	develop	where	a	significant	number	of	members	settled	in	the	same	
place	for	an	extended	period.	AWU	members	at	Port	Kembla	in	Wollongong	provide	
a	useful	 case	 study.	 	The	 local	press	 referred	 to	 the	Pork	Kembla	“branch”	of	 the	
AWU,	but	it	was	actually	a	section	of	the	Central	Branch.	The	Port	Kembla	members	

























local	 Port	 Kembla	 leader	 John	 Mathews	 stood	 against	 Bailey	 for	 Central	 Branch	
President	but	his	local	popularity	was	not	enough	to	win	the	state-wide	ballot.86	In	
addition	 to	 the	 Port	 Kembla	 members,	 four	 groups	 of	 railway	 workers,	 AWU	
timberworkers	 and	 AWU	 Nepean	 Dam	members	 declared	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 1927	
Rules.87	These	were	all	groups	of	members	who	worked	and	lived	with	one	another	




At	 first	 glance	 the	 AWU	 appeared	 to	 be	 a	 representative	 democracy.	 Members	
directly	 elected	 their	 branch	 executive,	 annual	 convention	 delegates	 and	 federal	
executive	 council	 members	 in	 an	 annual	 postal	 ballot.	 This	 appearance	 was	
deceptive,	however,	as	a	series	of	undemocratic	rules	undermined	the	legitimacy	of	
elections.	As	part	of	 the	 registration	process,	arbitration	courts	had	 the	power	 to	
disallow	union	 rules	 that	were	 tyrannical	or	oppressive	or	 contrary	 to	 law	and	 to	
order	the	union	to	obey	its	own	rules.88	This	was	very	limited	legislative	protection	















each	 of	 15	 local	 committees. 90 	Because	 of	 the	 AWU’s	 scattered,	 itinerant	
membership,	many	local	committees	failed	to	elect	a	representative	and	the	branch	
Executive	appointed	one	instead.91	The	power	of	office	allowed	the	sitting	officials	to	
further	 manipulate	 these	 appointments	 to	 their	 advantage	 by	 altering	 local	
committee	 boundaries,	 changing	 their	 own	 places	 of	 residence	 and	 packing	 local	
committee	meetings.92	The	Branch	Executive	also	appointed	replacements	 for	any	









Holloway,	 a	Victorian	AWU	convention	delegate,	 in	 the	Central	Branch	office	and	
then	 as	 an	 organiser.	 Opponents	 claimed	 this	 employment	was	 “in	 exchange	 for	
voting	to	close	the	[dissident]	Western	Branch”	in	1920.96	
	





























bar	 any	who	posed	 a	 genuine	 threat,	without	 providing	 any	 justification.	 In	 1924	
leading	BPG	member	John	Bowen	nominated	for	Central	Branch	president,	but	his	
name	 never	 appeared	 on	 the	 ballot	 paper	which	 stated	 that	 Bailey	 had	 been	 re-
elected	“unopposed”.	Buckland	eventually	informed	Bowen	that	in	the	opinion	of	the	
Branch	 Executive	 he	 did	 not	 “possess	 the	 necessary	 qualifications	 to	 fill	 the	
position”.101	
	
The	 AWU’s	 simple	 first-past-the-post	 voting	 system	 further	 favoured	 the	
incumbents.	The	candidate/s	with	the	highest	number	of	votes	were	elected	with	no	
preferences	 and	 no	 proportional	 representation.	 This	meant	 that	 the	well-known	
sitting	officials	did	not	need	majority	support	but	simply	more	votes	than	any	other	
individual	candidate.	The	officials	exacerbated	this	problem	by	having	their	allies	run	






















20	 Central	 Branch	 ballot,	 33	 out	 of	 34	 postal	 votes	 from	 “Elburn	 Wheat	 Yard”	



































branch.	 The	 union	 rules	 exacerbated	 this	 problem	 by	 outlawing	 electoral	
campaigning	and	canvassing.108	The	justification	for	this	was	that	election	campaigns	
would	be	divisive	and	would	give	an	unfair	advantage	to	candidates	with	superior	







Equality	 of	 salary,	 status,	 skill	 and	 education	 between	members	 and	 officials	 is	 a	
further	requirement	of	union	democracy.	There	is	a	historical	consensus	that	that	the	
AWU	 officials	 were	 “exceedingly	 well-paid”.	 110 	Some	 members	 at	 the	 time	 also	
complained	of	the	leaders’	high	salaries.111	This	was	in	stark	contrast	to	the	opinion	
of	 the	 officials	 themselves	 who	 often	 complained	 that	 they	 were	 poorly	 paid	
considering	 their	 hours	 and	 expenses. 112 	Some	 leading	 officials	 such	 as	 branch	
presidents	were	not	paid	at	all.	The	secretary	was	the	best	paid	position	in	a	branch	
and	 in	1911	 the	Central	Branch	 secretary	 received	£237	per	 annum	or	£4/12	per	
week	(double	the	minimum	wage)	while	an	average	shearer	who	sheared	90	sheep	


















officials	 received	 good	 salaries	 but	 they	 were	 not	 as	 extravagant	 as	 the	






The	 AWU	 oligarchs	 played	 on	 the	 aspirational	 and	 hierarchical	 elements	 of	 the	




working-class	 people,	 contempt	 and	 paternalism	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 professional-
managerial	class”.114	Officials	presented	themselves	tacitly	as	part	of	the	professional	
managerial	 class.	 Photographs	 in	 union	 publications	 featured	 the	 leaders	 in	





























The	 officials	 expressed	 these	 elitist	 views	 openly	 and	 clearly	 believed	 that	 the	















Ideas	 of	 masculinity	 within	 the	 AWU	 are	 also	 important	 here.	 As	 we	 saw	 in	 the	
introduction,	 Marilyn	 Lake	 argued	 that	 there	 was	 a	 tension	 in	 late	 nineteenth-
century	Australia	between	the	rival	masculinities	of	the	“responsible	domestic	man”	
and	 the	 larrikin,	 hedonistic	 “independent	 man”.	 By	 the	 1920s,	 the	 responsible	
domestic	 man	 had	 triumphed	 and	 responsible	 breadwinning	 was	 the	 dominant	
Australian	view	of	masculinity,	but	the	celebration	of	independent	masculinity	lived	
on	 amongst	 many	 workers.	 The	 AWU	 leaders	 in	 their	 suits	 fraternising	 with	
university-educated	 professionals	 were	 on	 the	 side	 of	 respectable,	 responsible	
breadwinning.	 They	were	 certainly	 no	hedonists	 and	Bailey,	 for	 example,	 proudly	
advocated	 teetotalism.119	This	 “respectability”	was	unacceptable	 to	 some	militant	
members	who	saw	it	as	proof	the	officials	had	“duchessed”	(sold	out)	to	the	ruling	
class. 120 	But	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 officials	 continually	 publicised	 photographs	 of	
themselves	in	suits	suggests	that	they	believed	respect	and/or	deference	was	a	more	
common	response	than	hostility	amongst	the	members	and	that	it	fit	well	with	the	










union	 was	 founded. 122 	When	 a	 leading	 official	 died	 it	 was	 common	 to	 call	 for	
donations	to	build	a	memorial	monument	in	his	honour.	AWU	buildings	were	also	















































Affiliation	with	 the	 ALP	 further	 exacerbated	 the	 status	 gap	 between	 officials	 and	
members	and	encouraged	union	officials	to	behave	oligarchically.	AWU	officials	often	
became	Labor	Party	officials	and/or	politicians,	even	Premiers	and	Prime	Ministers,	
















Both	 officials	 and	 members	 had	 minimal	 formal	 education.	 But	 the	 officials	
developed	skills	and	informal	education	on	the	job	that	created	a	significant	skill	and	





to	 the	 [arbitration]	 court”	 and	 developed	 skills	 similar	 to	 those	 of	 a	 lawyer. 128	
Members’	lack	of	understanding	of	the	complicated	arbitration	system	made	them	




Most	 AWU	members	 did	 not	 form	 strong	 occupational	 communities,	 the	 union’s	
















deliberately	 extend	 the	 status	 and	 skills	 gap	 between	 themselves	 and	 the	
membership.	The	union’s	 founding	constitution	either	contained	or	 facilitated	the	
development	 of	 a	 series	 of	 undemocratic	 rules	 and	 the	 arbitration	 system	made	
members	dependent	on	officials	and	further	undermined	participation	and	interest	
as	most	members	did	not	understand	the	complicated	arbitration	system	and	had	no	













campaign	 against	 the	 AWU	 leadership.	 One	 focus	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 internal	
opposition	within	the	AWU	from	individuals	and	groups	like	the	BPG.	We	see	that	
countervailing	 tendencies	 were	 constantly	 operating	 against	 oligarchy,	 chiefly	
through	 pressure	 from	 ordinary	members	 and	 support	 for	 democracy	 amongst	 a	
minority	of	leaders	such	as	Jack	Cullinan	and	Arthur	Rae.	We	also	see,	however,	that	
these	 tendencies	 towards	 democracy	 were	 not	 strong	 enough	 to	 overcome	 the	
foundations	of	AWU	oligarchy.	
	
This	 chapter	 analyses	 local	 autonomy,	 membership	 decision-making,	 internal	
organised	opposition	and	free	communication	within	the	AWU.	The	analysis	of	local	
branch	 autonomy	means	 that	 a	 key	 focus	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 how	 and	 why	 AWU	
oligarchy	changed	over	time	through	three	oligarchical	types;	from	an	organisation	
of	significant	branch	autonomy	to	one	of	centralised	national	control.	I	continue	my	
argument	 from	 the	 previous	 chapter	 and	 show	 how	 the	 AWU’s	 oligarchy	 was	






Most	 trade	 unions	 are	 oligarchies,	 but	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 oligarchies	 differs	
enormously	and	can	change	over	time.	It	is	therefore	surprising	that	little	work	exists	














system,	 externally	 appointed	 oligarchy	 and	 neo-classical	 oligarchy.	 I	 will	 focus	
primarily	on	federal	oligarchy,	collegial	oligarchy	and	simple	official	hierarchy	as	the	
AWU	moved	through	these	three	models	from	1886	to	1939.	A	federal	oligarchy	is	
one	 in	 which	 power	 is	 dispersed	 amongst	 autonomous	 regional	 branches,	 each	
controlled	 by	 independent	 rulers.	 In	 a	 collegial	 oligarchy	 power	 is	 shared	 equally	
amongst	a	central	group	of	leaders,	while	a	simple	official	hierarchy	is	dominated	by	
a	 single	 dictatorial	 leader.2	While	 acknowledging	 that	 “in	 practice	 there	must	 be	
considerable	variability	even	amongst	unions	approximating	one	model	fairly	well”,	
Edelstein	and	Warner	contend	 that	 the	simple	official	hierarchy	has	 the	“greatest	
potential	for	the	arbitrary	exercise	of	political	power	against	internal	dissidents”	and	
























oligarchy.	 The	 key	distinction	between	 the	 two	 is	 that	 in	 a	 collegial	 oligarchy	 the	
central	 authority	 controls	 the	 entire	 organisation	 while	 in	 a	 federal	 oligarchy	
branches	are	autonomous.	According	to	the	AWU	constitution,	AWU	branches	had	
no	 local	 autonomy	 and	 were	 completely	 subservient	 to	 the	 federal	 annual	
convention	and	executive	 council.	 This	 centralisation	was	 legally	 cemented	 in	 the	





to	 1000	 members	 two	 delegates	 and	 over	 1000	 members	 three	 delegates.	
Convention	delegates	also	elected	the	president,	two	vice-presidents,	treasurer	and	
secretary	and	set	the	salaries	of	all	federal	and	branch	officials.	The	executive	council	
was	 the	union’s	 highest	 authority	 between	 conventions	 and	 consisted	of	 the	 five	
officials	elected	at	convention	plus	one	representative	from	each	branch.4	
	
Despite	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	 AWU	 constitution,	 however,	 the	 union	 initially	
retained	 some	 of	 the	 features	 of	 a	 federal	 oligarchy.	 Paradoxically,	 the	 rules	
concentrated	 complete	 power	 in	 the	 federal	 annual	 convention	 and	 executive	
council	but	also	appeared	 to	give	branches	 significant	autonomy.	The	union	 rules	
gave	each	branch	“control	of	affairs	in	its	own	district”	with	which	other	branches	
could	“not	interfere	in	any	way”.	The	branches	also	managed	their	own	finances,	only	















federal	 oligarchy	 and	 closer	 to	 collegial	 oligarchy.	 This	 centralising	 process	 began	
before	the	commencement	of	compulsory	arbitration	in	NSW	in	1901	and	federally	
in	1904.	In	1891	the	Wagga	Wagga	branch	had	started	a	radical	newspaper	called	the	
Hummer.	Most	 officials	 from	 other	 branches	 worried	 that	 the	 radicalism	 of	 the	
Wagga	 officials	 and	 their	 newspaper	would	 alienate	 potential	 AWU	 allies.	 At	 the	
annual	 convention	 in	 February	 1892	 the	 neighbouring	 Goulburn	 Branch	 officials	
challenged	 their	 rival	Wagga	 counterparts	 over	 their	 use	 of	 union	money	 on	 the	
Hummer.7	This	 was	 the	 issue	 that	 would	 resolve	 the	 contradictions	 in	 the	 union	
constitution	with	regard	to	branch	autonomy.		
	





ideology	and	personal	 rivalries,	 the	 result	was	 to	expose	 the	 real	 limits	of	branch	
autonomy.8	
	
In	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century	 a	 conflict	 with	 a	 rival	 union	 within	 the	 newly-
established	 arbitration	 system	 caused	 power	within	 the	 AWU	 to	 become	 further	































members	 in	 the	relevant	state,	and	one	councillor	 from	each	branch	elected	by	a	
postal	vote	open	to	all	members	of	 that	branch.11	The	same	branch	officials	were	













in	 NSW	 when	 the	 Railway	Workers	 and	 General	 Labourers	 Association	 (RWGLA)	
joined	the	AWU	as	the	NSW	Railway	Workers	Industry	Branch	(RWIB).	The	following	
year,	 the	 Rockchoppers	 and	 Sewer	 Miners	 Union	 (RSMU)	 had	 merged	 into	 the	
RWIB.12	Prior	to	its	fusion,	the	RSMU	had	been	a	militant	union	that	advocated	job	
control	and	direct	action.	Less	militant,	the	RWGLA	had	still	been	willing	to	strike,	
and	had	 fostered	a	 strong	culture	of	membership	 involvement.	Once	 it	became	a	
branch	of	the	AWU,	however,	the	collegial	oligarchy	was	easily	able	to	stifle	militancy	





arbitration	 system’s	 facilitation	 of	 union	 oligarchy.	 Industrial	 judges	 deliberately	
altered	 jurisdictional	boundaries	 to	weaken	militant	unions,	allowing	conservative	




























assert	 their	 own	 branch	 autonomy	while	 simultaneously	 bringing	 the	 other	 NSW	
branches	increasingly	under	federal	control.	The	most	significant	example	of	central	
rule	 by	 the	 collegial	 oligarchy	 occurred	 in	 June	 1920	when	 the	 executive	 council	
merged	the	Western	Branch	into	the	Central	Branch	in	NSW,	thus	doubling	the	power	
and	 prestige	 of	 the	 Central	 Branch	 officials	 and	 eliminating	 the	Western	 Branch	
officials.15	The	executive	council	said	it	was	“of	the	opinion	that	by	closing	the	branch	
practically	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 administration	 expenses	 would	 be	 saved,	 and	 more	
effective	 and	 cohesive	 organisation	 created”.16	But	 this	 was	 really	 a	 coup	 by	 the	






conceived	 that	 his	 elimination	 could	 be	 effected	 by	 the	 abolition	 of	 the	
Western	Branch	office.17	
The	deposed	Western	Branch	leaders	were	not	part	of	the	ruling	group	and	had	been	
a	 constant	 source	 of	 opposition,	 radicalism	 and	 attempts	 to	 enhance	 union	
democracy. 18 	Secretary	 Jack	 Cullinan	 had	 also	 increasingly	 threatened	 Bailey	 in	
elections	 for	 the	 NSW	 representative	 on	 the	 executive	 council.19	One	 of	 the	 key	























some	 good	 work	 and	 made	 friends”. 24 	In	 1917	 he	 was	 elected	 Western	 Branch	
secretary	 when	 Arthur	 Blakeley	 left	 the	 position	 to	 enter	 the	 House	 of	
Representatives	for	Darling.25		
	





no	 paid	 official	 should	 be	 an	 annual	 convention	 delegate. 27 	The	 fact	 that	 the	
executive	council	could	use	such	blunt	suppression	against	Cullinan	and	the	Western	


















the	 domination	 of	 the	 Queensland	 Branch	 and	 its	 leader	 Fallon.	 The	 union’s	
centralised	constitution	allowed	Fallon	to	use	his	branch’s	massive	membership	to	
control	the	AWU	nationally.	By	1929	each	AWU	branch	sent	one	delegate	to	annual	








the	 AWU	 into	 a	 dictatorship	 (figure	 14).	 He	 was	 born	 about	 1890	 in	 Central	
Queensland,	son	of	an	Australian-born	shearer	who	participated	in	the	decade’s	big	
strikes.	A	strong	young	man	with	an	impressive	physique,	Fallon	left	school	at	a	young	
age	 to	 work	 in	 the	 transport,	 mining	 and	 pastoral	 industries.	 He	 enlisted	 in	 the	
Australian	Imperial	Force	in	1916	but	was	quickly	dismissed	due	to	poor	eyesight.	The	
following	 year	 he	was	 employed	 as	 a	municipal	worker	 and	 joined	 the	 AWU.	 He	














unapologetic	 elitist	who	was	 confident	 that	he	 knew	best	 and	 that	others	 should	
simply	obey.	He	ruled	the	AWU	through	fear,	openly	boasting	that	he	would	dismiss	






















anomalies	 and	 good	 points	 of	 the	 constitution”.34	Fallon	 and	 his	 allies	 were	 also	
unapologetically	 authoritarian;	 when	 NSW	 delegates	 complained	 about	 the	




The	 Queensland	 Branch	 controlled	 the	 annual	 convention	 but	 not	 the	 executive	
council	which	had	one	representative	from	each	state	and	one	representative	from	
each	branch.	It	seems	counterintuitive,	then,	that	Fallon	chose	to	control	the	union	








council	 was	 that	 if	 he	 did	 not	 get	 his	 way,	 he	 could	 wait	 until	 the	 next	 annual	
convention,	or	call	a	special	convention,	and	pass	a	resolution	to	force	the	executive	

























nationally.	 He	 blamed	 NSW	 leaders	 Bailey	 and	 Buckland	 for	 the	 union’s	 falling	
membership	and	political	isolation	in	that	state	and	set	about	eliminating	them	by	
combining	 the	 Central	 Branch	 and	 RWIB	 into	 one	 NSW	 Branch	 in	 1933. 40 	NSW	
delegates	strongly	opposed	the	fusion	but	there	was	nothing	they	could	do.41	The	
AWU	had	promised	the	RWGLA	 local	autonomy	when	 it	entered	the	union	as	 the	
RWIB	 in	 1916,	 but	 because	 the	 AWU’s	 centralised	 constitution	 gave	 the	 federal	
annual	convention	and	executive	council	unlimited	control	over	the	branches	they	






Completing	 the	 coup,	 the	 executive	 council	 failed	 to	 appoint	 any	 of	 the	 existing	
Central	Branch	or	RWIB	officials	to	administer	the	new	branch.	John	McNeill,	former	
Charleville	(Queensland)	and	Victoria	Branch	secretary	was	NSW	secretary,	and	RWIB	



















The	 AWU’s	 lack	 of	 local	 autonomy	 continued	 within	 each	 branch.	 The	 branch	
executive	 ran	 the	 branch	 and	 consisted	 of	 a	 president,	 two	 vice-presidents,	 a	
secretary	and	15	executive	members.	Until	 1914	 the	entire	branch	executive	was	
elected	 at	 the	 annual	 meeting	 of	 the	 branch.45 	Annual	 convention	 changed	 this	
system	because	most	of	the	widely	dispersed	members	could	not	attend	the	annual	
meeting	which	was	easily	stacked	by	the	sitting	officials.46	Henceforth	the	president,	
vice-presidents	 and	 secretary	were	 elected	 annually	 in	 a	 postal	 ballot	 open	 to	 all	
branch	members	while	each	branch	was	divided	into	15	sections	and	the	members	
in	 each	 section	 formed	 a	 local	 committee	 and	 elected	 a	 representative	 to	 the	
executive.47	The	establishment	of	local	committees	could	have	marked	the	beginning	
of	a	move	towards	local	autonomy	within	the	branches.	But	the	scattered,	itinerant	
membership	 was	 unable	 to	 participate	 and	 the	 local	 committees	 were	 poorly	




Some	 AWU	 worksites	 operated	 as	 local	 participatory	 democracies.	 Groups	 of	
shearers	 or	 navvies	 would	 elect	 a	 union	 representative	 (“rep”)	 and	 would	 make	
workplace	 decisions	 collectively.	 But	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 the	 AWU’s	 centralised	
constitution	meant	 that	 these	 local	participatory	democracies	had	no	power	over	
wider	union	issues	or	the	state-wide	and	nation-wide	elections.	The	fact	that	these	
local	 arrangements	 usually	 only	 lasted	 a	 few	months	 also	 limited	 their	 ability	 to	
organise	 or	 challenge	 the	 state	 and	 national	 leaders.	 The	 arbitration	 system’s	
industry-wide	 awards	 limited	 the	 possibility	 of	 local	 workplace	 negotiation	 or	 of	

























of	 employment	 which	 meant	 that	 the	 first	 union	 in	 a	 field	 was	 very	 difficult	 to	
displace.	This	lack	of	competition	reduced	the	need	for	unions	to	appeal	to	members	
by	satisfying	their	demands.	Furthermore,	preference	for	unionists,	and	compulsory	
unionism	 in	 some	 jurisdictions	 such	 as	Queensland	 from	1932,	 forced	workers	 in	
relevant	industries	to	join	the	AWU.	In	the	1930s	the	rival,	radical	PWIU	attempted	
to	 replace	 the	 AWU	 in	 the	 pastoral	 industry	 by	 operating	 outside	 the	 arbitration	
system	 but	 the	 AWU	 leaders	 cooperated	 with	 the	 pastoralists	 to	 defeat	 this	
challenge.50		
	
Most	 Australian	 unions	 including	 the	 AWU	 advocated	 and	 pursued	 compulsory	
unionism.	The	Australian	Worker	argued	“nothing	could	be	dearer	to	the	heart	of	
trade	unionists	than	the	recognition	of	their	right	to	say	that	they	will	not	work	with	















had	 no	 sanction	 with	 which	 to	 punish	 anti-democratic	 officials. 52 	In	 relation	 to	
political	parties,	Angelo	Panebianco	argued	that	the	ease	with	which	members	can	
leave	 the	party	 and	obtain	 the	 inducements	of	membership	elsewhere	 is	 the	 key	













all	party	members	to	be	a	member	of	 their	 trade	union.	For	example,	 in	1913	Mr	
Abigail	won	a	place	on	the	party’s	Central	Executive	as	a	league	representative	but	
he	was	removed	because	he	was	not	a	member	of	his	trade	union,	the	Typographical	
Association.	 Abigail	 said	 he	 and	 others	 had	 resigned	 from	 the	 Typographical	
Association	due	to	a	dispute	within	the	union	but	the	central	executive	ruled	that	this	




















Bird,	 a	 Lang	 loyalist	 and	 former	 Miners	 Federation	 official,	 refused	 to	 sign	 the	
rockchoppers’	award	for	the	RWIB	of	the	AWU.	Several	witnesses	claimed	Bird	had	






























“we	 cannot	 afford	 to	 have	 sections	 and	 factions	 within	 our	 ranks	 each	 fighting	
differently	to	the	other”.60	The	BPG	sent	a	long	list	of	reform	proposals	to	the	1925	
Annual	Convention	which	unsurprisingly	were	not	adopted	and,	in	a	typical	case	of	





















































a	 fraction	of	 the	AWU’s	membership	of	over	100,000,	before	disbanding	 in	1936.	
Andrew	Moore	argues	that	it	“lost	the	will	to	live”	and	that	its	leadership	came	to	
believe	 its	struggle	against	 the	AWU	and	Graziers	Association	was	bound	to	 fail.70	
That	 failure	was	based	on	the	simple	 fact	 that	the	PWIU	was	too	radical	 for	most	
AWU	members.	Those	AWU	members	who	were	interested	in	the	union’s	internal	
politics	may	not	have	been	happy	with	the	oligarchy	but	that	did	not	mean	they	were	





the	 RWIB.	 It	 collected	 membership	 dues	 from	 RWIB	 members	 and	 held	 £1	 per	
member	 in	 a	 fund	 to	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 AWU	only	 if	 it	made	 a	 series	 of	 democratic	




falsely	claimed	that	 the	Committee	had	“resulted	 from	efforts	of	an	alien	body	 in	



































the	 AWU	 claimed	 was	 a	 “bogus	 organisation”	 as	 it	 was	 seeking	 to	 replace	 an	





















Communication	within	 the	AWU	was	 tightly	controlled	by	 the	sitting	officials.	The	
Australian	Worker	was	the	main	avenue	for	official	communication	in	NSW	and	the	
leadership	governed	it	closely.	There	was	no	culture	of	debate	or	free	speech	within	
the	AWU	and	 the	union	 rules	openly	 stated	 that	 the	Australian	Worker	 could	not	
print	anything	that	contradicted	union	policy.79	Member	letters	critical	of	the	union	






over	 the	 Australian	 Worker.	 On	 the	 newspaper’s	 board	 of	 control	 were	 the	
secretaries	of	each	of	the	branches	in	which	the	newspaper	was	distributed,	Central,	
RWIB,	Victoria-Riverina,	Adelaide	and	Tasmania,	who	each	had	votes	on	the	board	in	



















Boote’s	 talent	 as	 a	 propagandist	 was	 doubly	 impressive	 because	 he	 was	 self-
educated.	Born	in	England	in	1865,	the	son	of	a	textile	dealer,	he	left	school	at	age	
ten	and	was	a	printer’s	apprentice.	He	loved	to	read	and	write	and	spent	much	of	his	
spare	 time	 in	 libraries	 educating	 himself.	Working-class	 liberalism	and	 the	 radical	
libertarianism	 of	 Charles	 Bradlaugh	 especially	 influenced	 Boote. 84 	In	 1889	 he	
migrated	to	Australia	and	worked	as	a	compositor	in	Brisbane	where	he	discovered	
socialism	and	was,	he	recalled,	“born	again”	as	a	radical	author	and	activist.	He	edited	
some	smaller	 labour	newspapers	 in	 the	1890s	and	 then	became	Brisbane	Worker	
editor	 in	 1902,	 thus	 beginning	 his	 lifelong	 connection	with	 the	 AWU.	 In	 1911	 he	


















His	 ideology	 was	 radical	 but	 gradualist	 and	 he	 opposed	 Communists	 and	
revolutionaries	whom	he	regarded	as	unnecessary	and	dangerous	within	Australia’s	
democratic	political	system.	His	internationalism	was	confined	to	white	workers	and	





AWU	 leadership	 occurred	 in	 1923.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 a	
conservative	faction	led	by	Bailey	and	the	NSW	AWU	leadership	controlled	the	NSW	
Labor	 Party	 executive	 and	 had	 engaged	 in	 increasingly	 authoritarian	 behaviour.	




























causes	 to	 which	 his	 masters	 were	 often	 vehemently	 opposed”. 90 	The	 BPG,	









































In	 addition	 to	 the	 Worker	 newspapers,	 AWU	 organisers	 were	 the	 other	 vital	
component	of	official	union	communication.	The	branch	secretary,	supervised	by	the	
branch	executive,	had	tight	control	over	the	organisers	who	were	union	employees	
who	 travelled	 their	 region	 collecting	 membership	 dues,	 enrolling	 and	 assisting	
members	 and	 organising	 the	 Labor	 vote	 in	 elections.	 In	 theory,	 branch	members	
elected	the	organisers	in	the	annual	ballot	but	in	practice	the	organisers	were	mostly	
allies	 of	 the	 secretary	 as	 he	 could	 sack	 them	 at	 any	 time	 and	 appoint	 as	 many	








commercial	 newspapers	 and	 other	 sources	 of	 information	 that	were	 often	 highly	
critical	 of	 the	 AWU	 oligarchs.	 AWU	workplace	meetings	 and	 individual	members	
















Furthermore,	 the	 bar	 on	 canvassing	 “against	 any	 candidate”	 in	 effect	 banned	
criticism	of	the	sitting	officials	around	election	time.	If	any	electoral	rival	had	used	





The	 AWU	 did	 not	 possess	 any	 of	 the	 seven	 requirements	 of	 union	 democracy	
identified	in	the	sociological	literature.	Most	of	the	union’s	members	did	not	form	
lasting	occupational	communities,	its	rules	were	undemocratic,	there	was	a	large	gap	
in	 status	 and	 skills	 between	 officials	 and	 ordinary	members,	 local	 autonomy	 and	




them	 and	 ultimately	 defeated	 them.	 The	 AWU	 experience	 accords	 with	Michels’	
expectations	 as	 the	members	were	unable	 to	 control	 their	 leaders	who	operated	
further	to	entrench	their	own	power.		
	
The	 officials,	 however,	 were	 only	 able	 to	 do	 so	 because	 of	 additional	 contextual	
factors.	 I	 have	 shown	how	 four	 contextual	 factors	 facilitated	AWU	oligarchy.	 The	
aspirational	 and	 hierarchical	 elements	 of	 the	 AWU	 ethos	 enabled	 the	 leaders	 to	
supress	rank-and-file	decision-making	and	deliberately	extend	the	status	and	skills	
gap	 between	 themselves	 and	 the	 membership.	 The	 nationalist	 and	 xenophobic	
aspects	of	the	ethos	allowed	the	leaders	to	discredit	dissidents	by	presenting	them	









form	 occupational	 communities,	 participate	 in	 the	 short-lived	 local	 branch	
committees	or	generally	participate	in	the	union	in	any	way	beyond	postal	voting.	












undemocratic	means.	The	party’s	 requirement	 that	members	also	belong	 to	 their	
union	further	undermined	members’	ability	to	quit	the	AWU	in	protest.	Finally,	the	






In	 October	 1916	 the	 Australian	 government	 asked	 the	 electorate	 to	 approve	 the	
conscription	of	Australian	men	to	fight	overseas.	The	plebiscite	vote	occurred	at	the	
end	of	the	bloody	Somme	campaign	on	the	Western	Front	and	followed	a	divisive	
debate	 over	 conscription	 which	 had	 split	 the	 Labor	 Party	 and	 the	 nation.	 The	
Australian	 Workers	 Union	 (AWU)	 was	 a	 leading	 force	 in	 the	 campaign	 against	






Given	 the	 closeness	 of	 the	 vote,	 historians	 have	 argued	 that	 conscription	 would	
probably	 have	 been	 introduced	 if	 not	 for	 the	 AWU’s	 strong	 campaign.2 	But	 the	






























Most	 prominent	 individuals	 in	 the	 labour	 movement	 supported	 Australia’s	






































Graeme	 Freudenberg	 described	 the	 AWU’s	 Arthur	 Rae	 as	 “unusual	 among	 Labor	
leaders	 in	having	opposed	Australian	participation	 in	 the	war	 from	 its	outbreak”.9	
John	Hirst	argued	that	Henry	Boote	also	opposed	sending	men	overseas	 from	the	
outset	 and	 that	 the	 Australian	 Worker	 ignored	 the	 thousands	 of	 enlisted	 AWU	
members	for	the	first	year	of	the	war	before	Boote	begrudgingly	began	a	weekly	page	



















Labor	 politicians	 was	 pressure	 of	 parliamentary	 deselection	 by	 this	 trade	 union	
base.11	John	Hirst	agreed	and	stated	that	“conscription	was	as	much	the	occasion	of	
the	Labor	split	as	the	cause	of	it”.12	Hirst	also	argued	that	the	labour	movement	used	









arguments	 were	 central	 to	 how	 labour	 anti-conscriptionists	 understood	 their	
opposition”.15	Archer	showed	that	the	Australian	labour	movement	had	been	greatly	
influenced	 by	 a	 British	 liberal	 tradition	 which	 saw	 militarism,	 and	 therefore	
conscription,	as	opposed	to	a	free	society.	He	also	convincingly	countered	Hirst	and	
demonstrated	 that	 Labor’s	 liberalism	 was	 not	 newly	 “discovered”	 during	 the	
conscription	campaign	but	went	back	to	the	Labor	Party’s	foundation	and	had	been	
especially	evident	in	the	first	decade	of	the	twentieth	century	in	the	New	Liberalism	




















dismisses	 too	 easily	 Dyrenfurth’s	 argument	 that	 conscription	was	 consistent	with	
trade	unionist	and	socialist	values,	which	I	will	return	to	below.	
	
There	 is	 a	 historical	 consensus	 that	 the	 AWU’s	 Worker	 newspapers	 were	




the	 other	 hand,	 pointed	 out	 that	 some	 AWU	 members	 wrote	 to	 the	 Australian	
Worker	advocating	conscription.20	Mark	Hearn	and	Harry	Knowles	also	observed	that	
several	 key	 officials	 supported	 conscription,	 namely	 founding	 President	 William	
Spence,	his	son-in-law	and	Australian	Worker	manger	Hector	Lamond	and	Women’s	
Page	 editor	 Mary	 Gilmore. 21 	So	 in	 the	 historiography	 there	 is	 some	
acknowledgement	 that	 opposition	 to	 conscription	was	 not	 unanimous	within	 the	
AWU	but	there	is	no	real	exploration	of	the	internal	debate	within	the	union	or	why	
the	opponents	of	conscription	won	that	debate.	There	is	also	no	significant	analysis	




















than	 any	 other	 portion	 of	 the	 British	 Empire”. 23 	This	 unanimous	 vote	 by	 the	















now?”	 Lamond	 further	 argued	 that	under	 the	 voluntary	 system	 there	were	 three	
classes	of	men	who	enlisted:	 the	unemployed,	 the	young	and	 impressionable	and	
those	who	felt	it	was	their	duty	to	enlist.	He	argued	that	either	the	labour	movement	




Labour	 movement	 advocates	 of	 conscription	 also	 argued	 that	 conscription	 was	
ideologically	 consistent	 with	 socialism	 and	 unionism.	 Hughes	 argued	 that	





shirker	 and	 the	 equitable	 distribution	 of	 the	 social	 burden.	 Compulsory	
unionism	is	pure	conscription.	It	insists	on	the	obligation	of	militancy	in	a	state	
of	war.	The	whole	crime	of	the	non-unionist	is	his	non-compliant	position.	
Boote	 replied,	 however,	 that	 to	 brand	 conscription	 as	 socialist	 was	 “the	 devil	 in	
disguise”.	“Socialism	will	free	men	not	enslave	them”,	he	wrote.25	Boote	challenged	








Lamond	 campaigned	hard	 for	 conscription.	He	 supplied	 the	SMH	with	 a	message	
from	Lieutenant	Albert	Jacka,	an	AWU	member	who	had	won	the	Victoria	Cross	at	
Gallipoli.	Jacka’s	appeal	read:	"ANZACs	demand	to	be	reinforced.	Trust	Australia	will	










Grayndler	 wrote	 that	 “the	 opinions	 in	 favour	 of	 conscription	 expressed	 by	 Mr	
Lamond,	and	the	attitude	attributed	by	him	to	Mr	Spence,	President	of	the	AWU,	are	
in	direct	conflict	with	the	views	and	policy	of	the	members	and	governing	body	of	
the	 AWU”. 29 	But	 what	 do	 we	 actually	 know	 of	 the	 opinion	 of	 members?	 The	
Australian	Worker	published	many	 letters	 from	members	against	conscription	but	
surprisingly	it	also	published	some	letters	supporting	conscription	until	September	
















and	 conditions”,	 the	 same	 logic,	 he	 said,	 should	 apply	 to	 military	 service.	 He	
concluded	with	an	accurate	prediction	of	the	coming	Labor	split:	“I	think	that	your	
[the	Australian	Worker’s]	attitude	is	 illogical	and	full	of	unnecessary	spleen,	and	if	








Some	 AWU	 members	 acknowledged	 that	 conscription	 was	 distasteful	 but	





















opinion	 was	 strongly	 against	 conscription.	 NSW	 Western	 Branch	 organiser	 Jack	
































for	 censorship. 40 	The	 fact	 that	 the	 paper	 published	 any	 opposing	 viewpoints	 is	
surprising	given	its	usual	closure	to	dissenting	voices	within	the	AWU.	As	we	have	


















executive	 council.	 The	 union	 was	 therefore	 a	 “collegial	 oligarchy”:	 a	 collective	
oligarchic	 leadership	 in	which	power	 is	shared	equally	amongst	a	central	group	of	
leaders.	
	













the	 representatives	 of	 Labor	 everywhere	will	 prove	 loyal	 to	 the	 trust	 reposed	 in	
them,	and	will	throw	themselves	vigorously	into	this	fight	for	the	preservation	of	our	
civil	liberties	now	threatened	by	military	domination.	It	now	devolves	upon	us	to	save	
Australia	 from	 the	 impending	 evil	 of	militarism”.42	Presumably	 each	 of	 the	 other	












for	 1916	 by	membership	 vote	 and	was	 a	 Labor	member	 of	 the	 federal	 House	 of	
Representatives.	The	AWU	leaders	unconvincingly	alleged	that	Lamond	and	Hughes	


























As	we	 saw	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 at	 this	 time	 the	 collegial	 oligarchy	was	 being	
challenged	 by	 radical	 officials	 from	 the	Western	 Branch	 such	 as	 Cullinan	 and	 by	
dissenters	in	the	Queensland	Branch	such	as	Ernest	Lane.	These	officials	led	the	anti-
conscription	 motion	 at	 the	 1916	 Annual	 Convention.	 The	 majority	 conservative	

























matters”. 47 	The	 board	 of	 control	 forced	 Lamond	 to	 resign	 and	 appointed	 the	
Australian	Worker’s	anti-conscriptionist	editor	Henry	Boote	as	acting	manager.	Boote	




We	 simply	 do	 not	 know	 the	 proportion	 of	 AWU	 members	 who	 supported	
conscription	 in	 1916.	 But	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 AWU	 was	 an	 oligarchy	 means	 that	
membership	opinion	had	little	influence	on	the	union’s	stance.	The	type	of	oligarchy	
that	existed	within	the	union	in	1916	determined	exactly	which	officials	decided	the	







of	 the	union’s	mythology	and	AWU	officials	 frequently	 cited	 it	 over	 the	 following	
decades	as	one	of	the	union’s	great	achievements.	At	the	AWU’s	50th	anniversary	in	
1936,	NSW	Branch	Secretary	John	McNeill	said	“if	the	AWU	never	did	anything	other	













Throughout	 the	 interwar	 period,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	







crucial	 shift	 from	 local	democratic	community	 to	national	democratic	community.	




that	 contained	 tensions	 between	 solidarity	 and	 egalitarianism	 on	 one	 side	 and	
competitiveness,	 hierarchy	 and	 aspirationalism	 on	 the	 other	 side.	 The	 most	
important	 difference	 was	 that	 miners	 worked	 and	 lived	 together	 in	 strong,	








There	 is	 a	 historical	 consensus	 that	 the	Miners	 Federation	 was	 one	 of	 the	most	
democratic	unions	in	Australia	in	the	interwar	period.	Yet	the	literature	provides	little	








the	 union’s	 official	History	 of	 the	Miners	 Federation.	Both	 authors	 provide	 useful	
narrative	and	inevitably	touch	on	the	union’s	internal	politics,	but	neither	offers	any	
sustained	 analysis	 or	 theoretical	 engagement.	 Marxist	 theory	 implicitly	 underlies	
both	 works	 and	 both	 historians	 tacitly	 argue	 against	Michels	 by	 contending	 that	
members	 placed	 important	 limits	 on	 officials.	 They	 also	 argue	 that	 the	 Miners	
Federation	was	 democratic	 and	 that	 the	 primary	 reason	 for	 this	was	 the	miners’	













Nevertheless,	 he	 adopts	Michels’	 and	 Vladamir	 Lenin’s	 criticisms	 of	 regional	 and	
national	union	leaders	and	cites	them	frequently.4	He	argues	that	“pit	top	meetings	
were	a	prime	site	of	…	tension	for	while	rank	and	file	miners	saw	their	 leaders	as	
would-be	autocrats,	 the	 latter	 saw	members	as	 a	 challenge	 to	be	mastered”.5	He	

















By	 contrast,	 I	 will	 argue	 in	 line	 with	 the	 earlier	 historiography	 that	 the	 Miners	
Federation	 was	 highly	 democratic.	 Metcalfe	 holds	 the	 union	 to	 an	 unrealistic	









The	 Miners	 Federation,	 officially	 the	 Australasian	 Coal	 and	 Shale	 Employees’	
Federation,	formed	in	1915.	Throughout	the	interwar	period	it	was	one	of	Australia’s	




the	Broken	Hill	metal	miners	 joined.8	Each	of	 the	 regional	mining	unions	became	
districts	of	the	Miners	Federation,	the	middle	tier	in	the	three	tiers	of	government:	
national,	district	and	 local	 lodge.	The	NSW	coalminers	are	 the	main	 focus	here	as	
they	made	up	a	large	majority	of	members	and	were	the	most	heavily	involved	in	the	







an	 extensive	 labour	 historiography.9 	Broken	 Hill	 miners	 are	 included	 in	 statistics	
unless	stated	otherwise.	
	





This	membership	 number	 remained	 stable	 until	 1939.	 Australia’s	 coal	 production	
peaked	early	in	the	period	in	1913	at	12.5	million	tonnes,	10.5	million	tonnes	from	
NSW,	before	the	First	World	War	destroyed	Australia’s	coal	export	trade.12	Initially	







bemoaned	 “the	 tendency	 of	 one	 section	 of	 the	 working	 men	 with	 an	 economic	
advantage	to	hold	a	pistol	at	the	heads	of	the	rest	of	the	community”.14	But	economic	
conditions	 and	 technological	 advancements	 nullified	 the	 miners’	 strong	 position.	
Australian	coalmining	declined	during	the	First	World	War,	and	unlike	most	industries	
it	 did	 not	 improve	 in	 the	 1920s,	 before	 declining	 even	 further	 during	 the	 Great	
Depression.15	Prior	to	the	First	World	War	Australia	had	exported	one	third	of	its	coal.	
The	war	destroyed	this	trade	and	until	the	Second	World	War	there	was	a	massive	




















in	membership	 and	 coal	 output,	 and	provided	 around	60	per	 cent	 of	 the	 union’s	
funds.18 	By	 the	 late	 1930s	 the	 North	 produced	 6.3	 million	 tonnes	 per	 year,	 the	
Southern	NSW	District	1.8	million	and	the	Western	NSW	District	1.4	million.19	
	




by	 Arthur	 Teece	 (1925-26	 and	 1931-33),	 Dai	 Davies	 (1926-31)	 and	 Bill	 Orr	 1934-
1940). 20 	This	 is	 a	 similar	 level	 of	 leadership	 stability	 as	 the	 AWU	 and	 suggests	





























The	Miners	 Federation	 had	 a	 tumultuous	 relationship	with	 the	NSW	 Labor	 Party,	













called	 the	 Workers	 Industrial	 Union	 of	 Australia	 (WIUA).	 Even	 though	 it	 was	





away	 from	 its	 dissident	 radicalism	and	 took	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 the	 party.	 Baddeley	
resigned	 as	Miners	 Federation	 president	 and	won	 the	 state	 seat	 of	 Cessnock	 for	
Labor,	 becoming	 Minister	 for	 Mines	 and	 then	 Deputy	 NSW	 Premier	 under	 Jack	
Lang.26	Lang	nominated	Willis	to	the	Legislative	Council	in	1925	and	made	him	vice-
president	of	the	Executive	Council	from	1925	to	1927	and	1930	to	1931.27	The	Miners	





By	 1925	 unemployment	 and	 underemployment	 of	 miners	 was	 an	 ever-growing	
problem.30	There	was	growing	dissatisfaction	and	militancy	amongst	the	miners	and	
in	 1926	 the	 CPA	 introduced	 its	Militant	Minority	Movement,	 from	1931	Minority	













as	 did	 dissatisfaction	with	 the	Miners	 Federation	 officials	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 a	 rival	
Communist	leadership	emerged.33	The	most	prominent	of	these	Communist	leaders	




The	Miners	 Federation	 was	 the	 first	 major	 trade	 union	 with	 a	 Communist	 Party	



































was	a	 leading	 force	 in	 the	opposition	 coalition	 that	 finally	defeated	 Lang	and	 the	
Inner	Group	in	1939.39	
Ideology	in	the	Miners	Federation	
Almost	 all	 Miners	 Federation	 officials	 identified	 as	 “militants”.	 Common	 Cause	
defined	a	militant	as	“one	who	wishes	to	see	something	done	instead	of	being	merely	
talked	 about”.40	More	 specifically,	militancy	meant	 advocating	 industrial	 action	 in	
addition	to,	or	instead	of,	arbitration	and	political	action.	Some	officials	were	militant	
reformists	while	others	were	radicals	who	embraced	various	forms	of	socialism	and	
anti-capitalism.	 The	 union’s	 official	 position	 throughout	 the	 period	 was	 against	
capitalism	 and	 for	 its	 replacement	 by	 a	 system	 of	 collective	 ownership.	 Miners	




















Valley	 and	 went	 on	 to	 become	 long-time	 Northern	 District	 President	 as	 a	 non-
Communist	radical	socialist	.45	The	Miners	Federation’s	official	history	recalled	Hoare	
as	“one	of	the	most	colourful	of	Federation	 leaders”.	“Stories	about	his	marathon	
speeches	are	 legendary”,	 it	 said,	and	“he	often	spoke	 literally	 for	hours	at	a	 time	
divesting	himself	of	more	and	more	of	his	clothing	as	he	warmed	to	his	task	of	driving	
home	the	lessons	of	the	class	struggle”.46	












focus	on	the	miners’	wages	and	conditions	and	not	 from	majority	support	 for	 the	






























“not	 possible	 to	 escape	 entirely	 from	 the	 existing	 legal	 net”. 54 	Communists	
recognised	that	arbitration	imposed	limits	on	their	freedom	of	action	but	Orr	argued	
















The	 Miners	 Federation’s	 support	 for	 political	 action	 and	 the	 Labor	 Party	 also	
declined.	In	the	1920s	Willis	and	Baddeley	had	tied	the	union	to	the	NSW	Labor	Party	
and	Lang.	A	1922	change	to	the	Federation	preamble	was	subtle	but	telling,	 from	











“respectable”	models	 of	 behaviour.59	This	 was	 interconnected	with	 the	 two	 rival	
forms	of	masculinity	we	have	seen	in	previous	chapters.	The	first	larrikin	masculinity	
was	misogynistic	and	hedonistic	celebrating	drinking,	gambling	and	sex.	Glorifying	
wasting	 money	 on	 gambling	 and	 drinking	 made	 a	 virtue	 out	 of	 many	 miners’	
unavoidable	poverty.60	The	responsibilities	of	providing	for	children	and	a	“nagging	
wife”	would	limit	time	and	money	spent	on	hedonistic	activities.	It	would	also	reduce	
the	 miner’s	 autonomy	 by	 removing	 his	 ability	 to	 withdraw	 from	 work	 that	 was	
demeaning	or	dangerous.61	Scorning	marriage	also	made	a	virtue	out	of	a	necessity	
as	 men	 outnumbered	 women	 in	 most	 mining	 areas. 62 	As	 Metcalfe	 argues,	

















































Like	 in	 the	 AWU,	 disagreements	 were	 settled	 with	 fists.	 Miners	 revered	 sport	
especially	 bruising	 rugby	 league	 and	 boxing.	 In	 the	 1930s	 Lithgow	 had	 ten	 rugby	
league	teams.70	A	miner	recalled	“even	at	work	we	had	these	25	pound	weights	…	
we	used	to	 lift	 these	25	pound	weights	up,	see	who	could	 lift	 them	up	over	 their	














piecework	 “breeds	 that	 selfishness	 that	 is	 not	 good	 or	 conducive	 to	 good	
comradeship”. 74 	Like	 the	 AWU,	 the	 miners’	 occupational	 community	 was	 not	
significantly	divided	by	race	or	gender	but	it	was	divided	by	occupation.	The	AWU’s	















As	 in	 the	 AWU,	 the	 miners’	 culture	 contained	 tension	 between	 solidarity	 and	
egalitarianism	on	the	one	hand	and	aspirationalism,	competitiveness	and	hierarchy	
on	the	other.		Unlike	the	AWU,	however,	solidarity	and	egalitarianism	tended	to	win	




the	mines	 and	often	 an	 extended	 family	would	work	 together	 in	 the	 same	mine.	
When	Greg	McKenzie	started	mining	in	the	1940s	in	Lithgow	the	other	fifteen	men	
in	his	small	mine	were	all	related.77		Furthermore,	the	miners’	piecework	was	not	as	












never	 had	 a	 cross	word	 in	 our	 life	…	 you	wouldn’t	 believe	 it.	 Any	 bastard	
working	with	me	for	three	years	and	not	having	a	row	you’d	wonder	why.	But	
that’s	fair	dinkum.80	






between	 the	 shearers	 and	 shedhands	 because	 there	 was	 a	 clearly	 established	
progression	amongst	the	miners	from	non-faceworker	to	faceworker.	There	were	still	
conflicts;	in	the	Northern	District	in	1911	wheelers	and	shiftmen	unsuccessfully	tried	
to	 form	 their	own	union	and	 split	 from	 the	miners.81	But	 this	 conflict	was	usually	
tempered	by	the	fact	that	non-faceworkers	were	not	perpetually	second-class	union	
members	but	were	 simply	waiting	 their	 turn,	 just	as	 the	current	 faceworkers	had	
done	before	them.82	Metcalfe	argues	that	the	union’s	deliberate	neglect	of	the	non-




The	Miners	 Federation	was	 further	 able	 to	overcome	 the	 tendencies	 to	oligarchy	
because	of	a	range	of	interwoven	cultural	factors	that	distinguished	it	from	the	AWU.	










numbers.84	Miners	 and	 their	 families	 were	 strongly	 interconnected	 within	 social,	
religious,	 charitable	 and	 sports	 organisations.	 Because	 miners	 and	 their	 families	
constituted	the	majority	in	most	mining	towns,	they	dominated	the	towns’	social	life	
and	events.	In	the	Western	NSW	District	town	of	Lithgow,	for	example,	the	annual	
eight	 hours	 demonstration	 was	 the	 biggest	 social	 event	 of	 the	 year	 and	 was	














The	 Women’s	 Weekly	 described	 miners’	 wives	 as	 “capable,	 ‘old-fashioned’	
housewives”	who	 “wage	 a	 continual	 battle	 against	 coaldust”.	 They	 rarely	worked	
outside	the	home	because	“there	are	no	crèches	and	kindergartens”	and	“the	miners'	













occupational	 solidarity.	 Socialising	 and	 leisure	 increased	 during	 strikes	 and	
unemployment,	 especially	 the	Great	Depression.89	The	miners’	 co-op	 stores	were	
generous	with	credit	during	strikes,	as	were	shopkeepers,	 landlords	and	mortgage	
holders.	If	the	miners	declared	a	business	“black”	in	a	mining	town	it	was	ruined.90	
The	 miners	 also	 demonstrated	 their	 strong	 occupational	 community	 in	 their	
treatment	 of	 unemployed	 members.	 Although	 they	 could	 not	 vote	 on	 financial	









into	 skips	 which	 the	 wheelers	 took	 to	 the	 surface. 95 	The	 physical	 exertion	 was	
compounded	by	the	extreme	heat	which	could	reach	50	degrees	celsius.96	Shift	work	
also	added	to	the	burden	with	many	miners	working	3pm	to	midnight	or	the	“dog	




















































and	 become	 landholders.	 Until	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 most	 shearers	 were	
smallholders,	perhaps	shearing	to	make	money	to	buy	more	land.	Some	miners	had	
similar	goals	to	leave	the	working	class	and	a	few	even	bought	mines,	but	this	was	
not	 a	 realistic	 aim	 for	 most.	 This	 reality	 helped	 to	 promote	 solidarity	 and	 class	
consciousness	amongst	the	miners	because	if	their	lot	was	going	to	improve,	it	would	
be	through	winning	higher	wages	for	workers	rather	than	by	escaping	the	working	
class.	Many	miners	 did,	 however,	 wish	 for	 their	 sons	 to	 escape	 the	 dangers	 and	
hardships	 of	 mining,	 if	 not	 the	 working	 class.	 The	Women’s	 Weekly	 noted	 the	











game	 than	 otherwise,	 drew	 into	 the	 union	 ranks	 the	most	 intelligent	 and	
competent	in	the	country	–	for	there	is	no	place	in	the	ranks	of	the	shearer	
for	 the	 loafer	 who	 watches	 the	 clock	 and	 waits	 for	 pay	 day	 –	 and	 so	 an	








worksites	were	 not	 allocated	 by	 seniority.	 The	 “cavil”	 (Latin	 for	 quibbling)	 was	 a	
quarterly	lottery	by	which	worksites	were	randomly	allocated.	This	ensured	fairness	






















the	 Miners	 Federation	 tried	 to	 introduce	 a	 measure	 that	 could	 limit	 members’	









of	 control.	 The	 lodges	 operated	 primarily	 as	 participatory	 democracies	 in	 which	
issues	were	debated	and	voted	on	by	members	at	daily	pit	top	meetings	and	frequent	
lodge	meetings.	There	were	also	pragmatic	elements	of	representative	democracy	as	








were	 expensive,	 but	 the	 reform	 reduced	 democracy	 and	 concentrated	 power	 by	















by	 1935	 even	 unemployed	 members	 could	 nominate. 122 	The	 central	 executive	
managed	 the	 union	 and	 comprised	 a	 general	 secretary,	 president	 and	 vice-
president.123	The	central	executive	was	answerable	to	the	central	council	which	was	









As	 in	most	 representative	organisations,	 there	was	 tension	between	 the	 views	of	
representatives	as	delegates	and	 trustees.	 The	union’s	1916	Rules	 suggested	 that	
representatives	were	trustees	when	it	advised	members:	“trust	your	officers	and	be	




















becoming	 union	 policy	 (direct	 democracy). 129 	Each	 lodge	 had	 one	 vote	 per	 25	














some	 were	 rejected.132 	Unlike	 AWU	members,	 Miners	 Federation	 members	 also	
voted	on	all	 district	 employment	 contracts,	 strikes	 and	political	 affiliations.	 These	
votes	were	 sometimes	 by	 ballot	 but	 usually	 by	 open	 vote	 at	 lodges	 or	 aggregate	
meetings	of	all	the	lodges	in	an	area.	Famously,	the	northern	miners	rejected	their	
leaders’	 compromise	agreement	during	 the	1929	 lockout.	133	Pressure	 from	below	
and	 the	 miners’	 culture	 of	 membership	 authority	 was	 obvious	 at	 meetings	 with	
routine	verbal,	and	occasionally	physical,	abuse	of	officials.	“You’ve	sold	us”	was	a	
common	 accusation	 flung	 at	 officials	 promoting	 a	 compromise	 agreement.134	The	
lodges	 and	 districts	 facilitated	 further	 membership	 decision-making.	 Lodges	




























































which	 miners	 openly	 disagreed	 with	 the	 majority	 varied	 at	 different	 lodges	 at	




The	 biggest	 of	 these	 meetings	 would	 occur	 with	 leaders	 speaking	 from	 a	 hotel	



















not	 officially	 forced	 all	 miners	 to	 join,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 and	 its	 members	















did	 not	 need	 to	 leave	 or	 threaten	 to	 leave	 the	 union	 to	 influence	 the	 leaders.	
Nevertheless,	 compulsory	unionism	did	have	more	 subtle	 negative	 effects	 on	 the	
Miners	Federation.	A	majority	of	workers	forcing	the	minority	to	join	their	union	is	













Even	 some	 Miners	 Federation	 insiders	 recognised	 the	 problems	 of	 compulsory	
membership.	Ross	wrote	in	the	official	history	that	“the	history	of	the	Federation	…	
tells	 of	 the	 apathy	 and	 conservatism	 that	 can	 follow	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 unionism	
becoming	 a	 ‘formal’	 thing	 with	 compulsory	 membership”. 153 	Like	 the	 AWU,	 the	
Miners	Federation	sought	a	short	cut	to	strength	through	compulsion	and	in	doing	
so	created	an	uninterested	and	even	hostile	section	of	members.	The	fact	that	votes	








with	 the	 traditions	 and	 practices”	 of	 the	 union.154	All	 the	 same,	 allied	 individuals	
worked	together	 in	unofficial	 factions,	as	 they	do	 in	all	organisations.	 In	1924	the	
ever-vigilant	SMH	 identified	a	“militant	element”	factional	opposition	based	in	the	
Northern	 fields. 155 	Metcalfe	 argued	 that	 “factionalism	 constrained	 rank	 and	 file	
involvement	by	giving	organised	subgroups	considerable	control	over	the	rest	of	the	
membership”.156	This	 argument	 runs	 counter	 to	 the	 sociological	 consensus	which	
argues	 that	organised	opposition	 is	 crucial	 to	union	democracy.	 Lipset	and	others	















formed	 its	 miners	 section. 158 	The	 AWU	 would	 not	 have	 tolerated	 any	 openly	
Communist	 organisation	 and	 other	 unions,	 such	 as	 the	 Boilermakers	 Union,	
specifically	 banned	MM	members	 from	 nominating	 for	 positions,	 but	 the	Miners	
Federation	maintained	 its	commitment	 to	 freedom	of	organisation	and	speech.159	
The	MM	created	councils	of	action	including	strike	relief	and	publicity	committees	at	
each	mine	 and	MM	 officials	 such	 as	 Orr	 made	 bitter	 attacks	 against	 the	Miners	
Federation	 Executive	 in	 the	CPA	newspaper,	 the	Workers'	Weekly,	 before	he	 and	
Nelson	 successfully	 deposed	 the	 sitting	 leadership	 in	 1934.160 	Just	 as	 Lipset	 and	
others	 would	 have	 predicted,	 organised	 opposition	 enhanced	 democracy	 by	






the	 Labor	Party	had	 gone	with	 the	AWU	where	 it	 had	 instead	 supported	existing	
dissidents	like	the	Bushworkers	Propaganda	Group	and	rival	unions	like	the	United	
Labourers	Union	and	Pastoral	Workers	 Industrial	Union.162	Even	 though	 Lang	was	
very	 popular	 in	 the	 coalfields,	 his	 candidates	were	 easily	 defeated;	 evidently	 the	
majority	of	miners	did	not	agree	with	Lang’s	criticisms	of	the	Communist	leadership.	
While	the	direct	 interference	of	the	Labor	Party	 in	union	elections	was	potentially	













in	 state	 parliament	 and	 for	 Orr	 and	 Nelson	 in	 the	Miners	 Federation	 leadership	
reveals	 that	 members	 relied	 “on	 individual	 leaders	 rather	 than	 on	 critical	
consideration	of	policies”.163	Perhaps	this	is	so,	but	it	could	equally	be	argued	that	
support	 for	 these	 leaders	 demonstrated	 the	members’	 ability	 to	 distinguish	 state	
parliamentary	politics	 from	union	politics.	 Jim	Comerford,	a	member	of	Richmond	
Main	Miners’	Lodge	since	1927,	recalled	that	the	men	were	generally	intelligent	and	
interested	 and	 did	 not	 follow	 leaders	 blindly.	 They	 “gave	 loyal	 support	 to	 their	





NSW	 Labor	 Party	 Executive	 successfully	 organised	 for	 the	 defeat	 of	 Communist	
officials	and	delegates	in	the	Sheet	Metal	Workers	and	Clerks	Union.165	In	the	mid-








£534	 per	 annum	 excluding	 expenses	 and	 president	 Baddeley	 £221.169	The	 lowest	

















1939)	at	£547	but	 the	president’s	 salary	had	more	 than	doubled	 to	£481.171	They	
both	earned	about	half	as	much	as	the	highest	paid	Australian	trade	union	officer,	
AWU	 General	 Secretary	 Edward	 Grayndler,	 who	 received	 £1000	 per	 year.172 	The	
officials	also	received	many	fringe	benefits.	Central	council	members	enjoyed	first-
class	rail	travel,	but	did	not	celebrate	it	as	openly	as	AWU	officials,	and	in	1939	the	






with	business	 owners	 and	politicians,	 and	most	 coalfields	 politicians	were	 former	
Miners	Federation	officials.	Labor	Party	affiliation	increased	the	status	gap	between	
ordinary	 members	 and	 officials	 like	 Willis	 and	 Baddeley	 who	 became	 politicians	
and/or	 powerful	 members	 of	 the	 extra-parliamentary	 party.	 Miners	 Federation	
leaders	were	guests	of	honour	at	important	events	and	frequently	interacted	with	
other	 local	 elites	 like	 judges,	 politicians	 and	 businessmen.175	The	 elite	 status	was	
exemplified	 at	Miners	 Federation	 and	 Labor	 Party	 events	where	 the	 officials	 and	


















was	 an	 obvious	 exception.	 But	 like	 the	 AWU	 officials,	Miners	 Federation	 officials	
gained	significant	education	and	skills	on	the	job.	The	union	aimed	to	limit	this	gap	
by	educating	members	on	important	issues.	There	were	frequent	educational	articles	
in	 Common	 Cause	 and	 the	 union	 held	 study	 classes	 and	 educational	 leagues	 for	
members	 to	 learn	 about	 radical	 and	 Marxist	 economics,	 political	 theory	 and	
history.177	The	Educational	Committee	of	the	Women’s	Auxiliaries	also	ran	education	
and	discussion	classes	for	women	and	youths.178	It	was	the	MM,	however,	in	keeping	




than	 seeking	 to	 build	 the	 miners’	 critical	 thinking	 skills,	 classes	 provided	
oversimplified	sketches	of	radical	economics	and	philosophy.	Less	formal	education	























































Editor	 Samuel	 Rosa	 frequently	 appealed	 for	 criticism	 of	 the	 newspaper	 and	 the	
union. 187 	He	 published	 detailed	 criticism	 of	 individual	 officials	 and	 policies	 and	
argued	 that	 all	members	 “have	 the	 right	 to	 [Common	 Cause]	 columns”	 including	
“hostile	 critics”. 188 	The	 newspaper	 demonstrated	 strong	 independence	 from	 the	
leadership.	 For	 example,	 in	 1922	 it	 advised	members	 to	 vote	 against	 the	 central	
council’s	 proposed	 9	 day	 fortnight. 189 	Nevertheless,	 the	 leaders	 did	 use	 the	




Free	 communication	 also	 occurred	 in	 the	 many	 pit	 newspapers	 that	 existed	 at	
individual	mines.	Pit	newspapers	became	increasingly	common	from	the	late	1920s	





a	 few	 pages	 and	 lost	 much	 of	 its	 industrial	 content.	 Nevertheless,	 in	 1928	 the	
Common	Cause	supplement	published	detailed	and	harsh	critiques	by	the	MM	of	the	





















and	 criticism	…	 there	will	 be	more	 space	 and	 greater	 scope	 for	 discussion	 in	 the	
future”.194	Orr	 instructed	that	“our	members	must	read	and	study	Common	Cause	
and	when	necessary	offer	 criticism”.195	In	 reality,	 however,	 under	 the	Communist	
leadership	Common	Cause	lost	much	of	its	independence	and	role	as	an	avenue	of	
free	communication.	Orr	and	Nelson	appointed	Edgar	Ross,	former	President	of	the	
Broken	 Hill	 MM,	 as	 editor	 of	 Common	 Cause.	 In	 conformity	 with	 the	 CPA’s	





Orr	 and	Nelson	 also	used	other	 avenues	of	 official	 union	 communication	 to	 their	
electoral	 advantage.	 In	 1934	 they	 sent	 circulars	 to	 all	 miners’	 lodges	 in	 NSW	 to	
counteract	Lang’s	propaganda	against	 them.198	They	also	 took	advantage	of	other	































Miners	 Federation	 democracy	 had	 its	 weaknesses.	 Open	 votes	 and	 compulsory	












side	 it	 provided	 organised	 opposition	 to	 the	 sitting	 officials	 but	 on	 the	 anti-
democracy	side	it	increased	the	status	gap	between	members	and	officials,	increased	









Strong	occupational	 communities	are	essential	 for	union	democracy.	This	 chapter	
focuses	in	on	the	issue	of	local	autonomy	and	investigates	how	the	Miners	Federation	
remained	democratic	while	shifting	away	from	local	occupational	communities	and	
local	 democracy	 and	 towards	 a	 national	 occupational	 community	 and	 national	
democracy.	Federation	created	new	opportunities	for	the	miners	but	it	also	created	
challenges.	Throughout	the	interwar	period	there	were	tensions	between	traditional	
local	 loyalties	 on	 one	 side	 and	 the	 new	 national	 organisation	 on	 the	 other.	 To	











communion	with	 the	 workers	 in	 their	 industry	 in	 their	 location	 but	 far	 less	 with	




Local	 loyalties	 manifested	 in	 a	 range	 of	 problematic	 ways	 within	 the	 Miners	










for	 distant	miners	 threatened	 the	 financial	 security	 of	 the	 union.	 Local	 decisions	
being	made	 at	 the	 national	 level	 undermined	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 unity	 of	 the	
Miners	Federation	because	miners	nationally	did	not	understand	 issues	as	well	as	
locals	did,	and	the	interests	of	the	miners	in	one	location	were	often	opposed	to	the	
interests	 of	 those	 in	 another.	 Localism	 and	 positive	 relationships	 between	 mine	
owners	and	miners	further	undermined	Miners	Federation	unity	and	caused	many	
smaller	 collieries	 to	 be	 outside	 the	 Federation.	 The	 Great	 Depression	 further	




powerful	 and	 successful	 unions	 in	 Australian	 history.	 Crucially,	 unlike	 other	 big	
national	unions,	notably	 the	AWU,	the	miners	did	so	while	remaining	democratic.	
They	achieved	this	impressive	feat	by	building	a	strong	national	mining	community.	





















Rising	 levels	 of	 class	 consciousness	 amongst	 the	 miners	 was	 the	 final	 crucial	
ingredient	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 national	 mining	 community.	 The	 historiography	
explains	the	interwar	rise	in	class	consciousness	amongst	the	miners	as	a	result	of	
the	workplace	conflict	that	is	inherent	to	mining,	the	social	and	economic	conditions	
of	 the	First	World	War	and	Great	Depression,	 and	 the	period’s	prominent	 radical	
ideologies	 and	 organisations	 like	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 Australia	 (CPA)	 and	 its	
Militant	Minority	(MM).	I	add	to	this	analysis,	elaborating	on	it	in	relation	to	the	more	
practical	 application	 of	 anti-capitalist	 ideology	 by	 the	 leadership,	 the	 effects	 of	
changing	mine	management	techniques,	and	the	increasing	inclusion	of	women	in	
the	 miners’	 community.	 These	 factors	 combined	 to	 create	 a	 national	 mining	














where	 previous	 attempts	 had	 failed	 because	 of	 the	 miners’	 increased	 militancy	
brought	about	by	the	First	World	War,	a	growing	awareness	amongst	the	miners	that	










the	 interwar	period	was	primarily	 due	 to	 the	 social	 and	economic	 circumstances,	
most	notably	the	Great	Depression.	Although	they	did	not	use	this	terminology,	both	
historians	acknowledged	that	in	order	to	succeed	the	Miners	Federation	needed	to	
convince	 various	 localised	 mining	 communities	 to	 become	 part	 of	 a	 national	
community	of	miners.	But	the	fact	that	these	histories	had	little	focus	on	the	miners’	
internal	 structure,	 organisation	 or	 democracy	 means	 that	 these	 issues	 were	 not	
explored	in	detail.		
	
Gollan	and	Ross	gave	even	 less	attention	 to	 localism.	Throughout	 their	narratives	
they	tacitly	acknowledged	some	instances	of	 localism	but	they	never	explored	the	













timeless,	 arguing	 that	 in	mining	 “more	 than	 in	 any	other	 industry	 employers	 and	










distinctive	outlook	 among	 the	people	of	 those	pit	 towns	 and	 villages	with	
their	Miners	Federation	lodges,	fiercely	attached	to	their	district	and	central	
organisations.10	





Raymond	 Markey’s	 argument	 is	 closer	 to	 my	 own	 than	 Gollan’s.	 Markey	 briefly	
recognised	that	because	of	the	miners’	strong	local	structure	and	history,	“much	of	
the	 history	 of	mining	 unionism	 consists	 of	 a	 struggle	 between	 lodge	 and	 district	
hegemony”. 11 	He	 suggested	 that	 miners	 had	 strong	 local	 communities	 but	 that	
“intercommunity	links”	between	areas	“remained	weak	in	the	nineteenth	century”.	

















mining	 society	 was	 complex,	 involving	 a	 mosaic	 of	 occupations,	 working	
arrangements,	 ethnic	 and	 religious	 backgrounds	 and	 allegiances.	 Referring	
solely	to	time	worn	clichés	of	class	and	struggle	simply	will	not	do.	A	number	
of	historians	and	sociologists	have	suggested	localism	as	an	additional	aid.14	










lodges	 had	 little	 formal	 autonomy	 and	 the	 central	 council	 had	 complete	 power	
(assuming	it	could	gain	majority	endorsement	for	its	actions	in	the	nationwide	lodge	
votes).16	On	paper	this	centralisation	seems	similar	to	the	AWU,	but	unlike	the	AWU	
the	Miners	Federation	was	 formed	 through	 the	 fusion	of	 strong	 local	bodies	with	
decades	of	autonomous	operation.17	This	meant	that	in	practice	the	central	council	
did	 not	 have	 as	much	 control	 over	 the	 lodges	 as	 the	 constitution	 suggested.	 The	
central	 council	 often	 pragmatically	 allowed	 the	 districts	 and	 lodges	 significant	
autonomy.	 Local	 variations	 in	 mining	 conditions	 meant	 that	 by	 necessity	 lodges	


















officials	 knew	 they	 could	 not	 simply	 dictate	 to	 them.	When	 they	 left	 the	 central	
officials	no	other	choice,	lodges	were	expelled	from	the	Federation	and	it	was	normal	
for	 several	 lodges	 to	 be	 outside	 the	 Federation	 at	 any	 one	 time. 20 	But	 unlike	
temporary	 AWU	 workplaces,	 mining	 lodges	 could	 remain	 healthy	 without	 the	
Federation,	which	could	not	afford	to	alienate	too	many,	so	appeasement	prevailed	
and	 lodges	 were	 usually	 welcomed	 back	 into	 the	 fold	 fairly	 quickly.	 Strong	 local	
organisation	enhanced	democracy	because	 it	meant	that	there	were	always	 lodge	
leaders	 who	 could	 form	 rival	 leaderships	 to	 challenge	 the	 district	 and	 federal	
officials.21	
	
The	 arbitration	 courts	 encouraged	 union	 centralisation	 and	 discipline	 within	 the	
Miners	Federation	as	they	had	within	the	AWU.	Arbitration	courts	refused	to	hear	
the	miners’	case	while	any	collieries	were	stopped.22	Arbitration	thereby	forced	the	
Miners	 Federation	 to	 either	 control	 or	 expel	 rebel	 lodges. 23 	In	 response	 to	
unauthorised	 stoppages,	 Justice	 H.	 B.	 Higgins,	 President	 of	 the	 Commonwealth	
Arbitration	Court	from	1907	to	1920,	said	“apparently	the	men	are	not	loyal	to	the	
public	nor	 to	 their	own	union”	and	“if	 the	executive	were	not	able	 to	control	 the	
union	there	must	be	other	men	to	take	charge.	No	union	[is]	worthy	unless	it	secures	


































increase	 their	market	 share	 and	 the	 Lambton	miners’	 lodge	 cooperated	with	 the	
owners	 as	 a	 larger	 market	 share	 meant	 more	 work	 and	 higher	 wages. 27 	This	




miners’	 unions	 often	 advocated	 cooperation	 with	 mine	 owners.	 “Not	 satisfied”	
complained	 about	 the	 Northern	 leaders’	 radicalism	 and	 hoped	 that	 “more	












providing	work	 for	 about	 800	 persons”.29	“Old	Newcastle	miner”	 argued	 similarly	











Unfortunately	 for	 the	miners,	 the	government	blocked	 the	 scheme	by	 refusing	 to	
carry	the	coal	on	the	railways.32	
	




















Employers	 and	 governments	 encouraged	 local	 thinking	 and	 local	 loyalty	 amongst	
miners.	Owners	and	state	industrial	tribunals	deliberately	made	agreements	so	that	








that	 they	were	 constantly	paying	 levies	 to	 support	miners	 from	other	 lodges	 and	
then,	when	 they	 needed	 support,	 the	 district	 officials	 refused.	 Disputes	 between	
lodges	and	between	the	district	and	lodges	over	money	were	commonplace.	In	1910	
the	 Northern	 district	 delegate	 board	 rejected	 a	 request	 for	 funds	 from	 Young	
Wallsend	Lodge.	In	reply,	the	lodge	unsuccessfully	requested	a	refund	of	a	strike	levy	
it	 had	paid	earlier	 that	 year.39	Miners	 also	 complained	 that	when	mines	 that	had	
enjoyed	good	employment	for	years	went	on	strike,	they	were	supported	by	others	
who	had	had	little	work.40	Members	especially	resented	recent	arrivals	to	a	mine	or	































through	 the	 five	 lodges	 of	 the	 West	 Wallsend	 district	 have	 pointed	 out	 that	 a	
determined	and	bitter	fight	will	be	made	on	this	question	of	political	freedom”.45	
	
These	 widespread	 local	 sentiments	 meant	 that	 even	 as	 moves	 for	 a	 national	
federation	were	growing	in	the	early	1910s,	there	were	others	campaigning	to	scale	
back	 district	 amalgamations.	 In	 1911,	 lodges	 in	 the	 Teralba	 and	Maitland	 regions	







































and	 1922	 there	were	 900	 separate	 stoppages	 on	 the	 Northern	 coalfields,	mostly	
unauthorised. 53 	Unauthorised	 stoppages	 undermined	 the	 Federation’s	 ability	 to	
convince	owners,	governments,	arbitration	courts	and	the	public	that	it	was	a	united,	
disciplined	 organisation	 that	 would	 honour	 agreements.	 Metcalfe	 argued	 that	
“support	 for	 petty	 stoppages	 drew	 on	 reluctance	 to	work	 and	 the	 interaction	 of	
resentments	and	loyalties	within	the	workforce”.54	It	also	drew	on	suspicion	of	the	














argued	 that	 this	was	 a	Michelsian	 example	of	 the	 elite	 interests	 of	 union	 leaders	
being	opposed	to	the	interests	of	members.	He	argued	that	“officers’	credibility	and	
effectiveness	 with	 owners,	 arbitration	 courts,	 political	 leaders	 and	 other	 union	
officials	 depended	 on	 their	 ability	 to	 predict	 and	 control	 the	 actions	 of	 their	
members.	 To	 do	 their	 job	 therefore	 they	 had	 to	 stifle	 a	 range	of	 their	members’	
political	 responses”. 55 	Certainly	 many	 members	 believed	 this	 was	 the	 case.	 A	
meeting	of	1200	striking	miners	in	Adamstown	in	1923	expressed	these	suspicions	of	
distant	officials.	A	slim	majority	endorsed	the	officials’	compromise	agreement	with	
the	 owners	 but	 the	 SMH	 reported	 that	 the	 meeting	 was	 marked	 by	 frequent	
interruptions	 and	 “general	 pandemonium”.	 Arthur	 Teece’s	 claim	 that	 “if	 the	
members	of	the	Maitland	district	had	had	their	way	the	Federation	would	have	been	
broken	 up”	 was	met	 with	 “uproar”.	 There	 were	 cries	 of	 “you	 have	 sold	 us”	 and	
“adjourn	the	meeting”.	Willis	then	said	that	the	men	who	were	trying	to	bring	the	
meeting	to	a	close	were	the	“enemies	of	labour”	and	“out	to	wreck	the	Federation”.	




tendencies	 of	 rank-and-file	 pressure	 on	 the	 leaders	 and	 the	 leaders’	 belief	 in	
democracy	 could	 counteract	 the	 tendency	 to	elitism.	 For	example,	 Jack	Savage,	 a	

















plan	 involved	appointing	 local	dispute	committees	but	 it	also	 involved	moving	the	













Federation	decisions	 to	 provide	or	 refuse	 relief	 payments	 to	 striking	 lodges	were	
always	controversial.	As	had	been	the	case	within	the	districts	prior	to	Federation,	
many	members	felt	that	they	were	constantly	paying	levies	to	support	miners	from	




power	 to	 authorise	 strikes	 from	 the	 central	 council	 and	 give	 it	 to	 the	 district	
executives	while	 still	 using	 the	 central	 funds.	 This	 situation	was	 clearly	 financially	


















not	 change	 the	 fact	 that	decisions	were	not	being	made	at	 the	 local	 level	 by	 the	
people	involved,	and	many	miners	did	not	appreciate	“outside	interference”.	Even	
by	1955,	when	Walter	“Pincher”	Smart	became	Southern	President,	he	recalled	that	











National	 control	 over	 local	 issues	 was	 problematic	 not	 only	 because	miners	 and	
officials	nationwide	did	not	understand	issues	as	well	as	the	people	involved,	but	also	





































as	 radical	 officials	 and	members	 preached	 the	 class	 war,	 the	 fact	 remained	 that	
miners	and	owners	often	had	interests	in	common.	Throughout	the	interwar	period	
the	Miners	Federation	called	 for	owners	 to	establish	cartels	and	criticised	owners	














that	 he	 often	 spoke	 to	 Arthur	 about	 horseracing	 and	 asked	 for	 insider	 tips.76	At	
smaller	mines	with	single	owners	and	several	dozen	miners	there	were	often	positive	
relationships	 between	 employers	 and	 employees	 and	 the	 interests	 of	 owner	 and	
workers	were	more	obviously	aligned.	During	strikes,	smaller	mines	would	offer	to	
pay	their	workers	double	to	stay	on	as	coal	prices	increased	due	to	decreased	supply.	
Both	miners	and	owners	 could	make	a	 lot	of	money,	even	 if	 it	meant	 the	miners	









wished	 to	 deal	 directly	with	 their	 employer	 because,	 “in	 the	words	 of	 one	 lodge	
official”,	the	Miners	Federation	executive	“has	never	veered	from	a	policy	of	using	
any	 minor	 pinprick	 as	 justification	 for	 poisoning	 the	 relations	 between	 the	
proprietors	and	their	employees”.80	
	
The	 mine	 owners	 and	 their	 organisations	 encouraged	 localism.	 C.M.	 McDonald,	
President	of	the	Northern	Collieries	Association,	said	that	“the	coalowners	deplore	
the	 cunning	 attempts	 being	 made	 to	 create	 a	 spirit	 of	 hostility	 and	 intolerance	
between	the	owners	and	the	mine	workers	whose	interests	are	practically	identical”.	





















phrase	monger”.	 Jack	 said	 “it	 is	 only	 rank	 and	 file	 control	 of	 the	workers,	 by	 the	
workers	that	will	allow	them	to	work	out	their	own	destiny	…	I	will	at	all	times	be	
subservient	 to	 the	 rank	 and	 file”. 83 	However,	 the	 CPA	 advocated	 “democratic	
centralism”	in	which	members	were	free	to	discuss	and	debate	an	issue	but	once	the	
majority	had	decided	all	members	must	fall	in	line	with	the	decision.	It	did	not	really	




the	 districts	 and	 replace	 the	 central	 council	 with	 a	 general	 secretary	 and	 five	
organisers.84	The	proposal	was	defeated	by	a	two	to	one	majority	and	even	many	
who	 voted	 for	 the	 MM	 plan	 did	 so	 more	 from	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 current	
leadership	 than	 from	 support	 for	 centralisation. 85 	Unlike	 the	 highly	 democratic	
Miners	Federation,	 the	CPA	was	an	authoritarian	hierarchy	which	extolled	“unity”	
through	 top-down	“iron	discipline”,	 similar	 to	 the	AWU	 in	organisation	but	not	 in	
ideology.86	For	example,	the	CPA	general	secretary	personally	chose	the	Communist	



















Finally,	 unemployment	 and	 underemployment	 caused	 by	 the	 Great	 Depression	
reinforced	some	miners’	local	loyalties.	Even	in	January	1928	before	the	Depression,	
the	Western	district	adopted	a	resolution	that	unemployed	members	of	the	district	










Advocates	 of	 Federation	 needed	 to	 overcome	 local	 loyalties	 and	 build	 a	 national	
mining	community	but	they	were	not	building	completely	from	scratch.	There	was	a	































which	 encouraged	 larger	 union	 organisation.	 Federation	 received	 encouragement	
from	 radical	 organisations	 including	 the	 IWW.	 In	 1911	 T.	 Johnson	 wrote	 to	 the	
Newcastle	 Herald	 encouraging	 his	 fellow	Northern	members	 to	 reject	 capitalism,	
form	a	 single	 industrial	mining	union	and	 join	 the	 IWW.102	From	around	1910	 the	
officials	of	the	various	regional	unions	increasingly	advocated	federation.	In	1911	the	
Northern	 miners	 appointed	 an	 organiser	 to	 work	 towards	 all	 coal	 unions	
combining.103	Three	quarters	(21	of	28)	of	delegates	at	a	quarterly	delegate	board	
meeting	supported	 the	move	 towards	 federation.104	President	David	Watson	said:	






























vehicle	 for	 a	 simplified	 socialist	 critique	 of	 capitalism”.107 	I	 disagree	 with	 Gollan;	







































phases	 in	 the	 interwar	 period,	 but	 the	 newspaper’s	 efforts	 to	 unite	 the	 miners	
nationally	remained	consistent	throughout.	By	its	very	nature	as	a	national	miners’	
newspaper	it	exposed	members	to	the	experiences	and	opinions	of	miners	in	other	















in	 Australian	mines	 and	 the	 newspaper	 published	 safety	 inspectors’	 reports	 from	
around	 the	 country.115 	When	 accidents	 occurred	 it	 also	 called	 for	 donations	 for	
victims	and	their	families.116	
	
Common	 Cause	 featured	many	 articles	 on	 the	 history	 of	 nineteenth-century	 coal	
mining	in	Australia	and	Britain	and	the	terrible	wages	and	conditions	which	had	only	
been	 improved	 by	 collective	 struggle. 117 	In	 the	 1920s	 editor	 Samuel	 Rosa,	 a	




the	 subsequent	 histories	 of	 Brian	 Fitzpatrick	 and	 Robin	 Gollan.	 It	 provided	 a	
materialist	 account	 by	 placing	 politics	 firmly	 in	 “the	 economic	 development	 of	
society”	and	highlighted	the	role	of	popular	struggle	in	political	and	social	change.119		


























national	 organisation,	 the	 Women’s	 Auxiliaries	 officially	 extended	 the	 Miners	
Federation’s	 national	 community	 to	minefield	women.	 They	were	 for	 the	 “wives,	















The	Auxiliaries	 took	 the	crucial	work	 that	women	had	done	to	 foster	 local	mining	
communities	 and	 brought	 it	 to	 the	 national	miners’	 community.	 They	 distributed	


















for	 support	of	 the	campaigns	of	 the	Federation”.128	The	Women’s	Auxiliaries’	 first	
objective	was	“to	assist	the	Miners	Federation	in	its	campaigns	to	safeguard	the	lives,	



































by	 focusing	 on	 three	 additional	 factors	 that	 contributed	 to	 the	 miners’	 class	
consciousness:	 the	Miners	 Federation	 leaders’	more	 practical	 application	 of	 their	






















uniting	 Australian	miners	 against	 a	 common	 enemy.	 It	was	 also	 derivative	 of	 the	
“class	struggle	ideology”	identified	by	Miriam	Dixson.134	
	
In	 1927	 the	 coal	 owners	 approached	 the	Miners	 Federation	 leadership	 to	 join	 a	
deputation	to	the	NSW	government	to	reduce	state	coal	charges.	As	we	saw	above,	
the	miners’	unions	and	owners	had	cooperated	 in	similar	ways	many	times	 in	the	
past,	but	not	 this	 time.	Three	years	 later	 the	SMH	was	still	decrying	 the	“ruthless	









It	 was	 straightforward	 compliance	 with	 their	 insistence	 that	 the	 owners	 and	 the	
workers	had	nothing	in	common.	They	were	showing	the	members	that	even	when	
the	interests	of	bosses	and	workers	appeared	to	be	aligned,	they	were	not	going	to	









renewed	 efforts	 to	 connect	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 with	 other	 working-class	
organisations.	The	 short-lived	Maritime	Transport	and	Mining	Union	 in	Newcastle	
included	the	Miners	Federation,	Seamen’s	Union	and	Waterside	Workers	Federation.	




Communist	 leadership	 from	 1934.	 After	 their	 election,	 Orr	 and	Nelson	 sought	 to	
revive	 the	 Combined	 Mining	 Unions	 Council	 which	 included	 all	 mining	 industry	
unions	and	had	collapsed	spectacularly	when	the	craft	unions	abandoned	the	Miners	
Federation	during	the	1929	Northern	lockout.138	Working-class	organisations	could	
be	 forgiven,	 but	 capitalists	 could	 not.	 The	 leaders	 encouraged	 a	 simple,	 militant	













when	 and	 how	 they	worked	 and	was	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 the	miners’	 spirit	 of	




















interwar	 period	 local	 ownership	was	 increasingly	 replaced	 by	 ownership	 by	 large	
companies.	Some	of	these	large	companies,	such	as	BHP,	adopted	an	authoritarian	
position	 and	 aggressively	 confronted	 the	miners,	while	 others	 such	 as	 the	Collins	







Collins	 House	 Group	 “were	 receptive	 to	 new	 ideas	 about	 industrial	 health	 and	
welfare	being	promoted	 in	Great	Britain	and	 the	United	States	as	part	of	 a	more	


















authoritarian	 management	 caused	 tense	 relations	 between	 owners	 and	 miners.	
From	the	late	1920s,	however,	the	influence	of	BHP	declined	and	the	Collins	House	
Group	 came	 to	 dominate	 the	 Broken	 Hill	 Mine	 Managers	 Association	 and	 “the	
acrimony	which	had	previously	 been	 felt	 between	 the	unions	 and	 the	 companies	
gave	way	to	an	attitude	of	‘give	and	take’”.145	
Broken	 Hill’s	 turn	 towards	 more	 cooperative	 mine	 management	 was	 more	 the	
exception	 than	 the	 norm,	 however.	 Beris	 Penrose’s	 analysis	 of	 lead	 poisoning	 in	
Mount	Isa	mine	in	the	1930s	provides	an	illustrative	case	study	of	the	dire	effects	of	








Some	 of	 these	 companies,	 again	 most	 notably	 BHP,	 introduced	 “scientific	
management”	 and	 production	 techniques.	 The	 ideas	 of	 “scientific	 management”	



































This	 poem	 reflected	 the	 view	 of	 many	 miners,	 probably	 most,	 that	 they	 were	
exploited	by	their	bosses	who	cared	more	about	profits	than	safety.	By	the	1930s,	



























Dolly	 Potter,	 a	 founding	 member	 of	 the	 Women’s	 Auxiliaries,	 recalled	 how	 the	
women	 cultivated	 this	 united	 “we”:	 “if	 it	wasn’t	 helping	 local	 causes	 it	would	 be	
raising	money	for	miners	elsewhere	caught	up	in	a	battle	with	the	bosses”.154	This	








Miners	 Federation	 needed	 to	 overcome	 longstanding	 local	 loyalties.	 The	 union’s	
officials	 and	 members	 built	 their	 national	 community	 through	 their	 national	
newspaper,	Common	Cause,	 shared	entertainment	 and	 sport,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
Women’s	Auxiliaries	and	the	development	of	class	consciousness.	In	explaining	the	
development	of	 class	 consciousness	 I	 have	 focused	especially	on	 three	previously	












By	 1935	 Broken	 Hill	 Proprietary	 (BHP)	 was	 the	 largest	 coal	 mining	 company	 in	
Australia.	 Looking	 approvingly	 at	 mechanisation	 in	 American	 coalmines,	 BHP	
announced	plans	to	open	the	first	fully	mechanised	coal	mine	in	Australia	at	Lambton	
B	 colliery	 near	 Newcastle	 in	 NSW.	 Militantly	 anti-union,	 the	 company	 saw	
mechanisation	 as	 a	 way	 of	 cutting	 costs	 and	 further	 weakening	 the	 Miners	
Federation	which	had	suffered	from	increasing	unemployment	since	the	First	World	




This	 case	 study	 is	 of	 the	 Miners	 Federations’	 unsuccessful	 five	 month	 campaign	
against	the	electric	coal	loader,	and	mechanisation	more	broadly,	from	September	
1935	to	January	1936.	The	campaign	has	received	little	attention	from	historians;	it	
was	 short	 and	 unsuccessful	 and	 seemed	 to	 be	 struggling	 against	 inevitable	
technological	 “progress”	 touted	 by	 capitalists	 and	Marxists	 alike.	 However,	 these	
contradictions	also	make	for	an	instructive	case	study.	We	see	a	Communist	Miners	























use	 this	 capital	 for	 development	 including	 further	mechanisation	 in	 its	 collieries.3	
Electric	loading	machines	would	be	used	to	load	coal	into	skips	at	the	coalface	and	
locomotives	would	replace	wheelers	and	horses	to	take	the	skips	to	the	surface.	In	
addition	 to	 the	 existing	 cutting	 and	 boring	machines,	 this	 would	 entail	 complete	




that	 with	 complete	 mechanisation	 “a	 single	 colliery	 in	 America	 is	 producing	 3.5	
million	tons	of	coal	annually.	Three	such	mines	could	supply	 the	whole	Australian	
market	and	ruin	all	other	coalmining	centres	 in	Australia”.5	Unlike	 in	other	unions	
such	 as	 the	 Australian	 Workers	 Union	 (AWU),	 however,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	
Central	 Council	 did	 not	 have	 absolute	power.	 In	 late	 September	 a	 conference,	 to	
which	 every	 lodge	 in	 the	 northern	 district	 sent	 a	 representative,	 met	 to	 decide	


















president	Charlie	Nelson	 said	 “the	price	of	 coal	 is	 considerably	below	 the	 cost	 of	
production,	 and	 is	 being	 maintained	 there	 by	 the	 intense	 exploitation	 and	
annihilation	of	the	coalminer.	The	time	has	arrived	for	a	definite	understanding,	and	







parties	knew	that	any	agreement	would	be	undercut	by	 rival	mines.	 In	 the	1920s	
most	mine	owners	belonged	to	the	Northern	Collieries	Association	but	by	1935	the	
two	largest	coal	companies,	BHP	and	J&A	Brown	Abermain	Seaham	Collieries,	were	
outside	 the	 Association	 and	 determined	 to	win	 a	 competitive	 price-war,	 as	were	
many	smaller	mines.10	Almost	all	the	small	mines	in	Australia	were	in	the	Northern	




Orr	 and	Nelson	were	both	members	 of	 the	CPA	and	 they	distributed	 a	 pamphlet	
criticising	 mechanisation	 in	 class	 struggle	 terms	 which	 concluded	 that	 “struggle	
between	the	coal	owners	and	the	mineworkers	is	inevitable".12	But	their	actions	in	
criticising	competition	and	calling	for	a	set	coal	price	tacitly	acknowledged	that	mine	
owners	 were	 not	 one	 united	 force	 and	 that	miners	 and	 owners	 had	 interests	 in	





























and	 municipal	 councils,	 business	 people,	 and	 others	 dependent	 on	 the	 industry,	
asking	for	their	cooperation	in	the	fight	against	rationalisation	and	mechanisation”.14	
In	November	1935	 the	Miners	 Federation	held	meetings	with	 small	 businesses	 in	
various	Newcastle	 districts	 and	 reported	 that	 “many	 small	 business	 people	 agree	
with	the	Miners	Federation	that	the	introduction	of	machinery	which	may	increase	



























taking	 the	 position	 against	 mechanisation	 Orr,	 Nelson	 and	 the	 CPA	 once	 again	












And	 again,	 this	 trend	 towards	mechanisation	opens	 a	 big	 field.	When	one	




















From	the	1910s	 it	had	adopted	a	strongly	anti-union	stance	across	 its	business.	 It	
brought	 many	 of	 its	 senior	 managers	 from	 the	 United	 States	 where	 they	 had	





The	 fight	 against	 further	mechanisation	 centred	 on	 Lambton	 B	 colliery.	 BHP	 had	
bought	the	mine	several	years	earlier	but	it	had	not	been	operational	since.	That	was	
about	 to	 change	 as	 the	 company	 began	 installing	 electric	 loading	 machines	 and	
electric	locomotives.25	Nelson	said	“the	gravity	of	the	position,	should	this	be	given	






B],	and	 the	 loading	machine	will	handle	between	300	 to	400	 tons	a	day.	This	 is	a	














“customs	and	traditions”	 is	 important.	Miners	Federation	 leaders	needed	to	work	




The	 central	 council	 ruled	 that	 no	Miners	 Federation	members	 were	 to	 work	 the	
mechanised	 loader.29	However,	 it	quickly	became	more	pragmatic	and	said	 that	 if	
BHP	was	prepared	to	concede	a	six	hour	day	and	a	guaranteed	minimum	wage	 it	





that	 the	 central	 council,	 Northern	 management	 committee	 and	 conference	 of	
northern	 lodge	 representatives	 had	 all	 declared	 against	 mechanisation.	 The	 final	
decision	 to	strike	was	up	 to	 the	men	at	Lambton	B	who	belonged	to	 the	Durham	
Miners'	Lodge.	On	11	November	a	lodge	meeting	held	outside	the	Lambton	B	colliery	
unanimously	 supported	 the	 strike.33	The	 fact	 that	 the	members	got	 to	decide	 the	
issue	exemplifies	the	high	levels	of	membership	decision-making	and	local	autonomy	
in	 the	Miners	 Federation.	 Simultaneously,	 however,	 it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 every	























Nationalist	 NSW	 Premier	 and	 Prime	 Minister	 during	 question	 time	 and	 the	
Nationalists	replied	that	mechanisation	was	good	because	cheap	coal	would	lead	to	
coal	 industry	expansion	and	more	 jobs.	Cheap	coal	would	also	cause	expansion	 in	
other	 industries	 that	 used	 coal. 37 	Jack	 Beasley	 in	 the	 House	 of	 Representatives	
proposed	a	select	committee	to	investigate	the	actions	of	BHP	on	numerous	grounds	
including	 “the	 proposal	 of	 the	 company	 further	 to	 mechanise	 the	 coal-bearing	





craft	 unions	 unanimously	 supported	 the	 Miners	 Federation’s	 anti-mechanisation	
policy	and	the	refusal	to	work	Lambton	B	while	the	electric	loader	was	in	operation.	
The	 craft	 unions	 involved	 were	 the	 Federated	 Engine-drivers	 and	 Firemen's	
Association	 (FEDFA),	 the	Amalgamated	Engineering	Union,	 the	Maitland	Deputies'	
Association,	the	Newcastle	Deputies'	Association,	the	Federated	Colliery	Mechanics'	
Association	and	the	Electricians'	Union.	The	unions	agreed	to	support	the	campaign	
subject	 to	 endorsement	 by	 their	members	which	 suggests	 similarly	 high	 levels	 of	
membership	 decision-making	 in	 the	 mining	 craft	 unions	 as	 in	 the	 Miners	
















solidarity	 with	 the	 Seamen’s	 Union.	 The	 seamen	 were	 striking	 over	 employers’	
victimisation	 of	 some	members.	 Again	 the	Miners	 Federation	 	 leaders’	 decisions	










solidarity	 and	 to	 the	 ultimate	 victory	 of	 this	 [working]	 class	 over	 their	 economic	
opponents”. 42 	The	 SMH	 said	 it	 was	 an	 attempt	 by	 the	 Communist	 Minority	
Movement	(MM)	to	restore	prestige	that	it	was	rapidly	losing	as	the	Seamen’s	strike	


















Miners	 Federation’s	 strong	 local	 organisation	 and	 autonomy,	 there	 were	 local	
leaders	able	to	lead	the	“no”	campaign.	The	secretary	of	the	Richmond	Main	lodge,	
for	 example,	 told	members	 "if	 you	accept	 this	 resolution,	 you	will	 be	 committing	
industrial	suicide”.45	
	
Following	 the	 decisive	 defeat	 of	 the	 strike	motion	 in	NSW	 the	 federal	 leadership	
continued	 to	 campaign	 for	 the	 strike	 in	 other	 states	 that	 had	 not	 yet	 voted.	
Extraordinarily,	 the	 leaders’	goal	was	to	win	a	national	majority	 for	the	strike	and	
force	 the	NSW	members	 to	 strike	against	 their	will.	 This	displays	a	hard,	national	
majoritarian	view	of	democracy	and	a	dismissal	of	local	autonomy	by	the	Communist	
leaders.	At	Ipswich	in	south	east	Queensland	Nelson	told	a	meeting	of	miners	that	
they	 should	 ignore	 the	 result	 in	NSW.	He	 appealed	 to	 the	miners	 by	 referring	 to	
pragmatic	“vital	 issues”	such	and	“mechanisation	of	industry”	and	“stabilisation	of	




of	67	 for	 the	 strike	demonstrates	 that	open	mass	votes	did	not	always	prevent	a	
minority	from	voicing	its	opinion.	Even	if	the	national	leaders	had	managed	to	win	a	
slim	majority	in	the	overall	vote,	it	seems	unlikely	that	they	could	have	successfully	
forced	 the	NSW	miners	 to	 strike	 against	 their	will.	 Local	 autonomy	 in	 the	Miners	




Although	 the	 leaders	 such	 as	 Orr	 and	 Nelson	 attempted	 to	 justify	 the	 strike	 in	
pragmatic	 as	 well	 as	 class	 terms,	 the	 members’	 voting	 suggests	 the	 pragmatic	
arguments	were	unconvincing	 then	and	 they	appear	equally	unconvincing	now.	 It	







leading	 the	 seamen’s	 strike,	 overcame	 pragmatic	 thinking	 for	 the	 leaders.	 Direct	
membership	decision-making	and	local	autonomy	saved	the	Miners	Federation	from	
pursuing	a	hopeless	and	disastrous	strike	which	would	have	left	it	broke	and	seriously	
weakened.	 This	 example	 runs	 counter	 to	 two	 widely	 held	 views	 in	 the	 union	
democracy	 scholarship:	 that	 leaders	 are	 usually	 more	 conservative	 than	 their	















demonstrates	 the	 strong	 local	 autonomy	 and	 complexity	 of	 Miners	 Federation	





















for	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 and	 it	 ended	 a	 five	 month	 campaign	 against	






leaders	 and	 joined	 the	 strike	 with	 disastrous	 results.	 The	 union’s	 high	 levels	 of	
democracy	had	hurt	it	in	that	instance	while	undemocratic	unions	like	the	AWU	had	
been	spared.	But	in	the	fight	against	mechanisation	and	the	unsuccessful	seamen’s	
strike	 between	 1935	 and	 1936	 the	Miners	 Federation’s	 democracy	 saved	 it.	 The	
members	resisted	their	leaders’	ill-conceived	call	to	join	a	disastrous	strike	in	which	
the	miners	would	have	been	starved	back	to	work	long	before	the	stockpiles	of	coal	
were	 exhausted.	 The	 Miners	 Federation’s	 new	 Communist	 leadership	 learned	 a	
valuable	lesson;	the	miners	were	not	easily	controlled	from	above.	This	case	study	
provides	an	example	of	union	members	being	 less	radical	and	more	sensible	than	
their	 leaders	which	 runs	 counter	 to	 the	 assumptions	 in	much	 of	 the	 trade	 union	































resulting	 improvements	 in	 democracy	 that	 occurred	 between	 1910	 and	 1939.	 By	
















We	 have	 seen	 how	 the	 Miners	 Federation’s	 strong	 occupational	 community	
facilitated	democracy	and	how	the	absence	of	such	in	the	AWU	promoted	oligarchy.	
In	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 there	 was	 not	 an	 occupational	 community	 per	 se,	 as	
members	came	 from	all	occupations	and	also	 included	professionals,	 farmers	and	
businessmen.	 But	 some	 local	 branches	 had	 strong	 roots	 in	 local	 working-class	
communities	 and	 this	 gave	 them	 significant	 power	 over	 local	 issues.	We	will	 see	
several	 examples	 of	 local	 branches	 winning	 victories	 over	 powerful	 state-level	
factions.	 These	 local	 communities	 had	 limited	 influence	 on	 the	 party	 as	 a	whole,	





the	 party	 at	 least	 one	 central	 executive	 and	 annual	 conference	 representative,	
enabled	 the	 ordinary	 members	 to	 directly	 elect	 representatives	 to	 the	 central	
executive,	and	allowed	for	the	development	of	local	power	bases	independent	of	the	
state-level	factions.	The	party	leaders	were	motivated	to	institute	these	changes	by	
pressure	 from	 ordinary	 members,	 desire	 to	 enhance	 their	 own	 popularity	 and	
legitimacy,	their	support	for	internal	democracy,	and	the	need	to	curb	infighting.	
	
Historians	 have	 incorrectly	 assumed	 that	 it	 was	 always	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 the	
controlling	 faction	 to	make	 the	 party	 less	 democratic.2	I	will	 demonstrate	 several	















file	 decision-making,	 internal	 opposition	 and	 free	 communication	 are	 equally	
important	 for	 party	 democracy	 as	 for	 union	 democracy.	 Political	 parties	 will	 not	
usually	have	an	occupational	community	because	their	members	will	come	from	a	
diverse	range	of	occupations,	but	a	strong	party	community	from	the	local	branch	







leaders	 came	 from	 such	diverse	backgrounds	 and	most	 extra-parliamentary	party	
positions	were	unpaid.	Political	parties	also	have	an	additional	category	of	members,	
the	politicians.	The	status	of	 the	politicians	compared	with	the	members,	and	the	
extent	 to	 which	 a	 party	 controls	 its	 politicians,	 is	 an	 important	 additional	
consideration	when	assessing	party	democracy,	which	I	address	in	chapter	nine.	The	





NSW	 unionists	 in	 the	 interwar	 period	 frequently	 argued	 that	 trade	 union	 power	











faith	 by	 placing	 them	 in	 charge	 of	 their	 economic	 and	 industrial	 affairs”	 because	
“they	express	an	opinion,	or	even	dare	to	express	the	desires	of	the	rank	and	file	they	








have	 a	 party	 machine	 run	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 a	 fascist	 dictatorship”.5	This	 line	 of	
reasoning	was	that	trade	unions	were	democratic	organisations	and	therefore	their	








political	 ambition	 who	 indulged	 in	 corrupt	 practices	 to	 further	 their	 own	
interest	and	the	 interest	of	whichever	faction	supported	them	at	the	time.	
The	 factions	 themselves	 did	 deals	 and	 switched	 allegiances	 with	 every	
appearance	of	cynicism.6	
More	recently,	Rodney	Cavalier	argued	similarly	that	




















note	 of	 inevitability	 and	 even	 timelessness	 to	 the	 party’s	 oligarchy	 presented	 by	
Rawson,	 and	much	of	 the	 subsequent	 historiography,	which	 gives	 it	 a	Michelsian	
flavour	even	though	no	historian	engages	with	Michels	or	his	iron	law	of	oligarchy.	
	
Rawson	argues	 that	 in	 the	many	disputes	which	divided	 the	party	 in	 the	 interwar	
period	 “it	 is	 difficult	 to	 determine	 any	 clearly-marked	 differences	 of	 principle	























rules	 to	entrench	 their	 power.	Cavalier	 argues	 that	 the	1916	Conference	was	 the	






































frequently	 expelling	 them	 from	 the	 party.	 Eventually	 the	 stage	 is	 reached	
where	there	are	at	least	as	many	unions	outside	as	inside	the	ruling	group.	





inevitability	 of	 the	 process	 also	 obscures	 important	 changes	 that	 occurred	
throughout	the	period	and	underplays	the	influence	of	countervailing	forces.	
	
Dixson,	 and	more	 recently	 Geoffrey	 Robinson,	 have	 also	 analysed	 interwar	 NSW	
Labor	 in	 terms	 of	 union	 power	 bases.	 They	 are	 less	 concerned	 with	 internal	
organisation	 than	 Rawson	 and	 Cavalier	 and,	 unlike	 them,	 they	 are	 supportive	 of	
union	power	because	they	argue	it	caused	the	second	Lang	NSW	government	to	be	
“the	most	radical	government	in	Australian	history”.	This	was	not	because	of	“Lang’s	






union	 support	was	especially	apparent	after	1934,	and	 it	was	 then	 that	 the	 Inner	
Group	increasingly	used	the	advantages	of	incumbency	and	corruption	to	maintain	











arguments	 of	 Dixson	 and	 Robinson	 on	 one	 side	 and	 Rawson	 and	 Cavalier	 on	 the	
other.	For	Rawson	and	Cavalier	the	factional	battles	are	almost	entirely	about	“men	
without	principle	[vying]	for	power”	whereas	for	Dixson	and	Robinson	the	 leading	
trade	 unionists	 were	 seeking	 influence,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 for	 ideological	 causes.	
Unsurprisingly,	there	is	truth	on	both	sides	and	I	demonstrate	that	both	ideology	and	
personal	 power	 were	 key	 drivers	 for	 most	 participants.	 	 It	 is	 not	 his	 focus,	 but	
Robinson	 briefly	 provides	 some	 explanation	 of	 the	 underlying	 forces	 behind	 the	
ideological	radicalism	in	NSW.	He	says	that	unlike	in	the	rest	of	Australia	“in	NSW	the	
left	was	eventually	victorious”	because	“miners	had	more	weight	in	NSW	labour,	the	
ambitions	 of	 the	 AWU	 divided	 it	 from	 potential	 allies,	 but	 personalities	 were	
significant,	the	leadership	of	the	NSW	left	was	more	pragmatic,	the	centre	of	trade	





officials	 to	 rank	and	 file	members”.21	He	was	a	 large,	 imposing	man	appropriately	
nicknamed	“the	Big	Fella”.	Dixson	argues	that	he	possessed	many	of	the	key	features	
of	 Australian	 masculinity:	 “physical	 strength,	 anti-intellectualism,	 anti-
authoritarianism-in-conjunction-with-authoritarianism	 in	 personal	 relationships;	
‘underdoggery’;	 an	 emotional	 bleakness	 and,	 correlatively,	 a	 tendency	 to	 keep	





















Historians	 contend	 that	 Lang	 and	 the	 Inner	 Group	 finally	 lost	 power	 in	 1939	 in	
conformity	with	Rawson’s	pattern	above.	 They	overreached	and	 refused	 to	 share	
power	 with	 the	 union	 leaders;	 the	 ousted	 union	 leaders	 combined	 to	 create	 an	
opposition	coalition	and	eventually	defeated	Lang.	The	fact	that	it	was	increasingly	








on	 “the	urban	 craft	 unions,	 or	maritime,	 coal	mining	 and	other	 unskilled	 unions”	
which	 all	 shared	 a	 “localised,	 participatory	 mode	 of	 organisation”.	 From	 1895,	
however,	 with	 the	 unions	 greatly	 weakened	 by	 the	 1890s	 strikes,	 the	 AWU	 and	
professional	Labor	politicians	imposed	their	“more	centralised,	bureaucratic	form	of	


















Like	 the	 AWU	 and	 Miners	 Federation,	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party’s	 community	 was	 a	
combination	of	local	face-to-face	community	in	the	local	branches	and	an	imagined	
community	 across	 the	 state.	 As	 with	 the	Worker	 newspapers	 in	 the	 AWU	 and	
Common	 Cause	 in	 the	Miners	 Federation,	 party	 newspapers	 such	 as	 Labor	 News	
(1918-24)	 and	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 (1922-38)	 were	 crucial	 in	 creating	 the	 state-wide	
imagined	community.	In	1928	Rozelle	East	branch	member	A.E.	Arundel	commended	
the	 Labor	 Daily	 for	 doing	 “something	 to	 bind	 [the	 party’s]	 scattered	 sections	
together”.28	
In	 1929	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 reported	 branch	 membership	 of	 24,361. 29	
Unfortunately	membership	figures	are	not	available	for	other	years	because	it	would	
be	instructive	to	see	how	they	rose	and	fell	in	response	to	circumstances	inside	and	

































that	branch	membership	was	highest	during	 three	periods	of	 state-level	 factional	
struggle:	 between	 Lang	 and	 the	 AWU	 (mid-1920s),	 between	 Lang	 and	 the	
Socialisation	Units	(mid-1930s)	and	between	Lang	and	the	Industrialists	(late-1930s).	




view	 from	 below	 presents	 an	 explanation	 for	 particular	 events	 rather	
different	from	the	generally	accepted	view	from	above.	The	rank	and	file,	at	
least	in	Glebe,	have	not	always	conformed	to	the	generalisations	that	party	




















strike,	 local	 party	 members	 raised	 money	 through	 house	 parties,	 gift	 evenings,	
euchre	 parties,	 dances,	 street	meetings	 and	 doorknocking.	 The	 party’s	 organising	
secretary	A.J.	Macpherson	also	made	collections	outside	the	Sydney	Cricket	Ground	





wide	 events.	 In	 1924	 the	 party	 held	 its	 first	 annual	 picnic	 and	 4,000	 members	
attended	at	Clifton	Gardens	in	Mosman	in	north-east	Sydney.	Attendees	participated	
in	a	wide	range	of	sporting	events	and	 family	activities.39	That	year	 the	party	also	




Daphne	 Houghton	 of	 Balmain	 Queen	 of	 the	 May.	 Houghton	 was	 surrounded	 by	
heralds,	pages,	and	maids	of	honour	and	dressed	in	a	white	satin	and	crimson	cloak	
























it	 had	 on	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 community,	 with	 women	 coordinating	 welfare,	
distributing	propaganda	and	organising	entertainment	and	sporting	events.	But	 in	
addition	 to	 this	more	 traditionally	 female	work,	 from	 the	early	 twentieth	 century	
Labor	Party	women	also	began	to	perform	more	traditionally	male	public	political	
roles:	 acting	 as	 delegates,	 running	 in	 internal	 elections	 and	 speaking	 at	 political	
rallies.43	The	party	rules	provided	affirmative	action	for	women	delegates	to	annual	
conference	which	 I	will	discuss	 in	more	detail	below.	Labor	women	also	 formed	a	
Women's	 Central	 Organising	 Committee	 in	 1904	which,	 by	 1930,	 represented	 26	
metropolitan	branches	and	six	unions.44	The	party	organised	social	sport	for	women	
including	 tennis	and	vigoro	 (a	sport	combining	 tennis	and	cricket).45	In	 its	 internal	







and	 husbands	 able	 to	 support	 them	 should	 be	 forced	 to	 give	 their	 jobs	 to	











should	 be	 allowed	 to	 run	 for	 office,	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 editorial	maintained	 that	 as	






The	 Labor	 Daily	 recorded	 local	 branch	 affairs	 in	 significant	 detail.	 In	 1924	 the	
newspaper	 reported	 that	 the	 Edgecliff	 branch	 Christmas	 tree	 committee	 had	













zealots	 should	 imagine	 themselves	 capable	 of	 educating	 anyone”.52	For	 the	 SMH	
editors,	the	fact	that	T.	Paine,	a	former	member	of	the	CPA,	was	the	President	of	the	
inaugural	Labor	Party	speaking	class	confirmed	their	suspicions.	By	1930	there	were	
100	 pupils	 participating	 in	 classes	 in	 the	 federal	 electorates	 of	 East	 Sydney	 and	












important	 centres”	 had	 “the	 object	 of	 training	 young	men	 to	 become	 proficient	
platform	 speakers”. 54 	These	 classes	 were	 more	 empowering	 than	 indoctrinating	
because	 they	 were	 teaching	 skills	 which	 could	 be	 used	 to	 advocate	 any	 political	
position	 rather	 than	 teaching	 oversimplified	working-class	 economic	 and	 political	
theory.	
	
Local	 branches	were	 strongest	where	 they	were	 built	 upon	 existing	 communities	












the	union	bureaucracies	 at	 the	 state	 level.	On	 the	annual	 conference	and	 central	
executive	 the	 unions,	 which	 usually	 meant	 the	 union	 leaders,	 enjoyed	 majority	















leagues	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 exercise	 power	 within	 the	 party.	 They	 were	




















convincing	 kind.	 Conferences	 in	 those	 days	 were	 occasions	 on	 which	
everybody	 accused	 everybody	 else	 of	 the	 basest	motives,	 and	 the	 lowest	


















year’s	 annual	 conference	 “compared	 more	 than	 favourably	 with	 former	 ALP	








number	 of	 votes	were	 elected.	 Block	 voting	 is	 renowned	 for	 its	 disproportionate	
representation	 of	 voters.	 Factions	 can	 promote	 “tickets”,	 organised	 lists	 of	
candidates	for	the	election,	and	the	most	popular	ticket	is	guaranteed	to	win	every	






the	NSW	Labor	 Party	 from	1916	 to	 1927.	 Even	when	 its	 advantage	was	 slim,	 the	
faction	 with	 the	 most	 annual	 conference	 delegates	 won	 every	 central	 executive	











the	 vote	 was	 divided	 between	 two	 tickets	 that	 each	 achieved	 30	 per	 cent.	 This	
oversimplifies	things	somewhat	because	some	popular	individuals	appeared	on	more	




This	 system	 also	 encouraged	 party	 splits.	 In	 1919,	 for	 example,	 the	 conservative	
faction	enjoyed	a	slight	majority	of	127	annual	conference	delegates	to	the	militant	
faction’s	 112	 delegates.	 But	 this	 bare	majority	 still	 gave	 the	 conservative	 faction	
every	position	on	the	central	executive.	Rawson	argued	that	“the	voting	on	[previous]	
issues	had	not	prepared	the	Industrialists	for	the	result	of	the	ballot	for	the	central	
executive	 which	 was	 almost	 a	 clean	 sweep	 for	 the	 ‘Moderate’	 faction…	 their	
overwhelming	defeat	left	the	Industrialists	ready	to	believe	that	the	ballot	had	been	
interfered	with”.65	But	this	argument	reveals	Rawson’s	lack	of	understanding	of	block	





Party.	 In	 1916	 Arthur	 Blakeley	 from	 the	 AWU	Western	 Branch	 submitted	 a	 new	





















to	 prevent	 individuals	 sitting	 on	 the	 branch	 executives	 and/or	 federal	 executive	
council	and	also	being	annual	convention	delegates.	The	AWU	annual	convention	and	












two	 representatives	 from	 rural	 local	branches.70	The	multi-talented	Voigt	was	 the	
primary	author	of	 the	1927	Rules.71	Short,	 lean	and	athletic,	Voigt	was	 the	5	mile	
running	 gold	 medallist	 at	 the	 1908	 London	 Olympics,	 and	 had	 emigrated	 from	
England	in	1911.	In	Australia	he	worked	as	a	mechanical	engineer	before	joining	the	
Labor	Council	research	bureau	and	becoming	a	Trades	Hall	Red.	In	1925,	he	founded	
the	 Labor	 Council’s	 radio	 station	 2KY,	 became	Willis’s	 private	 secretary	 and	 soon	
abandoned	 revolutionary	 communism.72	Voigt	 argued	 that	 the	 1927	 Rules	would	












which	would	 instead	 be	 “fixed	 back	 there	 by	 the	 rank	 and	 file”.74	The	 new	 rules	
largely	fulfilled	these	promised	democratic	improvements.	
	
The	 Labor	 Party	 branches	 in	 each	 state	 electorate	 formed	 an	 electorate	 council.	
Under	the	1927	Rules,	electorate	councils	came	together	 in	groupings	of	five,	and	
each	 grouping	 elected	 two	 (rural	 electorate	 councils)	 or	 three	 (metropolitan	 and	








depending	 on	 each	 union’s	 level	 of	 democracy,	 as	 had	 been	 the	 case	 under	 the	
former	 rules.	 In	 some	unions	 such	as	 the	AWU	and	Miners	 Federation,	 delegates	
were	 elected	 by	 membership	 vote,	 while	 in	 others	 they	 were	 selected	 by	 the	
leadership.75	As	we	saw	in	chapters	one	and	two,	even	in	some	unions	like	the	AWU	
where	members	elected	 the	delegates,	 the	elections	were	 so	undemocratic	 as	 to	
essentially	 amount	 to	 leadership	 selection.	 Kilburn,	 a	 member	 of	 the	 rules	
committee,	 dismissed	 AWU	 criticism	 of	 the	 new	 rules.	 He	 said	 that	 the	 criticism	













But	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 central	 executive	was	 elected	 in	 a	 group	 system.	 Voigt	
based	the	system	on	the	group	system	that	the	NSW	Labor	Council	had	adopted	in	




There	 were	 also	 four	 electorate	 council	 groups.	 The	 metropolitan	 and	 district	
electorate	 council	 group	 elected	 four	 central	 executive	 representatives,	 and	 the	





































has	 been	 some	 historical	 debate	 over	 whether	 the	 new	 rules	 were	 in	 fact	 a	
Communist	conspiracy.	Rawson	said	that	“once	the	rules	saw	the	light	of	day	it	was	





be	 deemed	 a	 fit	 and	 proper	 person	 to	 represent	 his	 organisation	 at	 the	 annual	
conference”,	 and	 argued	 that	 “many	 Communists	 and	 their	 friends	 would	 have	
become	delegates	under	 this	 rule,	 so	 in	 this	sense	the	rules	were	 ‘red’”.85	Dixson,	
however,	was	mistaken.	An	individual	needed	to	be	a	Labor	Party	member	to	become	
a	conference	delegate.	The	rules	barred	members	of	other	organisations	which	ran	
parliamentary	 candidates,	which	at	 the	 time	 included	 the	Communist	Party,	 from	































electorate	 council	 and	 trade	 union	 group	 came	 together	 to	 elect	 the	 group’s	
conference	delegates	in	a	single	vote.	In	fact,	electorate	councils	and	trade	unions	































union	 and	 electorate	 council	 group	 selecting	 at	 least	 one	 representative.	 This	
position	 sharing	 guaranteed	 that	 there	 would	 always	 be	 a	 minority	 factional	
opposition	on	the	central	executive.	For	example,	the	militant	faction	would	never	
control	the	three	AWU	representatives.	The	positions	were	dispersed	so	widely	and	
evenly	 throughout	 the	 party	 that	 the	 position	 sharing	 caused	 a	 genuine	
decentralisation	of	power.	
	
Two	 additional	 changes	 further	 instituted	 power	 decentralising.	 First,	 every	 party	
member	 in	 NSW	 could	 now	 vote	 directly	 for	 their	 respective	 electorate	 council	
representatives	 on	 the	 central	 executive.	 In	 1928,	 3,419	 local	 branch	 members,	
divided	 into	 their	 four	 groups,	 directly	 elected	 the	 ten	 electorate	 council	
representatives.	 That	 this	was	 only	 around	 15	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total	membership,	
however,	 casts	 doubt	 on	 how	 effectively	 the	 party	 facilitated	 membership	






allowed	 electors	 to	 vote	 for	 “third	 party”	 candidates	without	wasting	 their	 vote.	
Willis	 had	 observed	 the	 democratic	 advantages	 of	 preferential	 voting	 within	 the	















union	 in	 NSW	 with	 over	 21,000	 members,	 this	 was	 presumably	 by	 the	 militant	
faction’s	design.	The	AWU	could	justifiably	complain	that	it	should	have	received	five	
rather	than	three	places	on	the	central	executive	(35,000	members	divided	by	7,000	







councils	 in	 five-member	 electorates	 had	 elected	 five	 delegates	 plus	 two	 woman	
delegates	to	annual	conference,	and	electorate	councils	in	three	member	electorates	
had	elected	three	delegates	plus	one	woman	delegate.99	Kate	Deverall	argued	that	






















“the	 group	 system	 also	 made	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	 women	 to	 combine	 forces	 on	
conference	floor	in	support	of	particular	people	or	policies”.102	These	arguments	are	
plausible,	 but	 it	 seems	 more	 likely	 that	 grouping	 Labor	 women	 together	 in	 the	
metropolitan	electorate	council	group	would	improve	their	chances	of	gaining	places	




overall	 gender	 composition	 of	 the	 central	 executive	 did	 not	 change	 notably:	 five	
women	out	of	32	members	in	1926,	and	four	women	out	of	30	members	in	1928.103	
	
Panebianco	would	expect	 the	 leadership	 to	decentralise	power	 in	 response	 to	an	
increase	 in	 the	 substitutability	 of	 the	 organisational	 incentives	 that	 the	 party	
provided	its	members.	But	no	significant	increases	are	apparent	around	1927.	The	
most	 obvious	 way	 that	 the	 substitutability	 of	 the	 organisational	 incentives	 could	
increase	 significantly	 in	 the	 short	 term	 is	 through	 the	emergence	of	 a	 rival	party.	
According	to	Panebianco,	the	decentralisation	of	power	would	therefore	have	been	
more	likely	in	1919	when	breakaways	formed	a	rival	party,	or	in	the	early	1920s	when	
the	Communist	Party	of	Australia	was	on	 the	 rise,	or	especially	 in	1931	when	the	






to	1927.104	It	was	not	high	 substitutability	of	 the	party’s	organisational	 incentives	















NSW	Trade	Union	 Conference,	 for	 example,	 passed	 a	motion	 by	 125	 votes	 to	 13	
supporting	“the	principle	of	election	of	the	ALP	Executive	directly	from	the	industrial	
trade	union	groups	and	electoral	groups,	in	place	of	promiscuous	election	from	the	





members,	 the	 leadership’s	 legitimacy	 depended	 on	 its	 ability	 to	 be	 seen	 to	 be	
pursuing	“rank	and	file	control”.107	
	
Support	 for	 internal	democracy	amongst	the	 leaders	and	their	desire	to	make	the	
party	 organisation	 fairer	 and	 stronger	 was	 also	 a	 factor.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	
































not	necessarily	 involve	 sharing	power.	 Furthermore,	 removing	 the	election	of	 the	

























the	 majority	 of	 annual	 conference	 and	 central	 executive	 representatives	 and	 it	
appears	 that	within	most	 trade	 unions	 the	 leaders	 firmly	 controlled	 their	 union’s	
representatives.	This	was	certainly	the	case	in	the	AWU,	and	it	allowed	a	relatively	
small	number	of	 key	union	 leaders	 to	 form	a	coalition	and	effectively	 control	 the	
party	with	minimal	input	from	the	thousands	of	ordinary	party	and	union	members.	
The	fact	that	trade	union	 leaders	continued	to	enjoy	paramount	power	under	the	




in	 the	 introduction,	 that	 the	 rule	 of	 Lang	 and	 the	 Inner	 Group	 was	 not	 actually	
oligarchical	and	that	it	only	appeared	that	way	because	of	“a	broad	consensus	in	the	
party”.115 	Most	 party	 members	 supported	 Lang,	 and	most	 of	 those	 who	 did	 not	




































Lang’s	 domination	 of	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 in	 the	 1930s	 is	 one	 of	 countless	
international	 examples	 of	 the	 strong	 tendency	 towards	 oligarchy	 within	 formally	
democratic	 political	 parties.	 The	 1927	 Rules	 contained	 a	 key	 flaw	 from	 the	
perspective	of	party	democracy	in	that	they	invested	a	large	amount	of	power	in	the	




Lang	and	his	allies	were	able	 to	use	 their	positions	 further	 to	entrench	 their	own	
power.	Contrary	to	Panebianco’s	expectations,	this	shift	towards	oligarchy	occurred	
















enabling	 the	ordinary	members	 to	elect	 central	executive	 representatives	directly	
and	allowing	 for	 the	development	of	 local	power	bases	 independent	of	 the	state-
level	factions.	The	militant	faction	leaders	were	motivated	to	institute	these	reforms	
by	 pressure	 from	 ordinary	 members,	 a	 desire	 to	 increase	 their	 legitimacy	 and	
popularity,	support	for	a	degree	of	internal	democracy,	and	with	the	goal	of	reducing	
infighting.	 The	1927	Rules	 therefore	 support	 those	who	have	 argued,	 contrary	 to	
Michels,	that	political	parties	can	successfully	repel	the	tendency	towards	oligarchy,	















chapter	 focuses	 on	 three:	 factionalism,	 membership	 decision–making	 and	 local	






The	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 generally	 tolerated	 factionalism.	 Factions	 enhanced	 party	
democracy	 throughout	 the	 period	 by	 holding	 one	 another	 to	 account,	 providing	
opposition	in	elections	and	stimulating	membership	interest	and	debate.	Trade	union	
affiliation	 had	mixed	 effects	 here.	 Supporting	 democracy,	 individual	 trade	 unions	
were	 the	most	 important	building	blocks	of	 the	party-wide	 factions.	Undermining	
democracy,	however,	each	union	also	operated	within	the	party	as	 its	own	quasi-
faction	 and	 the	 power	 of	 each	 union	 was	 not	 necessarily	 proportionate	 to	 its	
membership	numbers.	All	unions	operated	as	quasi-factions,	even	those	with	only	
one	 delegate,	 but	 the	 larger	 the	 union	 the	more	 likely	 it	was	 to	wield	 significant	
power.	
	
Pre-selections	 of	 parliamentary	 candidates	 were	 the	 primary	 site	 of	 direct	
membership	 decision-making	 within	 the	 party.	 Over	 time,	 however,	 the	 central	
executive	 increasingly	 took	 this	 power	 for	 itself.	 Local	 party	 communities	 were	










with	 equal	 representation	 from	 unequally	 sized	 state	 branches	 and	 three	 steps	
removed	 from	members	 (branch	members	à	 electorate	 council	à	 state	 annual	
conference	à	 federal	 conference/executive).	 This	 assertion	 of	 NSW	 branch	 local	








leaders,	 failed	 to	 hold	 annual	 conferences,	 barred	 unions	 from	 electing	 certain	









Prime	 Minister	 Billy	 Hughes.	 But	 historians	 have	 not	 adequately	 recognised	 the	
importance	of	the	1923	dispute	between	the	politicians	and	the	AWU	faction.	This	
was	the	first	time	a	central	executive	asserted	the	right	to	choose	the	parliamentary	




Throughout	 the	 interwar	 period	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 broadly	 tolerated	 internal	









above	 two,	 alliances	will	 form:	 people	 have	 ideas	 in	 common,	 interests	 in	
common.	 Ambitions	 overlapping	 cause	 individuals	 to	 coalesce	 …	 Alliances	











Albert	Willis	was	 a	 leading	 organiser	 for	 the	militant	 faction	 but,	when	 his	 ticket	





Rule	30	provided	that	“if	any	members	are	 found	holding	secret	meetings	 for	 the	
















appeals	committee.	Tickets	 for	 these	committees	were	now	against	 the	 rules	and	
needed	to	be	organised	in	secret;	the	days	of	openly	handing	out	“how	to	vote”	cards	







As	 I	explained	 in	 the	 introduction	to	this	 thesis,	 from	1923	to	1931	the	party	was	
divided	 into	 two	main	 factions,	a	controlling	militant	 faction	 led	by	Willis	and	 the	





alternatives	 in	elections	and	 stimulating	membership	 interest	 and	debate.	 Indeed	
organised	opposition	 is	one	of	the	reasons	historians	have	so	much	evidence;	any	
alleged	misconduct	was	widely	 publicised	 by	 rivals.	 The	 ballot-box	 scandal	 is	 one	
example.	Unions	such	as	the	AWU	and	Miners	Federation	and	union	leaders	such	as	















movement	 and	 those	 of	 the	 Inner	 Group;	most	 socialisation	 leaders	 were	 junior	
union	officials	under	40	years	old.9	Clarrie	Martin,	for	example,	was	a	Teachers	Union	
official	who	lived	and	organised	in	Sydney,	Newcastle	and	then	Young	on	the	south	
west	 slopes	 of	 NSW.	 His	 grandson	 Nick	 Martin	 argued	 that	 he	 “represented	 a	
different	strand	within	the	NSW	ALP	from	the	dominant	industrial	left”	with	a	guild	

































At	 the	 1933	 metropolitan	 conference	 the	 socialisation	 units	 enjoyed	 a	 strong	














union	members,	 let	 alone	 the	wider	 electorate.	 Several	 years	 earlier	Martin	 had	
lamented	in	his	diary	the	absence	of	the	radicalism	necessary	to	implement	socialism:	
“the	people	seem	to	be	growing	even	more	conservative	and	I	am	convinced	that	we	
will	 never	 have	 a	 chance	 of	 introducing	 any	 radical	 measures	 and	 also	 winning	
office”,	he	wrote.16		
	
Perhaps	most	 important	 of	 all,	 the	 socialisation	 units	 did	 not	 win	much	 support	
amongst	union	 leaders.	The	second	Lang	government	had	done	enough	to	please	





















from	 the	 1920s	 and	 early	 1930s	 such	 as	Willis,	 Garden,	Oscar	 Schreiber	 and	 Ted	
Magrath.		
At	 a	 1936	 anti-Lang	Conference	Robert	 (Bob)	 King,	NSW	 Labor	 Council	 Secretary,	
recalled	his	time	on	the	committee	that	decided	Labor’s	1932	election	slogan.	The	
committee	 decided	 on	 “Labor	 is	 right	 and	 Labor	 is	 always	 right”.	 They	 sent	 it	 to	
Macquarie	Street	and	“heard	no	more	about	it”	until	they	saw	pamphlets	and	posters	



















Opponents	 threw	every	 insult	 they	could	 think	of	at	Lang	and	his	allies.	 Lang	was	
“dictator-in-chief”,	23	“arrogant”,	“tyrannical”	and	“reckless”.24	His	Inner	Group	was	
the	“old	gang”25,	a	“junta”,	a	“fascist	dictatorship”26,	an	“oligarchy”27,	“treacherous	
and	 dishonest	 political	 gangsters” 28 ,	 “yes	 men”,	 “crawlers”,	 “time-servers”,	
“splitters”29,	“lower	than	the	sewer	rats”30,	“ballot-fakers	and	rule	 jugglers”.31	The	
Inner	Group	tried	to	suppress	internal	opposition,	as	we	will	see	in	detail	below	in	
the	 section	 on	 local	 autonomy,	 but	 they	 were	 unsuccessful	 largely	 due	 to	 the	




unsuccessful	 but	 it	 marked	 the	 beginnings	 of	 tactics	 that	 were	 more	 fully	 and	





those	 officials	 supported	 Lang.	 The	 central	 executive	 withdrew	 the	 municipal	
endorsements	of	W.E.R.	Bates	and	J.	Morey,	both	of	the	Clerks	Union.32	The	Inner	
Group	also	resorted	to	bribery	and	gave	Trades	Hall	typists	movie	tickets	in	return	
for	 their	 votes	 in	 a	 Clerks	Union	ballot.33	None	of	 these	 Inner	Group	 attempts	 to	
control	the	unions	was	successful.	As	we	saw	with	the	Miners	Federation	in	chapter	























the	 preamble	 and	 constitution	 of	 the	 AWU	 shall	 not	 be	 eligible	 to	 continue	 his	
membership	 in	 the	 union”. 34 	This	 provision	 potentially	 undermined	 Labor	 Party	
democracy	 as	 once	 an	 AWU	member	 became	 a	 politician	 they	 were	 pledged	 to	
following	 the	policy	of	 the	party’s	annual	conference	and	caucus	decisions.	When	
AWU	 and	 Labor	 Party	 policy	 diverged,	 the	 AWU	 constitution	 attempted	 to	 force	
“their”	politicians	to	privilege	AWU	policy	over	Labor	Party	policy.	
	
The	 internally	 democratic	 Miners	 Federation	 also	 attempted	 to	 control	 “their”	
politicians	in	a	similar	way.	With	its	members	concentrated	in	mining	electorates,	the	
Miners	 Federation	 was	 in	 the	 strongest	 position	 of	 any	 union	 in	 the	 state	 to	
successfully	promote	or	block	the	pre-selection	of	politicians.	Coalfields	MPs	could	





















valid	 from	a	democratic	 standpoint	with	 the	added	advantage	of	promoting	 local	
autonomy.		
	
The	 Clerks	 Union	 was	 another	 union	 that	 tried	 to	 wield	 disproportionate	 power	
within	the	Labor	Party.	All	Labor	Party	members	had	to	belong	to	a	union	and	the	
most	 common	 union	 for	 Labor	 politicians	 was	 the	 Clerks	 Union	 which	 organised	
office	 support	 workers.	 This	 was	 the	 closest	 fit	 for	 many	 Labor	 MPs	 who	 were	











































significant	 site	 of	 direct	 member	 decision	 making	 was	 in	 pre-selecting	 Labor	
candidates	 to	 contest	 NSW	 Legislative	 Assembly	 seats	 and	 federal	 House	 of	
Representative	 seats	 for	 NSW.	 Several	 months	 before	 an	 election	 the	 branch	
members	and	trade	unionists	could	vote	in	the	pre-selection	ballot	for	their	preferred	
candidate	in	the	electorate	in	which	they	lived.	Given	that	the	central	executive	had	
complete	 power	 between	 annual	 conferences,	 however,	 membership	 decision-
making	power	over	pre-selections	was	never	absolute.	
	
By	 1910	 the	 party	 rules	 stated	 that	 the	 central	 executive	 could	 choose	 the	
parliamentary	 candidate	 for	 an	 electorate	 if	members	 had	 not	 chosen	 one	 three	
months	 before	 a	 general	 election	 or	 one	 month	 before	 a	 by-election.	 The	 1911	

































Prior	 to	 the	 1927	 Rules,	 annual	 conference	 delegates	 were	 generally	 chosen	 by	
electorate	 councils	 which	were	 themselves	made	 up	 of	 delegates	 elected	 by	 the	









therefore	one	 step	 removed	 from	the	ordinary	members	 (members	à	 electorate	
council	à	annual	conference	delegates).	Yet	in	1926	the	central	executive	insisted	
that	delegates	be	elected	directly	by	 the	ordinary	members	 in	 certain	electorates	
where	 the	 electorate	 council	 was	 known	 to	 be	 controlled	 by	 opponents	 of	 the	
controlling	faction.44	The	controlling	faction	knew	it	had	a	better	chance	of	winning	
at	 least	 some	of	 the	delegate	positions	 though	 a	direct	membership	 vote.	 This	 is	











The	 miners’	 strong	 occupational	 community	 and	 organisation,	 as	 well	 as	 their	
localism,	meant	that	they	would	not	accept	an	outsider	forced	on	them	by	the	central	
executive	and	would	gladly	elect	an	independent	candidate	instead,	as	had	occurred	
in	 1919	when	 Percy	 Brookfield	won	 the	 Legislative	 Assembly	 seat	 of	 Sturt	 in	 the	
Miners	Federation	stronghold	of	Broken	Hill.	In	mining	towns	almost	all	Labor	Party	














had	 a	 strong	 party	 community.	 In	 1931,	 in	 the	 inner-western	 Sydney	 federal	
electorate	 of	 Reid,	 the	 central	 executive	 disallowed	 the	 pre-selection	 ballot	 for	
“alleged	irregularities”	and	ordered	a	new	ballot.	The	Reid	Electorate	Council,	by	54	
votes	to	19,	opposed	any	further	ballot	and	insisted	on	the	selected	candidate,	C.	A.	
Morgan,	 being	 endorsed	 by	 the	 executive.	 It	 declared	 it	 was	 insisting	 on	 the	





president	 Paddy	 Keller	 was	more	 conciliatory,	 saying	 “I	 belong	 to	 a	 union	 which	
stands	 for	 rank	and	 file	 control”	and	 that	 “the	wishes	of	 the	 rank	and	 file	will	be	




























Despite	 strong	 local	 support	 Willis	 was	 unable	 to	 contest	 the	 seat	 as	 a	 Labor	
candidate	while	the	central	executive	opposed	him.	As	well	as	not	wanting	to	“rat”	










the	 ALP	 both	 influenced,	 and	was	 influenced	 by,	 the	 High	 Court’s	 corresponding	
constitutional	increase	in	power	of	the	Australian	federal	government	at	the	cost	of	

























counterargument	 is	 that	 this	 was	 simply	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 democracy,	 federal	
democracy	rather	than	unitary	democracy,	but	from	the	perspective	of	one	person,	
one	vote	it	was	undemocratic.	Federal	delegates	were	several	steps	removed	from	
the	 rank	 and	 file	 and	 because	 decisions	 were	 made	 by	 the	 combined	 votes	 of	
representatives	from	six	states,	it	was	difficult	for	the	ordinary	members	in	any	one	
state	to	influence	federal	decisions.	For	large,	federally	organised	trade	unions	like	








body	 between	 conferences.55	It	 consisted	 of	 two	 representatives	 elected	 by	 each	




The	 scope	 of	 the	 federal	 executive’s	 power	 to	 intervene	 in	 state	 affairs	was	 first	
tested	in	the	1923	dispute	between	NSW	Labor	parliamentary	leader	James	Dooley	














ALP	 had	 switched	 their	 positions	 within	 a	matter	 of	 months,	 reflecting	 both	 the	
cynicism	of	those	involved	and	the	ambiguous	powers	of	the	federal	bodies.		
	
NSW	Labor	 attitudes	 became	 increasingly	 hostile	 to	 the	 federal	 ALP.	 By	 1926	 J.F.	
O’Reilly,	NSW	representative	on	the	federal	executive,	was	warning	that	body	against	













and	 conference	 should	 have	 the	 extraordinary	 power	 to	 override	 the	


















to	 a	much	hotter	place	 than	Bourke”,	 he	 continued,	 “if	 the	 annual	 conference	at	
Easter	decides	to	lift	the	suspensions	they	can	do	so,	but	they	are	the	only	body	who	
can	 do	 it." 60 	The	 federal	 conference	 held	 strong	 and	 in	 1931	 gave	 the	 federal	






























present	 exists,	 such	 representation	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 party	 membership	 in	 each	




















the	 executive	 council	 members	 from	 other	 states.	 The	 AWU	 executive	 council	
announced	that	 it	considered	“the	maintenance	of	the	federal	authority”	to	be	“a	
basic	principle	from	which	no	deviation	can	be	tolerated”.	State	branch	autonomy	
“would	 be	 fatal	 to	 the	 national	 aspirations	 of	 the	 ALP,	 and	 would	 dissolve	 our	
movement”.68	Prime	Minister	 James	Scullin,	 a	 former	AWU	organiser,	praised	 the	
decision	as	“consistent	with	the	traditions	of	the	union”.	"I	expected	that	decision”,	















to	socialise	 industry.	Socialisation	 is	a	federal	matter,	and	 impossible	for	the	state	
alone.	The	first	step	to	socialisation	in	Australia,	by	constitutional	means	must	be	the	
nationalisation	of	the	banking	system,	and	control	of	the	credits	of	the	nation”.70	But	
as	 we	 saw	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 retained	 strong	 local	
autonomy	 for	 lodges	 and	 districts,	 so	 the	 opposition	 of	 Willis	 and	 the	 Miners	




The	 increase	 in	 local	 autonomy	 of	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 against	 the	 federal	 ALP	
occurred	alongside	a	decline	in	local	autonomy	within	the	NSW	party.	In	the	1910s,	
despite	 the	 party’s	 centralised	 constitution,	 the	 leagues	 retained	 significant	
autonomy.	 Following	 the	 money	 is	 usually	 instructive,	 and	 of	 each	 member’s	
sixpence	 membership	 fee,	 4d	 went	 to	 the	 local	 branch	 and	 2d	 to	 the	 central	
executive.71	This	reflected	the	fact	that	election	campaigns	were	organised	largely	at	




From	 the	 1890s	 onwards,	 controlling	 factions	 had	 deliberately	 failed	 to	 address	
certain	matters	at	the	annual	conference	so	that	the	central	executive	could	decide	









greatly	 expanded	 executive	 powers	 which	 culminated	 in	 1923	 when	 the	 central	
executive	 expelled	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 parliamentary	 leader,	 Dooley,	 elected	 his	





1925	 NSW	 election	 and	 then	 following	 the	 election,	 the	 executive	 cancelled	 the	
annual	conference	altogether	saying	the	party	needed	to	save	its	funds	for	the	next	
federal	 election.73	The	opposing	 conservative	 faction	 argued	 that	 the	 cancellation	
occured	 because	 the	 ruling	 militant	 faction	 feared	 it	 would	 lose	 control	 of	 the	
conference	and	the	new	executive.		
	
In	 the	 executive’s	 annual	 report	 for	 1925	 it	 noted	 that	 "the	 executive	 takes	 this	
opportunity	of	refuting	the	contention	that	it	had	something	to	gain	by	not	calling	a	
conference"	but	this	was	a	weak	argument	given	that	it	had	effectively	doubled	its	




country,	 but	 it	was	 nevertheless	 true.	 The	 episode	 highlighted	 the	 tension	 in	 the	
party	 rules	which	made	the	annual	conference	supreme	but	also	gave	the	central	




From	 the	mid-1920s	 there	were	 also	 ongoing	 disputes	within	 the	 party	 over	 the	
central	 executive’s	 control	 over	 who	 leagues	 and	 unions	 could	 select	 as	 annual	













with	 Communism	 and	 argue	 that	 the	 party	 was	 secretly	 “red”.	 In	 1925	 a	 SMH	
editorial	noted	that	in	the	US	there	was	a	“much	keener	appreciation”	of	the	danger	
posed	 by	 Communism	 and	 cited	 approvingly	 that	 “active	 membership	 of	
Communistic	organisations	 is	 in	California	an	offence	punishable	by	 long	 terms	of	
imprisonment”. 77 	Communism	 was	 electoral	 poison	 and	 most	 Labor	 officials	





unions	 could	 elect	 to	 represent	 them	 at	 annual	 conference	 or	 on	 the	 central	
executive	 amounted	 to	 turning	 the	 party’s	 democracy	 on	 its	 head.79	In	 1928,	 for	




certain	 people	 as	 delegates.	 Such	 action	 is	more	 problematic	 from	 a	 democratic	






































added	weight	 to	 the	 rebel	unions’	descriptions	of	 the	 Inner	Group	as	 increasingly	




























at	 one	 of	 the	 combatants.	 C.	 S.	Matthews,	 chairman	 of	 the	 disputes	 committee,	




At	 a	 Glebe	 branch	meeting	 he	 was	 literally	 shoved	 out	 of	 the	 chair	 and	 left	 the	























members	 that	 they	 “should	 not	 withdraw”	 from	 Lang	 Labor	 branches	 “until	 the	












the	 central	 executive	 increased	 its	 own	 power	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 membership-
decision	making,	but	some	branch	communities	were	strong	enough	to	resist.	The	
NSW	Labor	Party	itself	was	also	strong	enough	to	successfully	resist	domination	by	


















speech,	 corruption	 and	 violence.	 The	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 became	 increasingly	
undemocratic	under	Lang	and	by	the	mid-1930s	it	was	a	closed	and	corrupt	oligarchy.	
















as	 the	 Labor	Daily	and	Australian	Worker	were	 increasingly	 biased	 and	 closed	 to	











and	 the	 Inner	 Group	 in	 the	 mid-1930s.	 The	 Inner	 Group	 also	 used	 violence	 and	











elected	 individual	 rather	 than	 the	 party,	 so	 even	when	 the	 annual	 conference	 or	
central	executive	expelled	a	politician,	 the	 rebel	kept	his	place	 in	parliament.	The	
politicians	also	tended	to	be	more	well-known	and	charismatic	than	members	of	the	































powers	 as	 he	 deems	 necessary”.	 But	 Lang	 was	 still	 answerable	 to	 the	 central	
executive	and	annual	 conference.	 So	 from	1926	 to	 around	1934	a	more	accurate	
(though	less	elegant)	name	would	be	the	“annual	conference	and	central	executive	
dictatorship”,	or	simply	“extra-parliamentary	control”,	which	is	what	the	party	was	
supposed	 to	be	all	 along.	The	“Lang	dictatorship”	enhanced	 labour	democracy	by	
enabling	effective	extra-parliamentary	control	for	the	first	time	in	the	party’s	history.	






made	their	control	 illusory,	 so	 from	then	onwards	 the	 term	“Lang	dictatorship”	 is	
more	appropriate.	
	
The	party	privileged	 the	view	of	politicians	as	delegates	 rather	 than	 trustees.	As	 I	
argued	in	the	thesis	introduction,	the	delegate	view	is	more	democratic	as	it	implies	
that	the	members	have	more	direct	control	over	decisions.	Lang	was	very	popular	
with	 the	 union	 leaders	 and	 party	 members,	 but	 his	 poor	 treatment	 of	 his	
parliamentary	colleagues	had	seen	deputy	leader	Peter	Loughlin	go	within	one	vote	





Labor	politicians	was	 clear.	 John	Kilburn	 said	he	 “would	 sooner	be	 a	 captain	of	 a	
regiment	of	workers	than	a	performer	in	the	parliamentary	circus”.	“Again	and	again	
the	workers	have	been	betrayed	politically	and	 industrially”,	he	concluded.	3	Ossie	





















We	 can	 safely	 assume	 that	 a	 majority	 of	 the	 politicians	 opposed	 the	 “Lang	
dictatorship”;	only	half	had	even	voted	for	Lang	in	the	recent	leadership	ballot.	But	
the	politicians	understood	Lang’s	popularity	and	felt	the	mood	in	the	party;	they	did	
not	dare	 to	protest	 for	 fear	of	expulsion	or	dis-endorsement	at	 the	next	election.	
Three	years	 later	at	the	1929	Annual	Conference	Lang	was	able	to	claim	that	“the	
parliamentary	section	is	working	in	perfect	harmony	with	the	executive,	and	perfect	
amity	 pervades	 the	 party”. 5 	Geoffrey	 Robinson	 argued	 that	 the	 second	 Lang	
government	 (1930-32)	 was	 “the	 most	 radical	 government	 in	 Australian	 history”	
because	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 “a	 group	 of	 radical	 unionists	who	 expounded	 a	 class	
struggle	 ideology”.6	This	 governance	 by	 Lang	 and	 the	 leading	 unionists	 was	 only	
possible	because	the	politicians	had	been	tamed.	
	


























question.	As	 I	 discussed	 in	 the	 thesis	 introduction,	 it	 is	 debatable	which	model	 is	
more	democratic	and	it	depends	on	an	individual’s	subjective	view	of	democracy	and,	


















further	 discussion	 of	 the	merits	 of	 the	 case”	 until	 then.	 AWU	 factioneer	 George	












































































letters	 criticising	 Lang.	 In	 1924	 the	Goulburn	 eight	 hour	 committee	wrote	 to	 the	
















































worse	 after	Willis	 lost	 control	 of	 the	newspaper	 to	 the	 Inner	Group	 in	 1932.	 The	
following	year	he	criticised	the	Labor	Daily’s	“refusal	to	print	one	word	of	criticism	or	





interjected:	 “did	 you	 not	 work	 against	Mr	 Lang	 and	 support	 an	 opponent	 in	 his	
electorate	[in	a	preselection	ballot	four	years	earlier]”?	Davis	admitted	that	he	had,	
but	said	it	was	a	mistake	and	that	Lang	had	“proved	to	be	the	best	leader	NSW	has	
ever	 seen”.32	This	exchange	demonstrates	 the	extent	 to	which	opposition	 to	Lang	






[Lang]	 and	 had	 plotted	 to	 bring	 about	 his	 downfall	 from	 the	 position	 of	 leader”.	






then	 drove	 to	 various	 local	 rallies	 but	Macpherson	managed	 to	 evade	 them	 and	











and	 arguing	 that	 they	 should	 not	 have	 been	 expelled.	 Mr	 T.	 Falkingham	 of	 the	












the	policy	 of	 the	Communist	 Party”.38	Exactly	what	 constituted	 the	 “policy	 of	 the	
Communist	Party”	was	unclear	and	this	prohibition	gave	the	NSW	central	executive	
free	rein	to	redbait	against	opponents.	By	1938	the	Australian	Worker	claimed	that	






















page	 showed	 Lang	 speaking	 on	 a	 podium	 draped	 in	 the	 Australian	 flag	 with	 the	
headline:	“No	war	of	plunder”.	That	edition’s	editorial	was	titled	“A	war	of	plunder”	
and	 reiterated	 Lang’s	 isolationist	 stance	 against	 Australian	 involvement	 in	 a	
European	war	against	fascist	states.43		
	
The	 Labor	 Daily	 did	 not	 have	 a	 monopoly	 on	 communication	 with	 Labor	 Party	
members	 who	 could	 get	 party	 news	 from	 rival	 labour	 newspapers,	 such	 as	 the	
Australian	Worker,	 from	 the	NSW	Labor	Council’s	 radio	 station	2KY	and	 from	 the	
commercial	media.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 was	 probably	 the	most	 trusted	
source	of	party	news	for	most	party	members	and	it	did	enjoy	a	monopoly	over	some	
party	 information.	For	example,	 in	1928	the	central	executive	voted	that	only	 the	
Labor	Daily	could	attend	and	report	on	central	executive	meetings.44	It	is	difficult	to	
assess	the	capacity	of	the	Labor	Daily	to	influence	party	members’	opinions,	but	the	
























In	 1936	 the	 courts	 blocked	 an	 attempt	 by	 the	 Inner	 Group	 to	 dilute	 the	 unions’	
shareholdings	 in	the	Labor	Daily.48	To	cement	his	control	Lang	had	personally	 lent	
the	 Labor	 Daily	 £13,764.	 He	 attempted	 the	 same	 tactic	 with	 2KY	 by	 lending	 the	
station	£1000	but	the	Labor	Council	quashed	the	scheme.49	When	it	appeared	that	
the	 Inner	 Group	 would	 lose	 control	 of	 the	 Labor	 Daily	 to	 the	 Industrialist	 union	
coalition	in	1938,	Lang	tried	to	retain	control	by	calling	in	the	debt.	The	dispute	came	
to	a	head	at	the	shareholders’	meeting	on	2	February	1938.	The	Australian	Worker	












waiting,	 after	months	 of	 interminable	 and	wasteful	 litigation	 imposed	 on	 us,	 the	
Labor	 Daily	 is	 back	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 directors	 and	 the	 trade	 unions”,	 it	







































































that	 in	 Lambert’s	West	 Sydney	 pre-selection	 ballot,	 eight	 cars	 had	 been	 used	 to	
transport	a	team	of	men	to	vote	in	multiple	booths	using	fake	union	tickets.	None	of	
these	claims	were	ever	proven.	Lambert	replied	that	Catts’	speech	had	been	a	“long	
and	dreary	compilation	of	 incorrect	allegations”	 that	 relied	on	the	“statements	of	
self-confessed	criminals”	and	“unscrupulous	persons”.58	
	













opened,	and	ballot	papers	 to	be	 removed	and	altered	or	 replaced.59	A	committee	
appointed	by	the	1923	NSW	Labor	Party	Annual	Conference	to	investigate	the	ballot	
box	 scandal,	 and	 consisting	 entirely	 of	 the	 AWU	 faction’s	 enemies,	 found	 that	
Alderman	 R.	 Bramston,	 Australian	 Railways	 Union	 NSW	 branch	 Secretary	 Arthur	
Buckley	 and	 AWU	 officials	 Gavin	 Sutherland	 and	 Bailey	 were	 responsible	 for	 the	
creation	of	 the	 fraudulent	ballot	boxes.	The	executive	 immediately	expelled	 them	
from	 the	 Labor	 Party.	 Over	 the	 following	 years	 various	 labour	 organisations	 and	








Figure	 31	 The	 Labor	 Daily	 depicted	 a	 wolf	 named	 “Baileyism”	 in	 a	 den	 built	 of	
“intrigue”,	“corruption”,	“league	packing”,	“sliding	panels”,	“union	dictatorship”,	and	
“malice”.60	










number	 and	 detail	 of	 the	 accusations	 against	 the	 AWU	 faction	 leaders	 most	
historians	have	been	satisfied	that	they	were	the	chief	source	of	corruption.	With	so	







party	 in	 the	 interwar	period.	A	perverse	kind	of	natural	 selection	had	occurred	 in	
which	 most	 of	 those	 who	 had	 survived	 as	 pre-selected	 candidates	 or	 central	
executive	members	had	probably	needed	to	engage	in	some	degree	of	rule	bending.	
There	were,	however,	 some	genuine	attempts	 to	clean	up	 the	party.	The	militant	
faction	tried	to	reduce	ballot	fraud	by	introducing	a	rule	that	union	members	must	
sign	a	branch	roll	book	before	voting	in	pre-selections.	But	there	were	exceptions	for	
remote	 workers	 in	 the	 AWU,	 Miners	 Federation	 and	 ARU	 and	 the	 signatures	 of	
uninterested	or	fictional	union	members	were	easily	forged.61	The	ongoing	extent	of	
the	ballot	problem	was	highlighted	in	the	absurd	cases	where	more	“votes”	were	cast	
for	a	 Labor	 candidate	 in	 the	pre-selection	ballot	 than	 in	 the	general	election	 that	
followed.62	
	
As	 the	 Inner	 Group	 lost	 support	 amongst	 the	 trade	 unions	 in	 the	 mid-1930s	 it	
increasingly	 resorted	 to	 ballot	 manipulation.	 The	 Inner	 Group	 achieved	 this	
efficiently	 through	 the	 appointment	 of	 a	 central	 returning	 officer	 who	 took	 full	
control	of	all	party	ballots.	Local	counting	was	abolished	and	all	ballot	boxes	opened	



















as	 the	 Inner	 Group	 suggests,	 are	 not	 the	 votes	 counted	 by	 the	 local	 ALP	
officials	as	soon	as	the	poll	closes,	a	record	of	the	voting	made,	then	the	boxes	






fakers	 and	 rule	 jugglers	 are	 in	 control”.66	In	 1936	 an	 Industrialist	 conference	 had	
passed	 a	motion	 that	 unions	 and	 leagues	 should	 count	 their	 own	 ballots	 before	
sending	them	to	party	headquarters.67	This	proposed	reform	would	have	eliminated	





always	 been	 used	 during	 strikes.	 Some	 union	 leaders	 also	 employed	 hired	 thugs	
within	their	unions;	dissident	AWU	meetings	were	often	broken	up	violently,	but	of	
course	 the	 officials	 denied	 any	 responsibility. 68 	The	 AWU	 leaders	 probably	 used	


































its	whole	 content	 the	 Easter	Conference	of	 the	 Inner	Group	 revealed	 the	drift	 to	
fascist	policy	and	outlook	while	outside	the	doors	the	basher	gang	did	its	work”.	The	
SMH	was	not	surprised	by	the	bashings:	“the	dominating	idea	of	Langism	is	to	ride	
























Was	 Lang	 the	 dictator	 of	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party?	 In	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 1930s,	
perhaps.	He	certainly	dominated	the	party	to	an	extent	not	seen	before	or	since.	This	





party.	 Even	 then	 a	 growing	 Industrialist	 coalition	 resisted	 the	 Inner	 Group	 and	
defeated	 it	 in	 1939.	 The	 unions	 retained	 their	 independence	 and	 provided	 the	
organisation	and	impetus	to	resist	Lang	successfully.	The	Inner	Group	did	not	have	a	















large	 Industrialist	 section	 of	 the	 party,	 which	 included	 most	 of	 the	 trade	 union	
leaders,	was	in	open	rebellion	against	Lang	and	the	Inner	Group.	The	Industrialists	
ran	candidates	against	Lang	Labor	candidates	 in	six	seats	under	the	slogan	“Labor	
without	 Lang”.2	On	26	March	1938	 the	people	of	NSW	overwhelmingly	 re-elected	





Lang’s	post-1930	election	defeats	 together	and	explaining	his	 lack	of	 success	as	a	
result	 of	 his	 personal	 unpopularity	 with	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 electorate,	 party	
infighting,	“red”	scare	campaigns	by	conservatives	and	general	voter	doubts	about	
Labor’s	 ability	 to	 manage	 the	 economy.	 Don	 Rawson	 does	 not	 discuss	 the	 1938	






















In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 1937	 the	 NSW	 Labor	 Party	 central	 executive	 expelled	 leading	
Industrialist	members	of	 the	NSW	Legislative	Assembly	 (MLAs)	R.J.	 (Bob)	Heffron,	
Carlo	 Lazzarini,	Mat	Davidson	 and	 Ted	Horsington	 for	 their	 involvement	with	 the	
Industrialists.	 When	 branches	 in	 Heffron’s	 Botany	 electorate	 and	 Lazzarini’s	
Marrickville	 electorate	 refused	 to	 recognise	 the	 expulsions,	 the	 central	 executive	
expelled	the	branches	and	formed	“loyalist”	replacement	branches.5	The	Australian	
Labor	 Party	 (ALP)	 federal	 executive	 then	 ordered	 the	 NSW	 central	 executive	 to	





























Heffron	 and	 Lazzarini	 lost	 their	 pre-selection	 ballots	 because	 the	 branches	which	
contained	their	strongest	supporters	remained	expelled.	At	Broken	Hill	the	Barrier	
District	Assembly	rejected	the	central	executive’s	instructions	to	send	the	unopened	
ballot	 boxes	 to	 Sydney	 for	 counting	 and	 declared	 Davidson	 and	 Horsington	
selected.11	The	 central	 executive	 did	 not	 press	 the	 issue.	 Broken	Hill	was	 able	 to	
assert	its	local	autonomy	because	its	local	party	community	was	so	strong	that	the	
central	executive	knew	it	could	not	overrule	it.	Both	Davidson	and	Horsington	were	




Herald	 (SMH)	 had	 begun	 its	 campaign	 against	 Labor.	 “However	 deafening	 the	
oratorical	 artillery	 from	 the	 Left”,	 it	 editorialised,	 “the	 people	 are	 unlikely	 to	 be	
rendered	 insensible	 to	 the	promptings	of	memory”.	 The	editorial	 continued,	 “the	
Scullin	[federal	1929	to	1932]	and	Lang	[NSW	1930	to	1932]	administrations,	both,	in	
a	 sense,	 victims	 of	 external	 misfortune,	 accentuated	 the	 evils	 of	 the	 recent	




















suffered	 so	many	 reverses	 lately	 that	 its	 former	policy	of	 swift	 reprisals	has	been	
abandoned	in	favour	of	peace	at	all	costs”.15	This	is	an	example	of	the	complex	effects	
that	 internal	 opposition	 can	 have	 within	 a	 party,	 ranging	 from	 repression	 to	
toleration	 to	 leadership	 renewal.	 At	 first,	 the	 Inner	 Group	 responded	 to	 internal	
opposition	with	 repression.	 But	 when	 this	 was	 unsuccessful	 they	 were	 forced	 to	
tolerate,	or	at	least	ignore,	the	opposition	which	eventually	defeated	them.	
	
This	 Inner	 Group	 toleration	 for	 internal	 opposition	 still	 had	 limits,	 however.	 In	
December	 1937	 the	 Industrialists	 ran	 candidates	 against	 NSW	 Labor	 in	 the	
Paddington	municipal	elections	and	the	central	executive	summoned	the	assistant	
secretary	of	the	Clerks	Union,	Jack	Hughes,	to	attend	the	disciplinary	committee.	The	
disciplinary	committee	was	one	of	 the	ways	 that	 the	 Inner	Group	had	condensed	
central	 executive	 authority	 into	 an	 ever	 smaller	 group	 of	 its	 leading	 men.	 The	






Also	 in	 November	 1937,	 Lang	 used	 parliamentary	 privilege	 to	 make	 sensational	
corruption	charges	against	the	government.17	He	claimed	the	government	had	sold	
assets	in	state	pipe	works,	brick	works	and	metal	quarries	under	value	and	that	senior	
ministers	 and	 public	 servants	 had	 been	 paid	 hush	money	 and	 kickbacks.	 Stevens	
denied	 any	 government	 wrongdoing	 and	 appointed	 a	 Royal	 Commission	 to	











and	 recommended	 that	 unions	 stop	 paying	 affiliation	 fees	 to	 the	 party.18	Unions	
provided	the	bulk	of	party	funds	and	by	threatening	to	withdraw	funds,	a	small	group	
of	top	leaders	in	a	large	union	could	wield	significant	influence	over	the	party.	These	
officials	 would	 not	 necessarily	 reflect	 the	 views	 of	 their	 members,	 let	 alone	 the	
remainder	 of	 the	 party	 rank	 and	 file,	 and	 could	 potentially	 wield	 undemocratic	
influence.	In	January	1938	the	Industrialists	met	in	conference.	About	400	delegates	
attended,	representing	46	unions	and	62	local	branches.	The	Industrialists	and	media	


































March	 eight	 aggregate	 meetings	 took	 place	 on	 the	 northern	 coalfields	 and	 six	
adopted	 resolutions	 critical	 of	 the	 Inner	 Group	 and	 calling	 for	 federal	 ALP	
intervention.23	Plugger	Martin	spoke	at	the	Cessnock	meeting	where	his	criticisms	of	










minimum	wage	 of	 £4/2/6.	 Vague	 additional	 promises	 included	 cracking	 down	 on	
monopolies,	 fair	 rents	 and	 prices	 and	 full-time	 work	 for	 all.	 In	 rural	 NSW	 Lang	




with	 their	 claim	to	simply	be	“Labor	without	Lang”,	 the	 Industrialists	did	not	vary	




















from	 Redfern	 wrote	 that	 “any	 person	 with	 even	 an	 elementary	 knowledge	 of	












would	 bring	 its	 internal	 conflict	 into	 government.	 Stevens	 said	 “two	 groups	 of	
political	opportunists	are	struggling	for	mastery	of	the	Labor	machine”	and	that	this	
“strife	means	that	the	Labor	Party	is	totally	unfitted	to	govern”.33	Conservatives	also	












democracy	 in	 the	 state.	 The	SMH	 editorialised	 that	 “the	 [Stevens]	 government	 is	
standing	for	our	traditional	freedom	of	democracy	against	the	particularly	rabid	form	
of	 internal	 fascism	 into	 which	 the	 state	 Labor	 Party	 has	 degenerated	 under	 the	
ruthless	rule	of	Langism”.34	These	claims	of	a	potential	descent	 into	fascism	under	
Labor	were	bolstered	by	the	context	of	European	totalitarianism.	Communists	had	
entrenched	their	 rule	 in	 the	Soviet	Union,	 fascists	were	 in	power	 in	Germany	and	






space	 of	 one	 issue	 became	 equally	 anti-Lang.	 There	 was	 no	 space	 for	 dissenting	
views.	William	Young	of	Redfern	wrote	to	the	SMH	saying	“strong	appeals	are	being	






Lang’s	 desperate	 attempt	 to	maintain	 control	 of	 the	 Labor	 Daily	by	 calling	 in	 his	
personal	debt	was	politically	disastrous.	The	man	who	had	built	his	public	persona	
on	fighting	against	wealthy	elites	and	money	lenders	had	called	in	the	bailiffs	on	his	



























judgement	 in	 the	 Royal	 Commission	 into	 the	 sale	 of	 state	 assets,	 finding	 Lang’s	







also	 linked	 the	episode	back	 to	 Lang’s	 contempt	 for	 democracy.	 Lang’s	 “shocking	
































the	 Labor	 Party	 advised	 supporters	 to	 give	 second	 preferences	 to	 a	 non-labour	





NSW	 election	 Lang’s	 speech	 was	 broadcast	 outside	 the	 venue	 by	 “amplifiers	 of	












with	 you”	 and	 a	 chant	 of	 “good	 old	 Jack”.51	At	 the	 end	 of	 the	meeting	 Baddeley	
proposed	a	motion	of	“complete	confidence”	in	Lang.	One	brave	individual	dissented	
and	was	 rewarded	with	shouts	of	abuse	 from	others	 in	attendance.	On	18	March	
Lang	spoke	to	a	crowd	of	1,000	 in	Heffron’s	electorate	of	Botany	and	received	an	
equally	positive	response	as	he	had	in	Auburn.52	Lang	spent	little	time	campaigning	




carried	 resolutions	 expressing	 "the	 fullest	 confidence"	 in	 Lang	 and	 the	 central	
executive.54 	Others	 such	 as	 Corrimal	 in	 northern	 Wollongong	 rejected	 Lang	 and	
reformed	as	a	branch	of	the	Industrialists.55	In	the	northern	coalfields	a	meeting	of	
Abermain	number	one	miners'	lodge	pledged	to	support	the	Industrialist	candidate	









politics	 as	 in	 these	 19	 seats	 party	 pre-selections	 essentially	 took	 the	place	of	 the	
general	 election.	 The	 Stevens	 UAP/Country	 Party	 government	 won	 the	 election	
easily.	Labor	received	just	35	per	cent	of	the	vote	and	28	out	of	90	seats,	only	winning	


























Labor	 candidate	 W.J.	 Carlton	 narrowly	 beat	 the	 Industrialist	 H.J.	 Foley	 after	
preferences	 by	 6,573	 to	 5,617,	 with	 1,881	 votes	 going	 to	 an	 independent.	 In	
Leichhardt	 Lang	 Labor’s	 C.H.	Matthew,	 9,127,	 easily	 defeated	 the	 Industrialist	 JP	




































local	 autonomy	 from	 the	 party	 allowed	 union	 leaders	 to	 form	 an	 independently	







































oligarchical	 and	 the	 AWU	 from	 clearly	 oligarchical	 to	 highly	 oligarchical.	 Both	
organisations	 fit	 with	 the	 sociological	 consensus	 that	most	 ostensibly	 democratic	
parties	and	unions	will	be	oligarchies	and	become	more	oligarchical	over	time.	The	




assessing	 each	 organisation’s	 community,	 rules,	 local	 autonomy,	 rank-and-file	
decision-making,	 internal	 opposition,	 free	 communication	 and	 equality	 between	
officials	and	members.	Furthermore,	oligarchy	within	both	organisations	was	widely	
resisted;	 impulses	 towards	 democracy	were	 always	 operating	 in	 some	 form	 even	
when	the	organisations	were	at	their	least	democratic.	
	
At	 the	 opposite	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 was	 a	 democratic	
exception	 to	 the	 oligarchic	 norm.	 Here	 too	 the	 conflicting	 tendencies	 towards	
oligarchy	and	democracy	played	out,	but	democracy	won	 for	various	complicated	
reasons	 centred	 on	 the	miners’	work	 and	 occupational	 communities.	 Even	 in	 the	
Miners	Federation,	however,	Michels’	observations	were	relevant	as	voting	turnout	
suggests	 that	 around	 a	 quarter	 of	 members	 were	 disengaged	 and	 there	 was	
significant	deference	to	leaders	from	Albert	Willis	to	Bill	Orr.	The	Miners	Federation	




the	 picture.	 Usually	 the	 effects	 were	 straightforward	 with	 methods	 and	 cultures	










Organisations	within	 the	 interwar	NSW	 labour	movement	 influenced	one	another	
greatly.	Trade	unions	influenced	one	another	within	the	Labor	Party,	peak	bodies	and	
the	industrial	sphere	and	also	formed	the	most	influential	building	blocks	of	the	Labor	
Party.	 In	turn,	 the	Labor	Party	 influenced	the	unions	by	enhancing	the	power	and	









Affiliation	 with	 the	 Labor	 Party	 increased	 the	 status	 gap	 between	members	 and	
officials	 in	 the	AWU	and	Miners	Federation	and	encouraged	officials	 to	behave	 in	
oligarchical	ways.	Union	officials	often	became	Labor	Party	officials	and/or	politicians	
which	amplified	their	power,	fame	and	status.	This,	in	turn,	made	union	officials	more	
desperate	 to	keep	 their	union	positions	and	 therefore	more	motivated	 to	behave	
undemocratically.	Political	affiliation	also	meant	that	many	union	officials	were	less	
concerned	with	winning	improvements	for	their	members	and	more	concerned	with	
maintaining	 their	 union	 as	 a	 large,	 stable	 power	 base.	 In	 the	 democratic	Miners	
Federation	 membership	 pressure	 forced	 the	 leaders	 to	 focus	 on	 wages	 and	
conditions	 in	 order	 to	 keep	 their	 union	 positions	 but	 this	 pressure	 was	 less	
pronounced	in	the	AWU.	Even	in	the	Miners	Federation,	however,	in	the	mid-1920s	
Albert	Willis	 and	 Jack	 Baddeley	 led	 the	 union	 to	 ally	 closely	 with	 Jack	 Lang	 and	








Both	 the	 AWU	 and	 Miners	 Federation	 successfully	 pursued	 various	 forms	 of	
compulsory	unionism.	I	have	argued	that	this	undermined	democracy	by	creating	a	
significant	 minority	 of	 uninterested	 and	 even	 hostile	 members. 2 	Labor	 Party	
affiliation	further	exacerbated	this	problem	as	the	party	required	all	members	to	join	
their	 trade	 union.	 Neither	 the	 arbitration	 courts	 nor	 the	 Labor	 Party	 considered	
leaving	one’s	union	to	be	a	valid	expression	of	dissent,	even	when	it	was	the	only	
option	remaining	to	members	of	oligarchical	unions	like	the	AWU.3	This	was	only	one	
of	many	ways	 in	which	 arbitration	 undermined	 democracy	 in	 both	 the	AWU	and	
Miners	 Federation,	 but	 the	 effects	 were	 less	 pronounced	 in	 the	 latter,	 which	
maintained	a	more	contested	relationship	with	arbitration	and	continued	to	strike.	
	
Unions	 could	 also	 use	 their	 power	 within	 the	 Labor	 Party	 to	 attempt	 to	 silence	
dissenters.	For	example,	in	1930	the	AWU	tried	to	have	the	NSW	Labor	Party	Central	
Executive	withdraw	Arthur	Rae’s	endorsement	as	a	Senate	candidate	because	he	was	



























such	 as	 the	 Railway	Workers	 Industry	 Branch	 Rank	 and	 File	 Committee	 in	 1928.7	




Union	 (PWIU).8	In	 1934	 the	 controlling	 Lang	 faction	 in	 the	 Labor	 Party	 even	 ran	
candidates	in	Miners	Federation	elections	in	an	attempt	to	displace	the	Communist	
leadership.	 The	 attempt	 was	 unsuccessful	 but	 it	 still	 enhanced	 democracy	 by	





The	Miners	Federation	especially	brought	 its	strong	democratic	 lodge	culture	 into	
Labor	 Party	 branches	 in	mining	 areas.10	Dissident	 democratic	 activists	 within	 the	

















his	 repeated	personal	 success	within	 the	democratic	Miners	 Federation.12	On	 the	
other	hand,	the	AWU	leaders	transposed	their	oligarchical	methods	into	the	Labor	













democratically	 organised	 local	 branches	 could	 not	 match.	 Union	 strength,	 most	
obviously	the	Miners	Federation	in	the	coalfields,	also	allowed	the	party	rank	and	file	
to	 assert	 local	 autonomy	 and	 successfully	 resist	 the	 party	 executive	 in	 some	
electorates.14	
	
Each	union	entered	 the	party	 as	 a	 ready-made	quasi-faction	 and	 this	 could	 allow	




















Democratic	 impulses	 and	 countervailing	 tendencies	 against	 oligarchy	 were	
constantly	operating	to	varying	degrees	within	the	AWU,	Miners	Federation	and	NSW	




MM	 built	 up	 a	 strong	 critique	 of	 the	 Miners	 Federation	 leaders	 and	 eventually	




This	 was	 apparent	 to	 varying	 degrees	 for	most	Miners	 Federation	 leaders,	many	
Labor	Party	 leaders	and	even	some	leaders	 in	the	AWU	like	Rae	and	Cullinan.	The	
most	 important	 countervailing	 tendency,	 however,	 is	 membership	 pressure	 from	
below.	Even	in	the	oligarchical	AWU	the	leaders	needed	to	pay	some	attention	to	
membership	 opinion.	 In	 all	 three	 organisations,	 oligarchy	 was	 weakest	 where	
ordinary	 members	 lived	 and	 worked	 in	 strong	 communities.	 	 Almost	 all	 Miners	
Federation	members	 lived	 and	worked	 in	 such	 an	 environment	 and	 this	was	 the	
primary	 reason	 for	 the	 union’s	 high	 levels	 of	 democracy.	 Members	 successfully	
resisted	leaders	on	many	issues	from	work-sharing	to	local	stoppages	to	large-scale	




























Oligarchy	 is	 the	 norm	 within	 ostensibly	 democratic	 organisations	 including	 trade	
unions	and	political	parties.	 It	may	not	be	quite	 the	 iron	 law	 that	Robert	Michels	
claimed,	 but	 it	 is	 certainly	 a	 strong	 tendency.	 The	 three	 NSW	 labour	 movement	
organisations	studied	in	this	thesis	add	further	support	to	this	scholarly	consensus.	
The	 tendency	 to	 oligarchy	 is	 evident	 throughout	 but	 so	 is	 the	 potential	 to	 resist	
oligarchy	 even	 within	 the	 most	 undemocratic	 organisations	 like	 the	 AWU.	 Also	













democracy	 in	both	the	unions	and	the	party.	This	 is	actually	a	positive	 finding	 for	
labour	parties	because	it	contradicts	the	argument	made	by	some	both	within	and	
outside	 the	 labour	 movement	 that	 union	 affiliation	 has	 inherently	 undemocratic	
effects. 21 	Furthermore,	 much	 of	 the	 anti-democratic	 influence	 of	 unions	 on	 the	
interwar	NSW	Labor	Party	came	as	a	result	of	a	lack	of	democracy	within	the	unions	
themselves	rather	than	because	of	structural	effects	of	affiliation.	Democratic	labour	
parties	 do	 not	 need	 to	 drop	 union	 affiliation	 but	 they	 must	 acknowledge	 the	
tendency	 to	 oligarchy	within	 their	 affiliated	 unions	 and	 take	 a	 greater	 interest	 in	
































































o E154/8	 audited	 balance	 sheets,	 statements	 of	 income	 and	
expenditure,	 revenue	 accounts,	 guarantee	 fund	 and	 journal	 entries	
1919-41	








to	 the	 registrar	 of	 trade	 unions	 being	 membership	 statements,	











o E154/40	 AWU	 NSW	 country	 branches	 annual	 reports	 and	 balance	
sheets	for	Cobar,	Moree,	Inverell,	Bourke,	Wagga	and	Goulburn	1891-
1918	
o E154/41	 AWU	 NSW	 Branch	 annual	 reports	 and	 balance	 sheets	 for	
Central,	RWIB	and	NSW	Branch	1905-1957	



















o E154/40/6	Bourke	Branch	annual	 reports	and	balance	 sheets	1894-
1918	












































































• E165/3	 Conference	 Minutes	 and	 Reports	 of	 annual	 conventions	 and	
combined	meetings	of	Miners	Federation	1913-65	







































































































o Title:	 Reminiscences	 of	 John	 Bailey	 with	 comments	 on	 historical	
events,	1947,	MLDOC	531	
o Title:	A	short	history	of	 the	Shearers'	Union	 in	 the	making,	and	 the	




o George	 Buckland	 papers	 relating	 to	 pastoral	 industry	 unions	 and	






§ Personal	 files,	 being	 mainly	 correspondence	 and	 printed	






R.O'Halloran,	 K.	 O'Malley,	 C.W.	 Oakes,	 J.	 Osborne,	 J.W.	
Percival,	A.B.	Piddington,	W.G.	Spence,	T.	Waddell	
§ File	 re	 John	 Thomas	 Lang	 includes	 correspondence,	 notes,	
drafts	of	articles,	cuttings	etc.,	c.1913-29	
§ 'Full	story	and	documents	with	history	of	the	Industrial	Section	
of	 the	 A.L.P.	 -	 or	 "Billy	 Hughes	 secret	 junta".	 Scrapbook	
compiled	 by	Molesworth,	 including	 his	 typescript	 history	 of	
the	Section	(later	known	as	the	Industrial	Vigilance	Council	of	
the	A.L.P.),	with	rule	books	annual	reports	and	balance	sheet	


























Council	 and	 the	 Political	 Labor	 League;	 includes	 balance	
sheets,	annual	conference	papers	and	Labor	Daily	material	
(Call	No.:	MLMSS	398/1)		
§ 1905-1928;	 Printed	 material	 relating	 to	 the	 Australian	
Workers	Union,	the	Great	Strike	of	1917	and	miscellaneous	








































• Typescript:	 How	 “Reds”	 Captured	 the	 ALP	 Machine	
(1927)	
• LP	NSW	standing	orders	1925	



































o Pamphlet:	 the	 official	 history	 of	 the	
reconstruction	of	the	LP	1916	together	with	the	

























• Many	 relevant	 NSW	 ALP	 reports,	 delegate	 and	
resolution	lists,	selection	ballots	









































































• Statement	 of	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	 LC	 on	 the	 political	
situation	at	the	present	time	1922	




























• Labor	Monthly	 (NSW	Labor	Council	official	newspaper)	 (1926-29,	microfilm	
NLA)	(incorporated	into	Pan-Pacific	Worker	1928-32,	microfilm	NLA)	




• Socialisation	 Call	 (NSW	 Labor	 Party	 Socialisation	 Committee’s	 official	
newspaper)	(Vol.	1,	no.	1	(Apr.	1931)-		Ceased	Apr.	1933,	microfilm	NLA)	
• Sydney	Morning	Herald	(entire	period,	digitised,	searchable)	
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